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| Identifier: | 04BOGOTA11752 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04BOGOTA11752 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2004-11-02 18:31:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL CO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 011752 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014 TAGS: PREL, CO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT URIBE IN COLOMBIA Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------------ Introduction ------------ 1. (C) President Uribe welcomes the visit of President and Mrs. Bush with enthusiasm. Current hot topics include: --Floods in Northern Colombia, more than 150,000 persons affected --Demobilization and reinsertion of up to 3,000 paramilitary terrorists in the next two months --U.S. support in out years --Free Trade Agreement negotiations; next round in Tuscon at the end of November could be crucial --Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures --Major judicial reform starting in January --Extradition --U.S. travel advisory and security in Cartagena --Continued shortage of helicopters for counter-drug and counter-terror missions --Status of U.S. hostages --Human rights --Alternative development and humanitarian assistance --------------------------- Floods in Northern Colombia --------------------------- 2. (C) Heavy rainfall has caused flooding in the north coast region, including the Cartagena area. Some 200,000 persons have been affected and more than 300 homes destroyed. Through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, we are providing $150,000 in assistance to the Red Cross to help some 10,000 persons in the hardest-hit areas south of Cartagena. ------------------------------ Demobilization and Reinsertion ------------------------------ 3. (C) Colombia plans to demobilize 3,000 or so members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the country's largest paramilitary terrorist organization, in the next six weeks, adding to the over 1,000 paramilitaries who demobilized in 2003. The program is underfunded and the OAS verification chief has issued an international call for help; several European nations have responded with low levels of aid. Uncertainty regarding Patriot Act restrictions has prevented direct U.S. assistance or involvement in design of the program. President Uribe may seek U.S. assistance to help reinsert voluntarily demobilized ex-terrorists who are cooperating against their former organizations and otherwise adhering to the government's program. This demobilization/reinsertion is expected to be the template for eventual demobilization of up to 15,000 paramilitaries by the end of 2005, and the leftist terrorists of the ELN, with whom preliminary talks are underway but going slowly. ------------ U.S. Support ------------ 4. (C) As in past meetings, Uribe will be looking for private and public reaffirmations of U.S. support and continued financial resources for the next few years. Requested U.S. assistance tops $660 million in FY05, plus a number of DOD operating accounts. Special DOD assistance to Plan Patriota operations runs out after 2005. ---------------------------- Free Trade Agreement/Economy ---------------------------- 5. (C) Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement, with Peru and Ecuador, begin their fifth round on November 29 in Tuscon. President Uribe remains a strong proponent, but agricultural and other concerns, principally regarding pharmaceuticals, have prevented Colombia from moving as rapidly as it should. As a result, our goal of conclusion by early 2005 is uncertain. Colombia hopes for special consideration for its close cooperation on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts. Overall growth continues to be strong (about 4 percent), and investment is returning. But the country faces fiscal pressure, and President Uribe political pressure, from the competition for resources between defense and social needs, especially unemployment (currently 12.5 percent). ----------------------------- Drug Eradication/Interdiction ----------------------------- 6. (C) FY04 drug eradication and interdiction are at record levels. We should meet our 130,000-hectare goal for coca spraying and exceed last year's level for opium poppy. President Uribe is working to expand manual eradication efforts. We continue to press for spraying in national parks in the face of Colombian and U.S. congressional resistance. Drug seizures are also at record levels. In 2004 the Colombian National Police has seized approximately 56 metric tons; the Colombian military, primarily the navy and coast guard, approximately 68 metric tons; and a multi-national force approximately 192 metric tons. Between eradication and seizures, more than 475 metric tons of drugs have been blocked in 2004, in comparison to about 300 tons in 2003. --------------- Judicial Reform --------------- 7. (C) Colombia will switch to an oral adversarial trial system, like that of the U.S., in January. We have provided extensive training and advice to this major reform; it is also a high priority among many in the U.S. Congress. President Uribe may request additional resources. The Minister of Justice has requested that the justice sector rapidly/rapidly receive 50 percent of all Colombia-related drug assets that we seize; in the past, Colombia has received a smaller share, sometimes after years of delay. ----------- Extradition ----------- 8. (C) President Uribe has approved