US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1812

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001812 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE FROM AMBASSADOR LUNSTEAD 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, DRL/IRF 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CE 
SUBJECT: WITH PEACE STUCK UP, WHAT ARE OUR MESSAGES 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead, reason 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) This was written the afternoon of Wednesday, Nov. 2, 
just before we heard about the cancellation of your trip to 
Sri Lanka.  I wanted to send it anyway, first because I 
think you might find it interesting.  Second, and more 
important, because it gives some ideas on a way forward, on 
the messages we want to send to Sri Lankans in an attempt 
to move the peace process along.  Here's what was written 
yesterday. 
 
2.  (C) You will have seen both the scene-setter (Colombo 
1792) and the update on political maneuvering here (Colombo 
1794) which we have sent recently.  Before you arrive, I 
want to give you my personal views on the two key points on 
the peace process here, describe how they will play into 
your visit and suggest an approach that could help push 
things forward. 
 
It's All Local 
-------------- 
 
3.  (C) The first point is that progress on peace is 
largely hostage to domestic politics.  This has two 
aspects.  The first is the personal rivalry between former 
Prime Minister and now Opposition Leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe and President Chandrika Kumaratunga.  This 
is more than just political rivalry--the two have an 
intense personal dislike for each other.  This is 
heightened by Kumaratunga's desire to change the 
Constitution, for its two-term limit on the Presidency 
means her political shelf-life is running out.  Ranil, of 
course, would be happy to see her consigned to political 
oblivion. 
 
4.  (C) In large part because of this rivalry, Ranil's United 
National Party (UNP) has refused to participate in the 
broad-based 
National Advisory Council on Peace (NAC) which Chandrika has 
set up. 
Ranil has offered his party's support once negotiations 
with the LTTE begin.  I have talked with numerous senior 
members of the UNP in the past several weeks--they have all 
told me they thought the UNP should have agreed to 
participate in the NAC.  It is Ranil, and his colleague 
G.L. Peiris, whose distaste for Chandrika is even greater, 
who have blocked this.  I have found that Sri Lankans whom 
I talk to--including strong UNP supporters--disapprove of 
Ranil's decision. 
 
5.  (C) The second aspect is Chandrika's dependence on the 
Janatha Vimukta Peramuna (JVP) party for her coalition's 
survival.  The JVP is a weird amalgam of antedated Marxism 
and Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism.  The important points are 
that the withdrawal of their 39 seats would topple her 
government, and that they are bitterly opposed to real 
concessions to the LTTE. 
 
6. (C) The result is that Chandrika does not feel she has 
the ability to take bold steps to move the peace process 
forward.  She might move forward despite the JVP--if she 
knew that she had the support of the UNP to do so.  Failing 
that, the process is stagnating.  Her National Advisory 
Council is, I believe, her attempt to build that support 
and isolate the JVP.  Ranil understands that and does not 
want to help her out of her political difficulty-even 
though that is the only way peace can move forward. 
 
7.  (C) Ranil and Chandrika both do want to bring peace to 
the country.  One of the differences between them is that 
Ranil has a vision, a strategy and tactics to get there. 
Chandrika has only a vision--strategy and tactics are not 
her forte as she operates impulsively.  Ranil's strategy 
was to build peace on the ground as the negotiations 
proceeded so that the LTTE over time would change in 
reaction to the changing environment and, almost against 
its own will, morph into a political organization.  His 
tactics were to keep going back into negotiations even when 
the Tigers seemed most obdurate and uncooperative. This was 
not a bad plan.  The only problem is that the Sri Lankan 
public decisively rejected Ranil at the last election.  He 
continues to think, and act, as if this were their mistake, 
not his own. 
 
8. (C) Several of my Ambassadorial predecessors here who 
dealt with both Ranil and Chandrika told me one thing: 
never attempt to persuade them to do something by appealing 
to the greater national interest.  It just does not work. I 
have concluded they were absolutely right.  The personal 
rivalry between the two, coupled with the Constitutional 
straight jacket in which Chandrika finds herself, only 
emphasizes this point.  What one can do is appeal to their 
political instincts. 
 
9. (C)  With Chandrika, this means appealing to her sense 
of her destiny as the person to bring peace to Sri Lanka 
(her vision), while bolstering her courage by showing her 
that she will have the support of the international 
community if she moves forward.  (Ranil explicitly looked 
for this, referring to it as his "international safety 
net.")  With Ranil, it means telling him that his actions 
are hurting his own political standing, contributing to his 
own worst nightmare of a strengthened President 
Kumaratunga.  They both need to hear that if they cannot 
move forward with some minimal cooperation, the 
international community will lose interest and they will be 
left to deal with this problem on their own.  Further, our 
constant message has been that the primary US goals in Sri 
Lanka are promoting peace and prosperity because they are 
mutually reinforcing.  By not grasping this opportunity 
now, both of them play into the hands of the JVP, and 
potentially other extremist parties, that will use the 
continued deteriorating economic situation to push for 
barriers to investment and trade (thus hurting typical Sri 
Lankans) and bolster their own political fortunes at the 
expense of both the UNP and SLFP. 
 
LTTE Legitimacy 
--------------- 
 
10.  (C) The second point is the behavior of the LTTE. The 
peace process has always been based on GSL dealing with the 
LTTE, despite the Tigers' unsavory behavior, simply because 
they were the party that counted.  As mentioned above in the 
comment on Ranil's strategy, the assumption was that over 
time 
the Tigers would shed their terrorist ways and their 
monolithic 
character as the blandishments of normal life showed them 
there was something better out there than a continued life 
in the jungle.  The breakaway of the Karuna faction earlier 
this year could have been a sign that this strategy was 
working. 
 
11.  (C) Unfortunately, the reaction of Prabhakaran to all 
of this has been to become more, not less violent.  He seems 
willing to wipe out any Tamil who dares to speak or act 
against him--even if they are acting in a political way. 
This is causing a backlash in the South.  To put it in the 
most blunt terms, this raises a real question about the 
legitimacy of the Tigers as a negotiating partner. 
Certainly events have shown that the Tigers do not speak 
for all Tamils, even though they insist on recognition as 
the "sole spokesman" of the Tamils. 
 
12.  (C) I raise this question with myself and with others 
because I feel it is an issue we must keep in mind.  My 
conclusion, however, is that we have to accept the Tigers 
as the negotiating partner in the peace process, and keep 
on working on them, at least for now.  To abandon that 
strategy would be to abandon the peace process and, 
inevitably, return to war. 
 
13.  (C) The question, therefore, is how to influence Tiger 
behavior.  This has a two-part answer.  The first is to 
emphasize, as we have done all along, that Tiger behavior 
is unacceptable and must change.  Coupled with that is our 
assertion--backed up by our military to military 
cooperation--that we stand behind the Government and that a 
Tiger decision to return to war would be disastrous for 
them.  That is not a stick; it is a two-by-four that we use 
to hit them between the eyes.  The second part is just as 
important, however.  This is that if their behavior does 
change, our attitude toward them can change, and they can 
start down the road of political legitimacy.  These messages 
should come out when you deal with the press here so that 
they can reach the Tigers. 
 
Time to Move Forward 
-------------------- 
 
14.  (C) This is an opportune time for your visit.  While 
things are stuck up in some ways, the substantive 
differences between the parties on resumption of 
negotiations are actually quite small.  You can give them a 
nudge, as Mr. Akashi did just this week, and as Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Petersen will do right after you. 
 
END TEXT 
 
15. (C) That was the cable. We hope you will be able to 
reschedule your visit soon. 
 
LUNSTEAD