US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA11339

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 011339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2014 
TAGS: EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: THE UN'S FUTURE IN COLOMBIA 
 
REF: A) BOGOTA 11207 B) BOGOTA 11205 C) BOGOTA 10728 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador met with UN special advisor on 
Colombia James LeMoyne at the latter's request on October 28 
and 30.  LeMoyne said that the EU would release a new policy 
paper on Colombia in January 2005 which would lead to an more 
engaged approach.  On demobilization, LeMoyne reported that 
GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo had requested UN political 
support and technical assistance.  LeMoyne told the 
Ambassador that the UN system was not working in Colombia and 
relations between the UN and GOC were strained.  The SYG had 
proposed a high-level working group to discuss the situation 
which will meet later this month.  Foreign Minister Barco 
will lead the Colombian side.  Of particular concern was the 
operation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, whose relations with the GOC and G-24 had 
deteriorated sharply.  LeMoyne reviewed the latest GOC 
proposal for Mexican facilitation of talks with the ELN.  He 
also reported that the FARC was conducting a series of 
interviews with prominent leaders in Bogota from business, 
politics and journalism to discuss their views on the current 
situation, prospects for the future and possible scenarios in 
which the FARC may consider taking political steps.  LeMoyne 
said that he doubted the FARC would do anything to help 
President Uribe but might be willing to "play politics" to 
see what they could pocket.  He speculated that the FARC 
might use the Catholic Church, the Swiss, and ex-presidents 
Samper and Pastrana to pressure President Uribe on the 
hostages and a humanitarian accord with terms closer to what 
FARC leaders want. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) On October 28 and 30, Ambassador met with UN special 
adviser on Colombia James LeMoyne during the latter's 
five-day visit to Bogota.  Issues covered included possible 
increased engagement by the EU, upcoming demobilizations of 
the AUC, the future of the UN presence, the status of ELN 
negotiations with the GOC, and recent FARC activity. 
 
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NEW EU POLICY PAPER ON COLOMBIA 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) LeMoyne said the EU position on the Colombian peace 
process was shifting.  A new policy paper was circulating in 
Brussels which would be blessed by the Council in December. 
LeMoyne described it as advocating a more serious, engaged 
approach in Colombia.  It will establish a framework to do 
more, he said.  EU High Representative Javier Solana planned 
to come to Colombia in January to unveil it. (From readouts 
Embassy has received elsewhere, the EU paper may contain new 
positive statements but also establish new conditionalities 
on aid.  That will impede assistance and widen the 
Colombia/EU gap.) 
 
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PEACE PROCESS 
------------- 
 
4. (C) LeMoyne briefed Ambassador on his meeting with GOC 
High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo on October 
26.  In the context of upcoming demobilizations of the AUC 
(reftels), Restrepo had requested that the UN provide: (1) 
public support for the OAS mission, including an appeal to 
donors for financial and technical support; (2) a strong 
declaration urging that those who disarm and the communities 
that receive them not be attacked; and (3) high-level 
training for GOC officials on demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR).  LeMoyne recommended that the UN, the 
International Committee for the Red Cross and the Catholic 
Church expand and deepen their DDR programs already underway 
in the affected areas. 
 
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REPAIRING GOC RELATIONS WITH THE UN 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) LeMoyne told Ambassador that his meetings with GOC 
officials during the UNGA "were not good."  President Uribe 
remained unhappy with the UN.  As a result, the SYG has 
proposed that the GOC and UN form a small, high-level working 
group to discuss the GOC's vision of the UN in Colombia and 
what the UN thought it ought to be doing.  Barco will lead 
the GOC delegation to the first meeting tentatively planned 
for the end of November in New York. 
 
6. (C) LeMoyne conceded that the UN system was not working in 
Colombia, characterizing the various agencies as atomized, 
defending their own micro-programs.  He noted that helpful 
but frustrated UNDP (and UN country team) director Alfredo 
Witschi would be retiring in the spring.  This might be an 
opportunity to set in motion a new approach.  LeMoyne also 
underscored that other countries -- the EU, the Nordics, 
Canada, Mexico, Brazil -- had to weigh in with the SYG and 
others in the system to energize UN attention to Colombia. 
 
