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| Identifier: | 04MUSCAT1942 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04MUSCAT1942 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Muscat |
| Created: | 2004-11-03 09:47:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN |
| Tags: | EAIR EINV EFIN PGOV ECON MU Domestic Politics Ports Export Control and Border Security Economic Affairs |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001942 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR EB/TRA, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI USDOC FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/AMESA/OME/MTALAAT ROME FOR FAA/GJOYNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2014 TAGS: EAIR, EINV, EFIN, PGOV, ECON, MU, Domestic Politics, Ports, Export Control and Border Security, Economic Affairs SUBJECT: AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION GROUNDED Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Contains sensitive business information. Please handle accordingly. 1. (SBU) Summary: A long-expected pullout by British Airports Authority from the privatized consortium managing Oman's international airports means that the government will now run the airports in Muscat and Salalah. One of the alleged key sticking points was the failure of the government and the private consortium to agree on the financial terms for constructing a new passenger terminal in Muscat. Originally slated for completion by 2007, the new terminal likely will now be erected on a longer timetable under government control. A new 100 percent Omani government-owned company will be formed to assume control of the airports; the government has agreed to buy out the shares held by the private consortium. Most staff will be retained by the new company, including administrators and consultants from the previous consortium who will be invited to stay on for the first six months during a transition phase. End Summary. ------------- Rough Landing ------------- 2. (SBU) Airport management had long been viewed as an area where privatization could proceed in modernizing Oman's transport infrastructure and achieving key efficiencies in a growing regional marketplace. On September 10, 2001, a consortium led by the British Airports Authority (BAA) and the local firm Bahwan Trading Company (BTC) established the Oman Airports Management Company (OAMC). The largest shareholder in OAMC was an entity called Capital Aviation Services (75 percent shareholding), with the remaining shares held by the Omani government and Oman Aviation Services. Operating under a 25-year license granted in January 2002, OAMC's mandate was to modernize the existing airport facilities at Seeb International Airport in Muscat and Salalah International Airport in southern Oman, and lay the groundwork for the construction of a new passenger terminal at Seeb Airport by 2007. On October 20, 2004 newspaper headlines declared that Oman's privatization of airport management had come to an end with the pullout of BAA from OAMC, reportedly due to substantial disagreement over the financial terms of constructing the new terminal. Administration of the airports should revert to the government within 30 days according to the terms of the original concession agreement. ------------------------------- Company Never Truly Took Flight ------------------------------- 3. (C) General Manager Alex Borges of BTC (strictly protect) told Econoff that the blame lies squarely on the government's shoulders for failing to approve a single expansion plan submitted by OAMC in slightly over two years of operation. Whereas the contract called for renegotiation clauses, company insiders claim that the government never appreciated the increased aviation security costs associated with the September 11 terrorist attacks and the resulting decline in Middle East passenger traffic, but rather showed complete unwillingness to accept any long-term proposal floated by the company. Borges pointed to the Finance Ministry in particular as being uncompromising during the negotiations. 4. (U) In a local newspaper interview, OAMC CEO Colin Hobbs expressed his own frustration over the inability of the government to understand the scarcity of commercial financing for expanding Middle Eastern airports in the wake of September 11th. In addition, Hobbs intimated that Omani officials no doubt saw major airport projects being carried out by the governments of Doha and Dubai and decided to force OAMC's hand in order to reassume control and proceed with a publicly financed terminal project. Hobbs echoed separate comments from Borges in saying that OAMC succeeded in operating the airports effectively, reducing their costs, and enhancing their commercial viability; the only thorny issue in the end was building the new terminal. -------------------------------------- The Flying Public Demanded More Change -------------------------------------- 5. (SBU) News of the failed privatization generated mixed reaction around Muscat. The business world was not greatly surprised that OAMC would fail to deliver on airport expansion after a series of difficult circumstances for the regional tourism industry (e.g., September 11, OEF and OIF, Bali bombings, SARS). The local and regional media gave the matter greater attention, particularly given the ramifications for the government's privatization and tourism promotion efforts. 6. (SBU) Average Omanis were, if anything, pleased with the news. Most Omanis we have spoken to comment that apart from a significant facelift for the Muscat Duty Free shopping area, there were no major visible upgrades made to the existing terminal at Seeb under OAMC's tenure. Moreover, the Omani public's skepticism toward the government is only exceeded by its distrust of foreign companies and the local burgher class represented by family firms such as the Bahwan's. Much of the public therefore believes OAMC was likely unfairly benefiting from its deal with the government, and credits the Ministry of Transportation for finally putting an end to it. These factors gave OAMC a serious PR headache, even as it tried to parlay public dissatisfaction with the existing terminal into some sort of accord on constructing a brand new terminal. In the end this balancing act proved too difficult and costly for OAMC, leading to the company's dissolution. ----------------------- The Government's Thrust ----------------------- 7. (C) For its part, the government believes that OAMC never fully delivered on its core promises of upgrading facilities and laying out a feasible plan for future airport expansion. Acting Director General of Civil Aviation and Meteorology Sultan al-Saifi (strictly protect) described to Econoff the current situation, whereby a 100 percent Omani government-owned company called OMC will assume control of the airports. Following the most recent 90-day period of discussions, the government agreed to buy the shares of Capital Aviation Services. The original handover date of November 17 was accelerated because of Eid holidays and National Day celebrations, and the assets will now change hands no later than November 10. Nearly all staff members of OAMC are expected to remain with the government company, including technical and managerial personnel from BAA who may stay aboard for up to six months. Plans will move forward for a new terminal at Seeb airport under government guidance, and al-Saifi left open the possibility that private investors might be allowed to take equity stakes in future airport development projects. ------- Comment ------- 8. (SBU) Beyond the finger-pointing and the disappointment on both sides, this development casts a shadow over the pace and scope of privatization in Oman. Earlier hailed as a model of privatization for the GCC, Oman's airport management experiment appears for now to have failed, or at least been dealt a significant set-back. Bureaucratic obstacles remain in other privatization fields as well. One prominent American businessman confided that the government does not want to see a foreign company make too much money in a privatized venture, lest it be perceived as a net loss for the Omani people. Other commentators view the airport development as a "black eye" for Oman's investment climate, even if it is more a perception than the overall reality. BALTIMORE
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