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| Identifier: | 04NEWDELHI6999 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04NEWDELHI6999 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2004-11-02 11:57:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PTER IN NP India |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 006999 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 TAGS: PREL, PTER, IN, NP, India-Nepal SUBJECT: INDIA PUSHING NEPALESE ARMY TO BE MORE ACTIVE Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 1. (C) The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) should be more proactive in the fight against the Maoists, MEA Joint Secretary (Bhutan/Nepal) Ranjit Rae told Polcouns and Poloff SIPDIS in a November 1 meeting. Describing the recent India-Nepal security cooperation group meeting, Rae reported that the GOI pressed the RNA to demonstrate visible results in its anti-insurgency campaign. New Delhi was "at a loss" as to why the RNA had not been more forceful against the Maoists. Rae believed the cease-fire, called on account of a major local Hindu holiday, was over and that neither the GON nor the Maoists would extend it through the upcoming November 12 Diwalli holidays, as the GOI had hoped. 2. (C) Looking ahead to King Gyanendra's late November visit to India, Rae indicated that New Delhi would press for an increased pace of counter-insurgent operations, viewing this as, "one of the few buttons left to press." Rae said the GOI will also reiterate to the King New Delhi's strong opposition to any usurpation of emergency powers by the Palace. The Indian DCM from Kathmandu (who was also present during this meeting) added that he believed the US was reluctant to use the Palace as a conduit to push for more aggressive use of the RNA. 3. (C) Rae speculated that the October merger of the Maoist Communist Center and the People's War Group to form the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), was influenced by the Nepalese Maoists (Reftel 1244). He observed that this development confirmed GOI concerns of a Maoist spillover into India. 4. (C) Rae also commented on a conversation he recently had with the visiting British Ambassador to Nepal, who reportedly argued that taking a hard line with the Maoists might not be the best way to solve the problem. Rae said the British opinion was that a weakened Maoists position would only make them more recalcitrant and less likely to negotiate. Rae said that the GOI does not agree with this argument. He also expressed frustration about the continued European reluctance to press for a freeze on Maoist assets, calling this symptomatic of their naive approach to the violence in Nepal. MULFORD
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