 
7. (C) As LeMoyne saw it, the UN has three missions in 
Colombia: the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), a revised humanitarian action plan, and good 
offices.  He had already heard during this trip from FM Barco 
that GOC officials had lost confidence in the OHCHR presence 
and want it changed.  The 27 recommendations were now viewed 
as draconian demands.  In the view of GOC officials, whatever 
they told the OHCHR in the spirit of cooperation and 
consultation was used against them.  LeMoyne forewarned that, 
if the OHCHR report due out soon was seen as unfair by the 
GOC, "we will have a very big mess on our hands."  On the 
other hand, the UN presence and the human rights dimension in 
particular, were important to the Europeans and, with the EU 
likely to strengthen its involvement, the OHCHR would be even 
more essential.  The high-level working group needed to 
tackle this problem first. 
 
8. (C) According to LeMoyne, the humanitarian agencies were 
also not working because of turf battles.  The revised 
humanitarian action plan, to be launched in mid-November, had 
little chance of succeeding.  There was not much scope for 
the good offices role either.   There was little negotiating 
and unlikely to be any for a while.  U/SYG Prendergast was 
advocating that the UN lower its profile in Colombia or close 
down the operation altogether.  LeMoyne consulted with 
Restrepo on this point who urged that the UN good offices 
operation not depart.  Restrepo had agreed that increasing 
the role was equally unwarranted because it would raise 
illusions which were not true. 
 
9. (C) Ambassador agreed that the humanitarian agencies were 
making a huge effort, but most of it was being frittered away 
by incompetence.  He also expressed reservations about OHCHR 
representative Michael Fruhling.  LeMoyne reiterated his view 
that whatever its problems, the OHCHR presence was essential 
and would become even more so when the "Law for Justice and 
Reparations" passed the Congress.  Ambassador responded that 
the approach of both the OHCHR and leading NGOs on the law 
had been unhelpful.  Demobilization was happening and the 
legal framework to deal with senior leaders and those who 
have committed gross violations of human rights or 
narco-trafficking remained unfinished.  The result was that 
Restrepo's position at the negotiating table was undermined. 
His only response to requests from the AUC for legal 
guarantees was "no" because he has no legal structure to back 
him up. 
 
10. (C) LeMoyne said he was not prepared to write off the 
OHCHR but understood that the GOC wanted to.  Barco was more 
than upset, convinced that the GOC was given no credit for 
making a sincere effort and that mending relations may not be 
worth the effort.  Barco planned to travel to Geneva to meet 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour in 
mid-November to discuss the situation.  LeMoyne wondered 
whether the mandate of the office was a problem -- could it 
monitor and offer assistance to the GOC at the same time.  A 
debate was underway at OHCHR headquarters on the issue.  The 
office had had three directors and all had ended up badly. 
Perhaps it was time to review the mandate.  Ambassador 
disagreed, noting that the U.S. and others were able to do 
both.  GOC officials could absorb and respond constructively 
to criticism if convinced that their interlocutors were 
working in their best interest.  He noted that GOC officials 
remained fearful of the power and influence of the UN and the 
possibility that Colombia could land on the agenda of the 
Security Council.  GOC officials did not draw a distinction 
between the Council and the UN writ large, and were convinced 
that the parts of the UN they interacted with were 
unsympathetic. 
 
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STATUS OF TALKS WITH THE ELN 
---------------------------- 
 
11. (C) LeMoyne said the ELN was fading, no threat to anyone, 
and under the protection of the FARC.  The little brother-big 
brother dynamic remained in play: the smarter, more 
intellectual ELN, dependent on the thuggish and powerful 
FARC.  The ELN hated the FARC, was frightened of it, and 
believed it was wrong.  He was convinced that the FARC and 
ELN were meeting at high levels and maintained an agreement 
and alliance, and neither would negotiate seriously until 
things changed.  The ELN was trying to tell the FARC that it 
wanted international breathing space and needed to take 
political steps, but the FARC would limit its 
maneuverability.  Ambassador noted that the ELN remained 
politically important for the FARC, which would otherwise be 
isolated.  The ELN might be disappearing as a meaningful 
piece on the chessboard, but the FARC would do everything to 
keep it alive. 
 
