US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2836

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU:  SWARTBOL ON TURKEY, RUSSIA, 
CHINA, IRAQ, RUSSIA, AND KROES 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 2723 
     B. THE HAGUE 2789 
     C. THE HAGUE 2766 
     D. 10/28 HAGUE-UBI E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL, FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Rob Swartbol, PM Balkenende's senior 
foreign policy advisor, predicted to Ambassador Sobel on 
November 1 that the EU will make a positive decision on 
Turkish accession negotiations in December, but warned that 
the Turks will find some elements of the decision more 
objectionable than the Commission's report.  On Russia, 
Swartbol dismissed a Russian threat to lower the level of 
representation at the November 11 summit, noting that this 
would have little impact on EU negotiating positions; 
Russia's continuing unwillingness to engage the EU in 
Russia's "near abroad," however, is a more serious long-term 
problem.  The EU will probably not lift the China Arms 
Embargo during the Dutch presidency, according to Swartbol, 
but the lack of a new commission complicates the EU's ability 
to offer other deliverables (such as market economy status) 
at the December 8 EU-China summit.  The Dutch are officially 
committed to pulling out of Al-Muthanna in mid-March, barring 
unforeseen circumstances, but will participate in NATO and EU 
missions there and are pushing the EU to play a more active 
role.  The EU will continue to follow the EU-3's lead with 
regard to Iran, but could support a referral to the UNSC if 
the Iranians refuse to cooperate.  Finally, Swartbol said 
that the Dutch are fighting hard to retain the European 
Commission's Competition portfolio for Neelie Kroes but may 
ultimately relent to maintain EU unity.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TURKEY: THE WORST IS YET TO COME 
 
2. (C) Rob Swartbol, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Dutch 
PM Balkenende, told Ambassador Sobel on November 1 that 
current Turkish unhappiness with the European Commission's 
October 6 report is only a precursor of worse to come. 
Echoing comments made earlier by Dutch POLDIR Hugo Siblesz 
(ref A), Swartbol asserted that the Commission's report 
represented the "maximum" the EU could accept with regard to 
Turkey; the December 17 Council decision would be "narrower" 
in scope and even more likely to upset the Turks.  Ambassador 
Sobel pressed Swartbol to clarify what elements of the 
Council decision would be problematic and why.  Swartbol 
responded that the Austrians were insisting that language 
describing accession negotiations as open-ended actually 
spell out the possible outcomes, giving accession and 
non-accession equal weight.  (The French, he added, wanted 
similar assurances, but were being more creative on crafting 
open-ended language.)  Swartbol asserted that setting a date 
remained a highly contentious issue, but suggested that the 
EU might be able to finesse the issue by starting the acquis 
review on one earlier date (such as March, 2005) and 
beginning "actual negotiations" later.  He predicted that the 
date set to begin negotiations would most likely be in the 
latter part of 2005, although he did not rule out slipping to 
early 2006.  At the end of the day, he said, the Turks should 
focus on the positive elements of the decision and not make a 
fuss over the details needed to generate consensus. 
 
RUSSIA:  YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD IS MY BACKYARD 
 
3. (C) Turning to Russia, Swartbol confirmed that the 
Russians had threatened to send PM Fradkov to the November 11 
summit in The Hague if there was no agreement reached on the 
"four common spaces."  Swartbol dismissed the threat as 
inconsequential, however, noting that this only highlighted 
the pointlessness of holding semi-annual EU-Russia summits. 
The EU intended to stand firm, he said, on refusing to delink 
the four common spaces (ref D).  The biggest problem, he 
argued, is that the Russians refuse to acknowledge that the 
EU has a legitimate interest in developments within Russia's 
"near abroad"; what the EU thinks of as a "common 
neighborhood" is viewed by Moscow has its exclusive 
"backyard."  (Note:  Dutch POLDIR Hugo Siblesz also recently 
told the Ambassdor that the Dutch are increasingly concerned 
about the negative direction in EU-Russian relations; post 
will continue to follow closely and will report after the 
summit.) 
 
CHINA:  LIFT, BUT WHEN? 
 
