US embassy cable - 04ANKARA6257

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, TU 
SUBJECT: NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO ASK TURKEY FOR A PRT 
 
REF: A. USNATO 983 
     B. ANKARA 4485 
     C. ANKARA 2293 
     D. ANKARA 5836 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) We read with interest USNATO's thoughtful piece on 
ISAF Stage Two expansion (ref a).  While we agree that it 
would be beneficial to have a Turkish PRT in Afghanistan, any 
request to the Turks should not be made until after their 
February-August 2005 stint as ISAF VII commander, during 
which fall the Afghan parliamentary elections.  Instead, we 
should focus on getting the Turks to send as robust a 
presence as possible for ISAF VII. 
 
2. (C) The Turks felt burned in the last go-round of PRT 
force generation, and they are perplexed and angered by harsh 
Congressional criticism of their presence in Afghanistan 
given that they have provided the command element for ISAF 
once, are ready to do so again, and also offered a PRT only 
to have it turned down by the Alliance.  They believe that 
they made a good-faith offer to provide a PRT in Takhar (in 
the northeast), and also believe that the U.S., the Afghans, 
SHAPE, ISAF on the ground in Kabul, and the Germans sent them 
many mixed signals on PRT placement (ref c).  They restricted 
their proposal to areas already familiar to the GOT or 
private-sector Turks, and resisted efforts to locate their 
PRT in the Stage Two area.  When we were finally willing to 
accept a Turkish PRT in northern Afghanistan, the Foreign 
Minister had already decided to withdraw the offer.  Our 
attempt to convince the GOT to reconsider failed. 
 
3. (C) The Turks have a large and capable military, but IMF 
requirements and budgetary reforms have placed real limits on 
their ability to pay for deployments such as commanding ISAF 
VII.  The military was only reluctantly convinced to support 
Turkey's pre-Istanbul Summit proposal, and we expect they 
will be again reluctant to make the kind of long-term 
commitment a PRT entails.  Certainly this will be the case at 
least until they have finished with ISAF VII. Depending on 
NATO's needs for ISAF VII, Turkey is prepared to send a Corps 
HQ element, HQ plus one battalion, or HQ plus two battalions 
(ref d).  Given that the elections will occur on their watch, 
encouraging a larger presence seems to us to make sense. 
 
4. (U) Kabul minimize considered. 
EDELMAN