US embassy cable - 04MADRID4265

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
S/CT 
DS/IP/EUR 
DS/ICI/PII 
DS/DSS/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP, Counterterrorism 
SUBJECT: JAILED ETA LEADERS CALL FOR END TO ARMED STRUGGLE 
 
 
1. (U) Summary.  Six jailed ETA members signed a letter 
addressed to the ETA leadership calling for an end to the 
armed struggle in favor of political action in cooperation 
with leftist parties.  The letter, which was evidently not 
intended for public release but found its way to a regional 
newspaper, was written by high-ranking ETA inmates several 
months before the October arrest of two top ETA leaders in 
France.  The banned ETA front group "Batasuna" suggested the 
letter did not represent the genuine views of jailed ETA 
leaders and there are no indications that ETA or Batasuna 
plan to renounce violence in response to the document. GOS 
authorities and political parties pointed to the letter as an 
indicator of ETA's weakness, but emphasized the need for 
continued vigilance and further police action against ETA. 
End Summary. 
 
//THE LETTER// 
 
2. (U) On 11/2, Spanish newspapers released excerpts of a 
letter to the ETA leadership from six jailed ETA members 
lamenting ETA's disarray and calling for an end to the armed 
struggle. (See unofficial translation of key points in para 
7).  The authors state bluntly that "under the current 
circumstances, the armed struggle is not working," in large 
part because of the highly effective "repression" of ETA at 
the hands of Spanish and French authorities.  Rather than 
maintain ETA's militancy, the inmates recommend replacing the 
use of violence with political collaboration with leftist 
political parties in the Basque Region in pursuit of 
nationalist objectives. 
 
3. (U) The letter, which was written in August and was 
evidently not intended for public release, was signed by 
Inaki Arakama Mendia (Makario), Francisco Mujika Garmendia 
(Pakito), Inaki Bilbao Beaskoetxea, Carlos Almorza Arrieta, 
Kepa Solana Arrondo, and Koldo Aparicio Benito.  The highest 
ranking signer is Garmendia, who formed part of the ETA 
cupula until 1992, when he was arrested along with other key 
ETA leaders in Bidart, France.  Other signers were among the 
second tier of ETA's leadership, including Arrieta, who 
directed ETA's infamous "revolutionary tax" (i.e. - 
extortion) for several years, and Mendia, who led ETA 
operations in Madrid during its most active period in the 
1980's and represented ETA in negotiations with the GOS in 
Algiers in the late 1980s.  Observers noted that the document 
was written even before ETA leaders Mikel Albizu and Soledad 
Iparragirre were arrested in France in early October, arrests 
which themselves led to a further cascade of detentions of 
ETA suspects in Spain. 
 
//THE REACTION// 
 
4. (U) The release of the letter to a small Navarra newspaper 
(it is not clear who provided the copy) was apparently 
intended to further demoralize ETA during one of the worst 
periods in its history.  Minister of the Interior Jose 
Antonio Alonso, though downplaying the possibility of an 
actual halt in ETA's terrorist activities, cited the letter 
as evidence of ETA's weakness.  The ruling Socialist Party 
(PSOE) and the opposition Popular Party (PP) hailed the 
letter as vindication of their decades-long efforts to 
cripple the terrorist organization, though both parties 
echoed Minister Alonso's cautious tone. 
 
5. (U) Reactions were more varied in the Basque Region.  The 
PP spokesman in the Basque Parliament attacked the authors of 
the letter for lacking "any moral reflection" and casting 
their suggestion as merely a "strategic" decision.  Basque 
Minister of Justice Joseba Azkarraga called on ETA's 
political front, the illegal Batasuna party, to heed the 
letter and formally renounce the use of violence.  Basque 
Parliamentarian Arnaldo Otegi, who speaks for Batasuna though 
not technically a representative of the banned organization, 
decried the release of the letter and called on the media to 
"visit ETA's leaders in prison and see what they really 
think."  Batasuna is expected to release its own plan for a 
"solution to the conflict" within the next few weeks, a plan 
that may reportedly include the offer of a negotiated truce, 
but not a renunciation of the armed struggle.  ETA concluded 
a similar truce with Basque nationalist parties and the 
radical left Izquierda Unida (IU) in September 1998, a move 
roundly criticized by both the PSOE and PP as a concession to 
terrorists.  With respect to the ETA letter, IU leader Gaspar 
Llamazares said the time had come for Batasuna to break its 
ties with the "failing" ETA. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
6. (SBU) The ETA letter is a clear indicator of significant 
internal divisions within the leadership of ETA's 
once-formidable terrorist apparatus.  Regardless of whether 
or not the signers expressed contrition for their past 
violence, the fact that hardened leaders of the organization 
recognized the failure of the armed struggle and the 
inevitability of a political (vice military) resolution to 
the Basque Region's status represents a moral victory for the 
Spanish state.  It is also indicative of the more complex 
political climate for ETA within the Basque Region, in which 
the ruling Partido Nacional Vasco (PNV) is siphoning away 
nationalist support from the radicals by advocating ever 
greater autonomy from the central government through legal 
means.  Despite these positive developments, PSOE and PP 
caution is well warranted.  ETA has proven remarkably 
resilient in the past and several key leaders, including the 
notorious Josu Ternera, remain at large. 
 
//TRANSLATION OF KEY POINTS OF LETTER// 
 
7. (U) The full text of the letter is not available, but we 
have tranlated the key elements from the portions released by 
the press: 
 
- "In the history of ETA, we have never found ourselves in 
such poor conditions... Under our current circumstances, the 
armed struggle as we wage it today does not serve its 
purpose." 
 
- "You cannot base an armed struggle on the release of 
communiques and by making threats which cannot be realized. 
(An organization) cannot develop an armed struggle when it is 
so vulnerable to repression." 
 
- "The inability to wage an armed struggle and the 
impossibility of accumulating sufficient force to create the 
conditions for negotiations with the central government 
requires us to reconsider the vanguard strategy we have 
followed until now... The political left believes we have no 
ability to wield decisive influence through the armed 
struggle.  (We) are totally vulnerable to repression and 
without a capacity to react, and this is a reality that must 
be discussed openly, with all the attendant consequences." 
 
 
- "This is not a matter of fixing the car's rear view mirror 
or replacing a flat tire.  What's missing is the engine.  If 
we do not grab the bull by the horns, we may introduce a 
degenerative dynamic that will affect our (ultimate) 
political objectives...We must count on the institutional 
struggle and the mass struggle." 
ARGYROS