US embassy cable - 04AMMAN8998

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008998 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KMPI, ECON, JO 
SUBJECT: NEW CABINET TEAM ACTIVIST ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 
PRODDED BY KING 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  At the King's instigation, the newly 
reshuffled cabinet has embarked on a wholesale reform of the 
way government does business -- adopting what amounts to an 
MPP for government and ministries, in which mission goals, 
performance standards, and resource allocation are to be 
seamlessly integrated.  While many of the new ministers show 
enthusiasm and energy over this innovation, PM Fayez shows 
characteristic caution and passivity.  Deputy PM Muasher -- 
entrusted with launching the process and judging ministries' 
performance -- already has encountered political opposition 
in parliament, with the Speaker (baselessly) demanding a vote 
of confidence on the new ministers.  In the press, there is 
an open debate as to whether the renewed focus on structural 
reform is a diversion from the harder issues of social and 
political development.  While the King's commitment to 
structural reform is genuine and the effort essential if 
Jordan is to be transformed into a competitive, developed 
marketplace, there is some truth that his attitude on 
political reform is to "go slow."  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) King Abdullah expressed to Charge on October 31 his 
satisfaction with the newly reshuffled cabinet.  He had met 
with the ministers for a portion of their off-site, weekend 
retreat at the Dead Sea Marriott.  The King felt they had 
"got it" in understanding his vision for wide ranging 
internal government reform and performance-driven action.  He 
took particular pleasure in the fact that each minister has 
been given specific performance standards and timelines for 
delivery.  His impatience was palpable:-- "if any minister 
does not deliver, they'll be out" in three months, time, 
when performance on the first set of indicators will be 
judged.  In characteristic contrast, Prime Minister Faisal 
al-Fayez complained to Charge on November 2 that expectations 
for change may be hard to meet.  He anticipated significant 
political and parliamentary resistance to revamping the 
government's inefficient ways, which are motivated by 
micro-level impulses for patronage and favoritism.  "We have 
to do it (meet the King's agenda), but it will be hard," he 
said. 
 
3.  (C) Two men entrusted with driving this agenda forward, 
Deputy Prime Minister Muasher and Minister of State for 
Public Sector Reform Masaadeh, laid out for Charge and USAID 
Mission Director the details of the internal reform agenda on 
November 1.  Implementing a vision of a streamlined, 
efficient, and transparent public sector will involve a 
two-tiered approach.  Muasher's office at the Prime Ministry 
(called the Government Performance Unit ) GPU) will be 
responsible for the first tier, developing and implementing a 
reform strategy.  The GPU will produce a national public 
sector agenda with a set of objectives.  From these 
objectives, Muasher will develop 10 to 15 key performance 
indicators to measure ministries, work over the next ten 
years.  At the end of each year, ministers must show 
advancement within their indicators or face dismissal. 
Masaadeh's office of public sector reform will handle the 
operational tier.  He will establish a reform unit to set 
detailed standards for performance and offer training and 
technical assistance to help the ministries meet their goals. 
 Muasher also stressed that there are plans for a complete 
overhaul of the cabinet's workings, which like many Arab 
governments must decide as a body on matters of minutiae.  A 
greater delegation of authority will allow the cabinet to 
work at a more strategic level.  The Prime Ministry itself 
will be re-structured to make it a stronger policy setting 
body.  And with perverse but fitting symbolism, it is said 
that the Prime Minister will move his own office across the 
street from the Prime Ministry to a largely unused official 
residence, thus simultaneously making room for the burgeoning 
reform staff and signaling his detachment from them. 
 
4.  (C) Another key element in the restructuring is the 
development of four ministerial teams or committees for 
public sector reform, socio-economic development, human 
resources, and legal issues.  In Charge's meetings with the 
new cabinet, team leaders and members are showing enthusiasm 
over the concept, although how some of these highly 
competitive personalities will work together in practice 
remains to be seen.  The King and Muasher both highlighted 
for us the novel integration of the budgeting process and 
financial services into the development of ministries, 
performance goals.  The King was pleased that Finance 
Minister Abu Hammour was on board with the idea, and 
acknowledged that some ministries were unable to perform 
because of limited resources provided by a Finance Ministry 
left unaware of any ministry performance plans. 
 
5.  (C) The need for government restructuring is great, but 
the government already has received criticism for being 
singularly preoccupied with it at the expense of genuine 
political development and reform.  The Prime Minister, 
government spokesman, and Muasher himself with Charge 
insisted that such was not the case, but they are on the 
defensive.  Political Development Minister Shara told Charge 
and Emboffs that political development remained a priority, 
but the government would "review carefully" the draft laws on 
elections and political parties ) we "can't be hasty" he 
said.  (Royal Court Minister earlier told Charge the 
electoral law would not be submitted to the Parliament in the 
next year.)  Shara's focus is on nuts and bolts, grassroots 
reforms, and drawing the "silent majority" (his phrase) into 
the political process.  He detailed convincing plans to use 
NGOs, women's and youth groups, and UNDP to develop civil 
society institutions. 
 
6.  (C) Parliament is looking upon all this energy with some 
curiosity, even concern.  There seems to have been no serious 
effort to consult Speaker al-Majali or other members on the 
purpose of the changes.  This led to an unusual public 
complaint from the loyalist speaker, demanding that the 
cabinet present itself and a new platform for a vote of 
confirmation.  Legal Affairs Minister Ensour explained to 
Charge that the cabinet is a continuation of its predecessor 
and that the restructuring agenda was clearly identified in 
the King's initial public letter of instruction ) so Majali 
has no legal grounds to object.  However, as reflected in the 
PM's concern, parliament, filled with traditionalists thanks 
to gerrymandering, will be highly uneasy.  These brisk 
changes are designed to eliminate the very tools of patronage 
and featherbedding upon which Jordan's old politics thrived 
) and its economy did not.  The fact that the smooth, rich, 
Westernized, Christian Muasher is chief implementor, and the 
fast-talking Palestinian Minister of Planning chief salesman, 
will  only stoke MPs' suspicions.  Given the political 
constraints they face, this opposition is likely to manifest 
itself in indirect ways, by slowing down the most unpopular 
legislation and looking for issues unrelated to the King's 
agenda on which to berate the cabinet. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  Sweeping government restructuring is long 
overdue in Jordan and the region, and the King's commitment 
to it is genuine.  The model being used is a state of the art 
tool provided by a leading international consultant.  Senior 
government officials for the most part share the King's 
enthusiasm at most, or at least know their jobs are on the 
line.  Dig a few layers down in the government, or turn to 
parliament, and these concepts of change are met with a mix 
of incredulity and trepidation.  So the government will face 
an enormous challenge in moving forward.  The accusation that 
public sector reform - however badly needed - is a substitute 
for harder social and political reform has some validity. 
The King is concerned that significant transformation of the 
political system before Jordan's political culture is 
sufficiently mature will merely provide an opening to 
radicals.  At the same time, he wants economic, social and 
political reform to advance in mutually-reinforcing ways. 
Our concern is that if the King's caution overcomes his 
reforming urge now (when Jordan is doing well economically 
and is at peace internally), he is sure to keep his foot on 
the brake when the next economic downturn or domestic crisis 
inevitably develops.  End Comment. 
 
8.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
HALE