US embassy cable - 04ANKARA6256

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IZ 
SUBJECT: IS TURKEY CONSIDERING MILITARY INTERVENTION IN 
IRAQ? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: According to Turkish press reports, the 
Turkish military is drawing up plans to intervene in northern 
Iraq should the situation in Kirkuk spiral out of control. 
These same reports claim that the USG has given the green 
light for such an intervention.  TGS leadership has publicly 
denied this, and MFA officials claim to be ignorant of any 
such plan.  Such an intervention would be a foreign policy 
disaster with no good consequences for Turkey (much less Iraq 
and the region).  We surmise senior Turks leaked the story to 
the press to underline the depth of their concern that Kurds 
will essentially overrun Kirkuk and use it as the basis for a 
viable independent Kurdish state, which would be viewed here 
as an existential threat to Turkey's own territorial 
integrity.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) The Turkish press has recently reported that the 
Turkish military was drawing up plans for 20,000 troops or 
more to intervene in Iraq if the disorderly flow of Kurdish 
IDPs into Kirkuk continued unabated.  The Oct. 30 edition of 
the newspaper Cumhuriyet quoted an official Turkish source as 
saying that the operation would not take place until after 
Dec. 17, when EU leaders will decide whether to commence 
accession talks with Turkey.  The Turkish military would have 
the dual role of dealing with the Kurds in Kirkuk and with 
PKK/Kongra-Gel terrorists in the Kandil Mountain area. 
Further, the article claimed that the U.S. was prepared to 
give the green light to this intervention.  Presumably as 
evidence for this claim, the article notes recent statements 
by the Ambassador that we share some of Turkey's concerns 
regarding the importance of a peaceful, orderly process to 
redress Saddam's forced emigration from the region.  Finally, 
the story noted that the Turkish National Security Council 
(MGK in Turkish)--a mixed body of the most senior Turkish 
military and civilian leaders--had discussed the military's 
plan at its Oct. 27 meeting.  Later Oct. 30, MFA Spokesman 
Namik Tan denied that Turkey plans to intervene and called on 
the international community and Iraq to cooperate in working 
toward Iraq's territorial integrity and national unity. 
 
3. (U) The Nov. 2 edition of the newspaper Sabah quotes a 
senior diplomatic source as outlining a five-point plan for 
Kirkuk: 
 
--Turkey will wait to see the outcome of January elections in 
Iraq. 
--Turkey will maintain that a referendum on the future of 
Kirkuk would be illegitimate, as it will be unduly influenced 
by the large influx if Kurds to the region. 
--FonMin Gul will seek support for its position from other 
Iraqi neighbors at the Nov. 22-23 Cairo conference. 
--Turkey will monitor the activities of the Iraqi Property 
Claims Commission in Kirkuk. 
--If "undesired developments" occur in Kirkuk, Turkey will 
intervene militarily. 
 
4. (U) At a Nov. 2 press conference, TGS DCHOD General Ilker 
Basbug denied these stories: "At the moment the Turkish Armed 
Forces have no plans for intervention in northern Iraq," he 
said.  Perhaps more importantly, Basbug denied that the U.S. 
had in any way given the green light for such an 
intervention.  However, Basbug noted that Turkey is watching 
developments in Kirkuk quite closely, since conflict there 
could lead to civil war in Iraq, which would in turn directly 
affect Turkish interests. 
 
5. (C) At a small farewell luncheon hosted by the Ambassador 
on Nov. 2 for outgoing MFA Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal--also 
attended by UK Ambassador Westmacott, incoming MFA 
Undersecretary Ali Tuygan, and Deputy Undersecretaries Baki 
Ilkin and Nabi Sensoy)--Westmacott reported that the MGK's 
new civilian Secretary-General, Yigit Alpogan, had told him 
that the MGK had not/not discussed a military plan to 
intervene in Kirkuk at its Oct. 27 meeting.  The senior MFA 
officials present at the luncheon all denied knowledge of any 
such plan.  The Ambassador thanked the officials for MFA 
spokesman Tan's Oct. 30 comments. 
 
6. (C) Comment: The Turkish press is notoriously inaccurate 
about many things, but we wonder if much of this recent, 
disturbing reporting is the result of leaks from some senior 
Turks--either military or civilian--who wanted to emphasize 
the depth of Turkish concern about Kirkuk.  Many Turks fear 
that Kurds will overrun Kirkuk and turn it into the political 
and economic center of an independent Kurdistan.  They would 
view this development as an existential threat.  Of course, a 
Turkish intervention absent both IIG and coalition blessing 
would severely damage Turkey's relationship with Iraq, the 
U.S., the EU, and the entire region; in short, it would be a 
foreign policy disaster and many Turkish officials surely 
recognize that.  Moreover, it is unclear what Turkish forces 
would be expected to do in Kirkuk, assuming they got there; 
throughout the 1990s the Turkish military conducted 
cross-border operations against the PKK and rarely ventured 
further than 10 miles from the border. 
 
7. (C) Comment, cont.: The fact remains that the Turks 
believe their concerns about Kirkuk are falling on deaf ears 
in both Washington and Baghdad.  We need to send a clear 
message--as the Ambassador did with DefMin Gonul on Nov. 
3--that their intervention is not an option but that we and 
the IIG also have concerns about developments in Kirkuk and 
are working to maintain stability there. 
EDELMAN