4. (C)  Noting that the French were using "every opportunity" 
to press for a lift of the Arms Embargo, Swartbol said he 
would not be surprised to see the issue reappear on the 
agendas for the upcoming GAERC and Council meetings.  The EU, 
he said, is in principle agreed on a lift; the only question 
is "when."  Swartbol doubted that a lift would occur during 
the Dutch presidency, putting the odds at "80-20" against. 
Echoing recent public statements by FM Bot, however, Swartbol 
suggested that the EU could make a positive signal regarding 
a future lift at the December 8 EU-China summit.  (Note: 
Swartbol remarked in confidence that Bot has "flip-flopped" 
on the China arms embargo and expressed frustration with 
ministers who hold a strong position "until they go to 
America and change their minds.")  Ambassador Sobel warned 
that in American eyes, lifting the Embargo during the Dutch 
EU presidency could create a "defining memory" of the Dutch 
presidency, and asked whether progress had been made on 
identifying other deliverables for the summit.  Swartbol 
responded that the EU had prepared a "great package" (which 
he offered to share with us) but noted that the absence of a 
new commission complicated the EU's ability to take steps 
toward granting China market economy status, which he 
characterized as the "jewel in the crown." 
 
IRAQ:  "NO" MEANS "NO" -- UNLESS.... 
 
5. (C)  Ambassador Sobel noted that the Dutch government 
would soon send a letter to the parliament (refs C and D) 
laying out its position on Iraq and asked whether this would 
prompt debate on a possible Dutch extension in Al-Muthanna. 
Swartbol responded that the Dutch government's official 
position on an extension was "no."  He did not rule out the 
possibility of a debate in parliament, but stressed that at 
the moment only one faction -- the conservative Liberal Party 
(VVD) supported an extension.  All other parties, he said, 
were opposed, and he did not expect this to change absent a 
"drastic deterioration" in the situation in Iraq.  If the 
elections were to be delayed, for example, then the Dutch 
might be prepared to remain a few extra weeks, although he 
cautioned that "we won't say this openly."  The British and 
Japanese are lobbying hard to keep the Dutch mission in 
Al-Muthanna, he added, and their concerns (and those of the 
U.S.) are well understood.  In response to Ambassador Sobel's 
question, Swartbol confirmed that the Dutch planned to 
maintain a much smaller presence in Iraq through proportional 
contributions to NATO and EU missions, and stressed that 
there was no intention to leave Iraq completely.  He refused, 
however, to describe a remaining Dutch presence as 
"significant."  (Note:  On November 1, FM Bot reiterated in 
parliament that the government intended to end the 
Al-Muthanna deployment in March but did not rule out 
reconsidering "in the event of unforeseen circumstances" or 
"if the entire world appeals to us.") 
 
6. (C) Turning to the EU support package for Iraq, Swartbol 
confirmed that the Council hoped to present a completed 
package to Allawi on November 5.  Without providing details, 
Swartbol said that the French continued to obstruct agreement 
on the package, although the Germans, on the other hand, had 
been "surprisingly helpful."  Noting that it was always 
difficult to get the French to join consensus, Swartbol 
commented that Allawi had complicated matters further by 
making himself personally unpopular with the French through 
his "unhelpful" comments. He complained that the 
 
IRAN:  MORE TIME NEEDED 
 
7. (C)  Swartbol said the Dutch Presidency would continue to 
follow the lead of the "big three" and to seek coordination 
between the EU and the U.S.  He expressed appreciation for 
the "extra time" the U.S. appeared to be giving the EU-3 to 
work on Tehran.  (Ambassador Sobel stressed that this time 
was quickly running out.)  Swartbol anticipated that if the 
Iranian response to the EU-3 proposals is negative, then the 
EU might eventually support a referral to the Security 
Council. 
 
COMMISSION POLITICS:  WHITHER NEELIE KROES? 
 
8. (C)  Swartbol confirmed that Prime Minister Balkenende has 
recovered from his recent illness and is fully focused on 
finishing out a successful EU presidency.  Although Swartbol 
did not accompany Balkenende to Rome personally, he made 
clear that Balkenende had held substantial discussions with 
incoming European Commission President Barroso regarding the 
crisis over the new commission, and that they had been in 
"daily" contact since.  Swartbol made clear that Balkenende 
was fighting to retain the competition portfolio for Neelie 
Kroes, but suggested that it would be hard to resist if 
Barroso appealed to the Dutch as EU President to support a 
compromise slate acceptable to the European Parliament. 
Balkenende and Barroso reportedly are having dinner together 
this week and will discuss the matter further.  (Note:  In a 
separate meeting with POLCOUNS, PM advisor Wepke Kingma also 
did not rule out the possibility that the Dutch might 
ultimately have no choice but to accept a modified portfolio 
for Kroes, especially if that would allow Barroso to present 
a new Commission to the European Council meeting on November 
5.) 
 
SOBEL