US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA12829

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 012829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KJUS, PTER, PHUM, CO, VE, BR, UN 
SUBJECT: DAS SHAPIRO AND PDAS FARRAR MEET WITH PRESIDENT 
URIBE 
 
REF: BOGOTA 12512 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) December 15, 2004, 5:30-6:30 p.m., Presidential 
Palace, Bogota. 
 
2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
WHA DAS Charles Shapiro 
INL PDAS Jonathan Farrar 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
David Henifin, WHA/AND Deputy Director 
Al Matano, INL/LP Deputy Director 
Craig Conway, POL (notetaker) 
 
Colombia 
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President Alvaro Uribe 
Jaime Bermudez, Presidential Communications Director 
Francisco Gonzalez, MFA Americas Division (notetaker) 
 
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Summary 
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3. (C) WHA DAS Shapiro, INL PDAS Farrar, and Ambassador Wood 
called on President Uribe on December 15.  Uribe expressed 
gratitude for U.S. counternarcotics and counterterrorism 
assistance, but shared his concern that record levels of 
seizures and eradications have not had an effect on prices in 
Europe and the U.S.  Uribe noted that Colombia's illegal 
armed groups have been seriously weakened by GOC military 
pressure and, like the paramilitaries, both the FARC and the 
ELN will opt for peaceful negotiations within the next five 
years.  Uribe stressed the importance of human rights in GOC 
policies and pledged to continue dialogue with NGOs.  He also 
promised to review key human rights cases, including 
Guaitarilla, Cajamarca, and Mapiripan, with the MOD.  Uribe 
agreed to clarify the GOC's positions and implementation 
plans for demobilization by presenting a series of key points 
to the international community.  Uribe commented on his 
difficult position with regard to Venezuela and Brazil and 
promised to look into Colombia's voting position on human 
rights in the UN.  Despite the Supreme Court's wait-and-see 
attitude on extraditions, Uribe affirmed his full support for 
continued extraditions.  End Summary. 
 
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Counternarcotics 
---------------- 
 
4. (C) President Uribe expressed appreciation for U.S. 
assistance, noting that without U.S. support Colombia would 
not have the ability to fight guerrilla or paramilitary 
groups, both of which are financed by narcotics trafficking. 
Farrar thanked Uribe for his Government's efforts against 
illegal armed groups and pledged continued support for 
counternarcotics efforts.  Uribe asked Farrar for the USG's 
assessment of counternarcotics programs in Colombia and 
expressed concern that, although seizures and crop 
eradication figures are at record high levels, the price of 
cocaine has not increased.  Uribe noted that a failure to 
show results would lead to greater pressure for legalization 
or funding cuts.  Wood observed that there is not enough data 
on actual narcotics supply in the U.S. or quantities of 
narcotics in the "pipeline," which limits our ability to 
explain the lack of tangible results on the streets of the 
U.S. 
 
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Prospects for Success 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) In response to a question, Uribe said Colombia's 
illegal armed groups cannot resist an additional five years 
of military pressure.  Refusing to promise concrete dates and 
noting the importance of being a realist, Uribe pledged to 
continue to pressure illegal armed groups.  Paramilitaries 
are not negotiating simply because they want peace, but 
because of the military pressure the Government has applied 
and their fear of extradition to the U.S.  Uribe speculated 
that splinter groups of narcotrafficking organizations will 
follow in the wake of the paramilitaries and observed that 
destroying those groups will require a military solution. 
Uribe said that the ELN has been significantly weakened and 
is seeking a political solution.  Uribe estimated the FARC 
have lost about 40 percent of their military capacity and had 
only a limited capacity to recruit new members.  Uribe 
speculated that the FARC would agree to negotiate if he wins 
re-election, but added he would continue to caution the 
public to not expect quick results.  DAS Shapiro told Uribe 
the U.S. would continue to support the GOC's efforts.  Uribe 
agreed on the importance of sustaining efforts to improve 
security and increase public confidence in Government 
institutions. 
 
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Coordination and Advances 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Uribe noted that cooperation with the U.S. has been 
extraordinary, citing several recent captures of guerrilla 
leaders, including the FARC's "Foreign Minister," Rodrigo 
Granda Escobar (septel).  Shapiro said he had been impressed 
with USG-GOC coordination during his visit to San Jose de 
Guaviare and congratulated Uribe on his efforts to increase 
the state's presence throughout the country.  Uribe said he 
had observed a greater commitment from the armed forces to 
address corruption and collusion with paramilitaries.  He 
also noted that the number of allegations of collusion 
continues to drop. 
 