since taking office more than 150 extraditions to the U.S. He will likely ask for more political sensitivity in our extradition requests, as he and his ministers have done several times in the last year. Although Uribe is solid in his support, extradition faces political pressure from well-connected drug traffickers awaiting extradition and from paramilitary leaders involved in peace negotiations. We are taking steps to avoid killing the golden goose. Uribe may raise paramilitary leaders' efforts to negotiate extradition at the peace table. We have said that extradition should not be a topic in the negotiations, and not be addressed in any way before all/all demobilization steps are fulfilled by the paramilitary leaders, including peaceful demobilization of their troops. Uribe has agreed. ------------------ Cartagena/Consular ------------------ 9. (C) The U.S. travel advisory warns against all travel to Colombia. President Uribe may ask for a cut-out for Cartagena, so cruise ships, a potential major source of tourist revenue, can enter. Cartagena has not seen a terrorist incident for two years, has special safeguards for cruise ship tourists (no incidents have been reported for European cruise ship tourists), and has a better security record than many Latin American capitals. Although we resist a cut-out for Cartagena, we are working to revise the travel advisory for Colombia as a whole, and the State Department head of security will visit Cartagena at the end of November. ---------------------- Plan Patriota/Military ---------------------- 10. (C) The Colombian Armed Forces has made steady progress against illegal armed groups since the late 1990s, thanks in large part to U.S. assistance. Plan Patriota is currently focused in FARC-dominated, heavily forested southeastern Colombia; it is going well, but slowly. The logistical strain of keeping 17,000 troops in the dense, hostile jungle, hundreds of miles from their supply bases, has been a huge challenge. Poor inter-service cooperation, corruption, and tolerance of paramilitarism continue, but they are improving, most recently with good changes in senior military leadership. There continues to be competition for scarce helicopters between counter-drug and counter-terrorism missions. President Uribe may ask for additional Blackhawk helicopters. ---------- Reelection ---------- 11. (C) Constitutional reform to permit Presidential re-election is near completion; we believe it is probable. The reform will face review by the Constitutional Court early next year, a wild card. The press may seek a U.S. view on re-election. Although we can praise President Uribe, we should avoid comment on re-election, which could be played as "interference in domestic affairs." Uribe is above 65 percent approval in polls. ------------ Human Rights ------------ 12. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in human rights, but has not been completely successful in ensuring accountability, strengthening the military justice system, in breaking military ties to paramilitary groups, or in ending corruption. The government has an active dialogue with NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments. Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the military and police. The Embassy vets all units that receive U.S. assistance, in accordance with the Leahy Amendment. Homicides fell by 20 percent, kidnappings by 30 percent, and forced displacements by 49 percent in 2003; that trend has continued in 2004. Less than 2 percent of human rights violations are attributable to government security forces. But recent violations by members of the armed forces, such as the suspicious murders in August of three trade unionists in the highly conflictive department of Arauca, demonstrate the need for further improvement. ------------- U.S. Hostages ------------- 13. (C) The three U.S.-contractor hostages captured by the FARC in February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the world. (Another U.S. contractor and a Colombian were killed by the FARC in the same incident, when their helicopter safely crash-landed due to mechanical failure near a FARC camp.) Plan Patriota operations have increased the likelihood that we will receive more information about the hostages, but also that an unintended encounter between Colombian forces and the hostage holders will result in their execution. The Colombians are providing full assistance, both to keep us informed and to avoid unplanned encounters that might endanger the hostages. The U.S. publicly has counseled against negotiations with the FARC for any of its dozens of hostages, to avoid providing an incentive for further hostage-taking. We have supported Uribe's proposals for an exchange of hostages for FARC prisoners not accused of violent crimes provided that the FARC prisoners are prevented from returning to terrorist activities; so far the FARC has refused. Uribe has assured us that the U.S. hostages will be included in any possible exchange. ------------------------------------------- Development, Humanitarian, Judicial Reform ------------------------------------------- 14. (C) Alternative development, humanitarian aid, and democracy programs are going well. We have leveraged substantial private sector assistance to establish 270 square miles of legal agriculture benefiting 40,000 families. U.S. aid has helped nearly 2 million internally displaced persons. Colombia has the largest displaced population outside Africa. WOOD
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