12. (C)  LeMoyne heard that the Mexicans were putting 
considerable pressure on the GOC to move the negotiating 
process forward.  The ELN wants to meet the Mexicans directly 
and Mexico wants the ELN to come to Mexico.  Restrepo has 
resisted so far, insisting that the ELN respond to earlier 
GOC proposals.  Nine years of ELN traveling abroad had 
yielded little.  Restrepo wants the ELN to acknowledge that 
it has to deal with the GOC.  His latest proposal is for the 
Mexicans to tell the ELN that Restrepo meet with (jailed) 
Francisco Galan as a first step.  Then, the ELN would be 
permitted to go to Mexico for a one day meeting, and the next 
day, ELN would meet with Restrepo with Mexican facilitation. 
LeMoyne did not know how the ELN would respond.  He assumed 
the Mexicans would wince but go along. 
 
13. (C) Ambassador responded that the GOC was afraid that 
Mexican facilitation would turn into a negotiating session 
with the GOC outside the room.  Restrepo also knew, according 
to LeMoyne, that whatever travel rights he conceded to the 
ELN, the GOC would soon be pressed by the Swiss and others to 
give the FARC. 
 
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NEW FARC MOVES? 
--------------- 
 
14. (C) LeMoyne reported that the FARC had assembled a team 
of interviewers who were soliciting views in Bogota on the 
current situation, prospects for the future, and possible 
scenarios in which it could consider taking political steps. 
The FARC had reached out to a number of prominent individuals 
in business, politics and journalism.  Some had agreed to 
talk; others refused.  Most were surprised how easily the 
FARC was able to move around Bogota.  Characterizing the FARC 
as a Stalinist, 1950s-style organization whose public 
statements still mattered, LeMoyne said that the most recent 
FARC communiqu "was not entirely bad" either.  Finally, he 
said that FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez had cancer and 
was dying, and an effort was underway to raise the profile of 
Alfonso Cano.  He expected that an interview with Cano would 
be published soon, projecting him to a wider audience. 
 
15. (C) LeMoyne doubted that anything constructive would come 
out of the FARC leadership "until President Uribe was 
re-elected."  The FARC hated Uribe and would do nothing to 
help him politically or otherwise.  They are convinced, 
according to LeMoyne, that he will weaken after re-election. 
Nonetheless, the FARC may want to play politics over the next 
few months and see what they can pocket.  He speculated that 
they might use the Catholic Church or the Swiss to test the 
waters.  Or, they might make peace overtures through 
ex-presidents Samper or Pastrana to pressure Uribe on the 
hostages and a humanitarian accord with terms closer to what 
FARC leaders want.  Or, the FARC could accept a cease fire 
and play along to see what they could get out of it, with the 
hope of damaging Plan Patriota along the way.  LeMoyne 
acknowledged that Plan Patriota has been a strategic hit on 
the FARC and the leadership would do anything to rid 
themselves of it. 
 
16. (C) According to LeMoyne, the Swiss channel (Jean-Pierre 
Gontard) remained open, and he and the Swiss government 
continued to press the FARC for a ceasefire.  Their preferred 
scenario was to bring the FARC to Switzerland for a direct 
meeting with GOC officials under Swiss auspices.  LeMoyne 
noted that Restrepo had told him that if the FARC agreed to a 
ceasefire, everything was possible. 
 
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COMMENT 
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17. (C) In addition to an exhange of views, LeMoyne was 
looking to mend fences with the GOC and the G-24 to salvage 
the UN presence in Colombia.  The latter is worth monitoring 
closly.  LeMoyne's operation will be part of the GOC-UN 
evaluation.  He said that he would resign if it became clear 
that he was impeding progress.  The OHCHR operation has lost 
the GOC's confidence and exhausted its political capital with 
the G-24.  A meeting between Foreign Minister Barco and UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour would be 
useful to clear the air.  This is the OHCHR's largest 
operation outside of Geneva and should be its biggest 
success.  The GOC needs it to succeed as well.  As the GOC 
and the UN negotiate their future relationship, other 
countries active in Colombia beside the U.S. need to approach 
the SYG on the importance of supporting demobilization and 
other aspects of the peace process.  In that context, a new 
EU policy as described be LeMoyne would be welcome.  We 
understand that UK Foreign Secretary Straw has raised 
Colombia with the SYG on several occasions over the last few 
months.  Countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Brazil and others now need to do the same. 
WOOD