US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1426

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL, G/TIP 
STATE PASS LABOR/ILAB 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, BM, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: RANGOON ILO WARY OF REACTIVATING COUNTERMEASURES 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1402 
     B. RANGOON 1365 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. STATE 223852 
     D. RANGOON 1224 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Two weeks before the ILO Governing Body's 
consideration of Burma, ILO's Rangoon liaison had more bad 
news about forced labor in Burma.  Despite some progress in a 
year-old treason case against three men who contacted the 
ILO, there were increasing incidents of forced labor, poor 
GOB cooperation in investigating allegations, and cases of 
retaliation against those who reported forced labor.  Even 
though the picture is bleak overall, the ILO liaison urged 
caution on supporting ILO sanctions against Burma, predicting 
"swift retaliation" by the GOB and a likely end to the ILO's 
good work here.  End summary. 
 
Good News and (Mostly) Bad News 
 
2. (SBU) In preparation for the mid-November discussion of 
Burma by the ILO Governing Body, on November 3rd ILO's 
Rangoon liaison briefed the Chief of Mission (COM) and other 
local diplomats on the forced labor situation.  Two issues 
currently dominate ILO's attention here: (1) an ongoing court 
case against three individuals convicted and sentenced to 
death in part for contact with the ILO; and, (2) the GOB's 
cooperation (or lack thereof) in pursuing allegations of 
forced labor (ref B and D).  The representative indicated 
that there'd been some good news recently on the first topic, 
with the Supreme Court Appellate Branch announcing on October 
14th that, contrary to the wording of the initial conviction, 
it was not a crime to have contact with the ILO.  This 
element of the initial conviction was ordered removed. 
However, the Court did not release the three from prison as 
requested by the ILO, instead reducing their sentences to 
five years (for one individual also convicted of attempting 
to kill SPDC leaders) and three years (for two who were also 
convicted for their contacts with the outlawed, Thai-based 
Burmese trade union group the Federation of Trade Unions of 
Burma). 
 
3. (SBU) Despite this small improvement on the treason case, 
there were several negative trends that tarnished the period 
since the most recent ILO assessment in June.  Specifically, 
the ILO liaison noted the GOB's continued lack of progress 
investigating forced labor cases referred by the ILO.  Of the 
38 cases referred in 2004, the GOB has responded to only 18 
of them -- in each case rejecting the forced labor 
allegations.  One of the GOB's denials was of an allegation 
made directly by the ILO liaison based on his own eyewitness 
account of massive forced labor in Chin State (ref D). 
 
Punishing the Victims 
 
4. (SBU) Perhaps even more alarming to the ILO liaison are 
the increasing incidents of local GOB officials taking action 
against those who complain to the ILO about forced labor. 
The liaison noted in his November 4th report to ILO HQ that 
local police officials arrested, interrogated, and then 
released two individuals in Rangoon Division and three in 
Rakhine State after they had made reports to the ILO about 
forced labor in their communities.  The GOB has taken no 
action in these cases despite urgent requests by the ILO's 
Rangoon office. 
 
5. (SBU) In the same vein, the ILO liaison told diplomats of 
an incident where a judge rejected two plaintiffs' 
allegations of forced labor then turned around and convicted 
the two of "defaming" the local official accused of requiring 
the labor.  The two were sentenced to six-months imprisonment. 
 
ILO: Sanctions Won't Work 
 
6. (SBU) Despite what the ILO liaison admits is a "serious" 
situation in Burma, he made clear to the diplomats attending 
that requesting a reactivation of the 2000 Article 33 
measures (ref C) would be counterproductive.  He said that 
this should be the last resort and would almost certainly 
lead to a stern and immediate retaliation by the GOB -- 
particularly, he thought, with the new "less internationally 
minded" Prime Minister in place.  COM noted that in an 
October 25th meeting with Labor Minister U Tin Winn (ref A), 
the minister had stated explicitly that reactivating Article 
33 measures would lead the GOB to eject the local ILO office. 
 The liaison agreed that this was a probable outcome, and 
said he was seeking a way forward that would show the ILO's 
concern with the situation without jeopardizing the ILO's 
tenuous position here.  None at the table had any specific 
ideas for how to accomplish this. 
 
Comment: The ILO's Good Work 
7. (SBU) We think the liaison's comments have merit.  ILO is 
doing important work here as the focal point for credible 
complaints about forced labor and other human rights abuses. 
We find the ILO liaison here a reliable and helpful monitor 
of labor abuses in a country where verifiable information on 
human rights abuses is hard to find.  In addition, the 
liaison's regular reports to his headquarters are quite frank 
and critical (compared to other UN agency reporting here). 
Enhanced ILO countermeasures would have an important symbolic 
impact but are unlikely to alter the regime's behavior other 
than to give those in the SPDC who find the ILO's presence 
irritating additional ammunition to lobby for the 
organization's removal.  End comment. 
Martinez