US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA11753

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014 
TAGS: PTER, KJUS, SNAR, PHUM, PINR, PREL, CO, AUC, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES DEMOBILIZATION DETAILS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) On November 12, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos 
Restrepo reviewed for the Ambassador recent developments in 
demobilizing the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
and clarified key steps in the process.  Restrepo's principle 
concern is that without adequate security, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) could occupy AUC areas and 
gain access to key mobility corridors and coca growing areas, 
especially in the conflictive Catatumbo region.  Meanwhile, 
the Catatumbo Bloc has submitted a list of names and 
identification numbers of those who will demobilize and the 
GOC has selected a demobilization zone.  The GOC is beginning 
to receive lists, select demobilization zones, and prepare 
security for other AUC groups scheduled to demobilize before 
the end of the year. 
 
2. (C) Restrepo detailed parts of the demobilization process: 
 
- Monitoring: He asserted that monitoring former 
paramilitaries' behavior was key to the process' legitimacy 
but emphasized that local government and police had to 
cooperate with him. 
 
- Identification:  Restrepo will consider issuing each 
individual demobilizing a provisional identification card 
when they enter the demobilization zone. 
 
- Interviews: Each demobilized paramilitary is required to 
report to a local reinsertion center to be interviewed by the 
Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia), with whom he must 
cooperate.  If this does not happen, the individual would not 
be pardoned for having belonged to an illegal armed group and 
would be arrested. 
 
- Renunciation: Before leaving the demobilization zone, each 
individual is required to sign two documents: one renouncing 
membership in an illegal armed group and the other requesting 
pardon for the crime of sedition.  End Summary. 
 
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Security Biggest Challenge 
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3. (C) Restrepo said his biggest concern was securing the 
Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander Department, where 
1,400 paramilitaries are scheduled to demobilize in the 
coming weeks.  He explained that the AUC controls territory 
around the Catatumbo River thereby depriving the FARC of a 
key mobility corridor into Venezuela.  The security forces' 
presence is minimal.  The Navy does not patrol the Catatumbo 
River and there is no police or military presence west of the 
river, where the government estimates there are 1,800 
hectares of coca.  Restrepo is worried that without patrols 
on the river and an increased presence on the ground, the 
FARC would occupy the former AUC territory, especially the 
coca-growing areas.  Restrepo would like at least four Navy 
patrol boats on the river and aerial and manual eradication 
of coca. 
 
4. (C) Restrepo warned that a FARC takeover of the 
demobilized region would de-legitimize the peace process and 
strengthen the AUC's negotiating position.  AUC Commander 
Salvatore Mancuso has already threatened to halt 
demobilization if the government cannot prevent the FARC from 
taking over Catatumbo.  Restrepo hoped the U.S. could provide 
support for security, but noted that he had not yet discussed 
this idea with President Uribe. 
 
5. (C) In a subsequent conversation, Ambassador raised 
Restrepo's concern about Catatumbo with Armed Forces 
Commander General Ospina and Navy Commander Admiral Soto. 
Both already were aware of the issue, and promised at least 
some level of action.  We will follow up. 
 
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Some Zones Identified, Lists Submitted 
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6. (C) Restrepo described recent progress: 
 
-- Catatumbo: The Catatumbo Bloc, led by a retired Police 
Captain "Camilo Catatumbo," submitted a list of 1,400 members 
to demobilize, including 900 full names and cedula (national 
identification document) numbers.  The Fiscalia, Department 
of Administrative Security (DAS, rough FBI equivalent), 
police, and military intelligence have begun researching the 
names.  The Bloc also submitted a list of weapons, which 
includes 470 rifles, 350 pistols, and several machine guns. 
A two-hectare demobilization zone about 28 kilometers from 
the town of Tibu has been selected (reported in the press on 
November 14).  During the week of November 15, the government 
will prepare the zone's infrastructure.  The publicly 
announced target date of November 29 for formal 
demobilization will probably be pushed back a week or two. 
 
