US embassy cable - 04NEWDELHI6999

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INDIA PUSHING NEPALESE ARMY TO BE MORE ACTIVE

Identifier: 04NEWDELHI6999
Wikileaks: View 04NEWDELHI6999 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2004-11-02 11:57:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER IN NP India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 006999 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: INDIA PUSHING NEPALESE ARMY TO BE MORE ACTIVE 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) should be more 
proactive in the fight against the Maoists, MEA Joint 
Secretary (Bhutan/Nepal) Ranjit Rae told Polcouns and Poloff 
 
SIPDIS 
in a November 1 meeting.  Describing the recent India-Nepal 
security cooperation group meeting, Rae reported that the GOI 
pressed the RNA to demonstrate visible results in its 
anti-insurgency campaign.  New Delhi was "at a loss" as to 
why the RNA had not been more forceful against the Maoists. 
Rae believed the cease-fire, called on account of a major 
local Hindu holiday, was over and that neither the GON nor 
the Maoists would extend it through the upcoming November 12 
Diwalli holidays, as the GOI had hoped. 
 
2.  (C) Looking ahead to King Gyanendra's late November visit 
to India, Rae indicated that New Delhi would press for an 
increased pace of counter-insurgent operations, viewing this 
as, "one of the few buttons left to press."  Rae said the GOI 
will also reiterate to the King New Delhi's strong opposition 
to any usurpation of emergency powers by the Palace. The 
Indian DCM from Kathmandu (who was also present during this 
meeting) added that he believed the US was reluctant to use 
the Palace as a conduit to push for more aggressive use of 
the RNA. 
 
3.  (C) Rae speculated that the October merger of the Maoist 
Communist Center and the People's War Group to form the 
Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), was influenced by 
the Nepalese Maoists (Reftel 1244).  He observed that this 
development confirmed GOI concerns of a Maoist spillover into 
India. 
 
4.  (C) Rae also commented on a conversation he recently had 
with the visiting British Ambassador to Nepal, who reportedly 
argued that taking a hard line with the Maoists might not be 
the best way to solve the problem.  Rae said the British 
opinion was that a weakened Maoists position would only make 
them more recalcitrant and less likely to negotiate. Rae said 
that the GOI does not agree with this argument.  He also 
expressed frustration about the continued European reluctance 
to press for a freeze on Maoist assets, calling this 
symptomatic of their naive approach to the violence in Nepal. 
MULFORD 

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