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Human Rights 
------------ 
 
7. (C) Shapiro stressed the importance of continued work on 
human rights.  Uribe reaffirmed his commitment to human 
rights, noting the central role they play in his efforts. 
Shapiro noted the importance of continued dialogue with NGOs. 
 Uribe acknowledged the tense nature of many of his 
discussions with NGOs, but agreed continued dialogue is 
important.  The Ambassador recognized improvements on human 
rights, but stressed the importance of progress on several 
key human rights cases that are followed carefully by 
Congress and NGOs, including Guaitarilla, Cajamarca, and 
Mapiripan.  On Guaitarilla, Wood stressed the importance of a 
transparent, public judicial investigation with effective 
results, adding that an internal disciplinary process was not 
sufficient.  Uribe agreed to review the case with the MOD. 
 
8. (C) On Mapiripan, Farrar said that Fiscalia pressure on 
Orozco and the persistence of unresolved human rights cases 
impede the Administration's efforts with Congress.  Uribe 
stressed he only has the ability to guarantee military 
justice, noting that Colombia's judicial system is 
independent of the executive branch.  Uribe noted that the 
latest generals' promotion list contained no individuals 
accused of human rights abuses or collusion.  Wood expressed 
U.S. interest in General Avila's dismissal, stating that it 
was not sufficient simply to remove him from command and 
reassign him.  Wood stressed the importance of thorough 
investigations of all allegations.  Uribe asked if there was 
direct evidence implicating Avila.  Uribe agreed that Avila 
would have to be retired if there was sufficient evidence 
against him, but cautioned that the Government cannot dismiss 
an officer on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. 
Uribe promised to follow up with the MOD. 
 
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Paramilitary Demobilization 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Shapiro and Wood encouraged Uribe to be more active in 
communicating the GOC's position on the Law for Justice and 
Reparations, noting that the GOC's silence had allowed their 
opponents to frame the debate and created confusion in 
Washington and European capitals.  Uribe stressed the 
importance of balancing peace and justice, but added that the 
GOC was slowly resolving differences with members of the 
opposition in Congress.  He also stressed the importance of 
legislation that would apply to paramilitaries and guerrillas 
equally, noting that many guerrillas would not agree to the 
lengthy prison sentences included in the opposition's draft 
legislation.  Uribe agreed that the GOC would draft a series 
of key points, including criteria and an implementation 
process, to present to the international community in order 
to clarify the GOC's position. 
-------------------- 
Venezuela and Brazil 
-------------------- 
 
10. (C) Uribe said he had discussed Chavez with President 
Bush in Cartagena.  He described the difficulties of 
balancing Colombia's friendship with the U.S. with the 
importance of maintaining positive relations with his 
neighbors.  The absence of evidence proving that Chavez stole 
the elections and Chavez's private assertion that he has no 
relationship with the FARC or narcotraffickers makes it 
difficult to condemn him publicly, despite Uribe's private 
distrust of Chavez and his belief that Chavez may be helping 
the FARC and narcotics traffickers.  In bilateral meetings, 
Uribe's criticisms have focused on Chavez's failure to take 
action against narcotraffickers.  Uribe also told Chavez in 
Cuzco that he is not helping himself by taking a 
confrontational position with the U.S.  On Brazil, Uribe said 
his relationship with Lula is complicated by Lula's effort to 
build an anti-U.S. alliance in Latin America.  Lula is more 
practical and intelligent than Chavez, but is driven by his 
leftist background and Brazilian "imperial spirit" to oppose 
the U.S.  Uribe has little influence with either Lula or 
Chavez because they see him as a friend of the U.S.  Uribe 
said he would continue to press Chavez to take action against 
narcotraffickers and noted that Lula has not followed through 
on promises to fight narcotics trafficking. 
 
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OAS Secretary General 
--------------------- 
 
11. (C) In response to a question, Uribe said the GOC wanted 
to support the candidacy of former President of El Salvador 
Flores for Secretary General of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), but cautioned that Flores would have to ratchet 
up his public relations effort.  (Mexican Foreign Minister 
Derbez, presumably visiting to advocate his own candidacy, 
was the next visitor on Uribe's schedule.) 
 
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UN Human Rights Votes 
--------------------- 
 
12. (C) Shapiro said he did not understand the GOC's 
abstentions on key human rights votes in the UN involving 
Cuba, Zimbabwe and Sudan.  In particular, he asked the 
President to oppose possible upcoming no-action motions in 
the UNGA plenary on Iran and Turkmenistan.  Uribe asked MFA 
Americas Division Director Francisco Gonzalez if the GOC had 
in fact abstained on earlier votes and promised to review the 
matter with the MFA. 
 
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Extradition 
----------- 
 
13. (C) In response to a question on extradition, Uribe 
explained that the Supreme Court of Justice had taken a 
wait-and-see position in the wake of a statement -- and 
despite the later retraction of this statement -- by an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami that Gilberto Rodriguez 
Orejuela would be tried for acts committed during the past 20 
years, contrary to USG assurances that he would not be tried 
for acts committed before 1997 (reftel).  Uribe affirmed his 
commitment to extradition and expressed confidence that the 
matter would be resolved in the near future. 
 
14. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Shapiro. 
WOOD