 -- Uraba: The government has identified a demobilization 
zone but the AUC groups operating in Uraba have not submitted 
a list.  The AUC's territory in Uraba is relatively 
controllable, and Restrepo has been working closely with the 
Army's 17th Brigade to develop a strategy to protect it.  The 
police have a permanent presence in much of the region.  The 
only potential problem area is the Nueva Antioquia region 
where the FARC and AUC have competed for control. 
 
-- Valle and Valle del Cauca: The Calima Bloc is scheduled to 
demobilize there but has not submitted a list and the 
government has not identified a demobilization area. Restrepo 
is concerned about security because the FARC has a strong 
presence and could regain key mobility corridors. 
 
-- Cordoba: Mancuso submitted a list of several hundred names 
and cedula numbers.  Restrepo expects his biggest challenge 
to be winning public trust.  The population there generally 
believes the AUC is needed for its safety and has little 
faith in state security forces. 
 
-- Llanos (eastern plains): Since AUC Centauros Bloc 
Commander Miguel Arroyave was killed and the independent Self 
Defense Forces of Casanare (ACC) have suffered heavy military 
blows, the region has become more stable and less violent. 
However, demobilization of the AUC groups is complicated. 
The Centauros Bloc has broken into two groups, one led by 
"Mauricio," a former guerrilla, in the north and the other 
led by "Jorge Pirata" and "Cuchillo" in the south.  AUC 
commander Miguel Mejia, who is in Santa Fe de Ralito, offered 
to demobilize the 300-member Vencedores of Arauca but 
insisted that his twin, Pablo Mejia, be included in the 
demobilization.  Both brothers are major drug traffickers and 
Restrepo has refused to let Pablo participate in the 
demobilization.  The paramilitaries and the FARC groups 
operating on the eastern plains are deeply involved in drug 
trafficking, making any demobilization complicated. 
 
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Law for Justice and Reparation 
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7. (C) After the GOC's last draft of the Law for Justice and 
Reparations was completed in April under the supervision of 
the Peace Commissioner's Office, Restrepo asked President 
Uribe to put the Ministry of Interior and Justice in charge 
of the bill.  Given the AUC's dislike of the legislation, 
Restrepo said negotiating with the AUC and being responsible 
for the law put him in too difficult a position.  Restrepo 
has not seen Senator Rafael Pardo's version of the law. 
 
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Monitoring 
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8. (C) In response to the Ambassador's comment that close 
monitoring of the demobilized paramilitaries was key to 
preventing paramilitaries from returning to criminal 
behavior, Restrepo said he needed the local governments and 
security forces to cooperate with him.  He expressed 
frustration with the Medellin city government's reluctance to 
punish or even publicize crimes carried out by demobilized 
members of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN).  To prevent 
similar problems in future demobilizations, Restrepo's office 
hired a police Colonel to help coordinate demobilizations 
with local police units. 
 
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Identification, Investigation, and Renunciation 
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9. (C) Restrepo agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that 
each paramilitary be given a provisional identification card 
upon entering the demobilization zone. 
 
10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that each 
demobilized member be interviewed by the Fiscalia, Restrepo 
clarified that the former paramilitaries are not pardoned for 
rebellion until they speak with the Fiscalia at the 
government-controlled reinsertion centers.  Upon leaving the 
demobilization zone, each former paramilitary is required to 
report to a local reinsertion center.  At these centers, the 
Fiscalia interviews each former paramilitary, dental records 
are taken to verify identity, a pardon for sedition is issued 
after a thorough investigation by the Fiscalia, and each 
individual enrolls in reinsertion programs.  Any former 
paramilitary who fails to report to one of these centers or 
cooperate with the Fiscalia's investigation can and will be 
arrested for having belonged to an illegal armed group. 
Restrepo also is creating an intelligence team that will 
interview the paramilitaries while still inside the 
demobilization centers. 
 
11. (C) Restrepo underscored that before leaving the 
demobilization zone, each paramilitary is required to sign 
two documents: one renouncing his/her membership in an 
illegal armed group and pledging not to return to criminal 
behavior and one requesting pardon for rebellion against the 
state.  Without signing these documents, the individual is 
not eligible for reinsertion benefits. 
 
 
WOOD