US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1796

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR E.MILLARD 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: AKASHI "SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGED," BUT NOT CLEAR WHY 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1794 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.  1.4(b,d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Japanese envoy Akashi is "somewhat 
encouraged" from his visit to Sri Lanka.  He found President 
Kumaratunga eager to move forward on talks, while the LTTE's 
Thamilchelvan complained that a "no war, no peace" situation 
was not satisfactory.  Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe said 
the UNP would not join the National Advisory Council until 
talks started, and JVP leader Somawansa supported talks but 
was distrustful of LTTE.  Ongoing debate on LTTE's commitment 
to federalism as solution is probably more sound than fury. 
We believe resumption of talks largely held back by Southern 
political factors, which prevent LTTE's real intentions from 
being tested.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Akashi "Somewhat Encouraged" 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi on November 2 
briefed selected Chiefs of Mission (US, UK, Netherlands, 
Australia, Norway, European Community) at the conclusion of 
his visit to Sri Lanka.  In sum, Akashi said, although he had 
been pessimistic before he arrived, he was now "somewhat 
encouraged."  He had met with President Kumaratunga, with 
Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe, with Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) political chief Thamilchelvan, and with a 
number of other minor political leaders.  He met Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) leader Amarasinghe at the latter's 
request.  He had also visited Trincomalee and Batticaloa in 
the east. 
 
President Wants to Talk 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Akashi said that he had a good meeting with President 
Kumaratunga, who told him she wanted to resuscitate the peace 
talks.  She asked him to convey the message to the LTTE that 
she was willing to meet 75 percent of LTTE demands on the 
agenda for the talks -- they needed to do the rest.  Akashi 
clarified that this meant that the GSL had agreed to begin 
talks solely on the basis of the LTTE's Interim Self 
Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal, that upon conclusion of 
an agreement the interim authority would be implemented, and 
that while it was being implemented, talks on final 
settlement issues would begin. 
 
Thamilchelvan Relaxed, Situation Needs to Change 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C) Akashi said that Thamilchelvan, who had arrived back 
from his month-long visit to Europe just two hours before 
they met, seemed relaxed and upbeat.  Thamilchelvan said the 
situation in Sri Lanka was at an important turning point, and 
the opportunity needed to be seized.  The present situation 
-- no war, no peace -- was not acceptable, and there was a 
need to move forward.  It was also necessary to maintain and 
strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).  Akashi said that 
he raised the issue of killings of political opponents and 
child abductions; Thamilchelvan responded with the usual 
explanations.  Thamilchelvan complained, again as usual, of 
the lack of humanitarian assistance to the North and East. 
 
5.  (C) European COMs at table all noted that Thamilchelvan 
had received strong messages from all countries he visited on 
his recent tour: 
-- Killings must stop 
-- Child abduction/recruitment must stop 
-- LTTE should reaffirm commitment to a settlement based on a 
federal system. 
 
All present noted that there is considerable humanitarian 
assistance flowing to the North and East (as well as 
assistance to other parts of the country) and that this 
should be brought to the LTTE's attention. 
 
JVP Wants Talks, Distrusts LTTE 
------------------------------- 
6.  (C) Akashi during this visit met for the first time with 
a JVP representative, the party's eminence grise, Somawansa 
Amarasinghe.  (This meeting was at the JVP's request.) 
Akashi said Somawansa maintained the JVP was not opposed to a 
negotiated solution within a federal structure.  Akashi 
noted, however, that Somawansa evinced a great distrust of 
the LTTE. 
 
Ranil Won't Join Advisory Council 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Opposition Leader and former Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremesinghe repeated to Akashi that the United National 
Party (UNP) would not participate in the President's proposed 
National Advisory Council (NAC) at this time, but would do so 
after negotiations resumed.  Akashi said that, interestingly, 
Thamilchelvan told him that the LTTE appreciated 
Wickremesinghe's additional statement that the UNP would 
support the government if it began negotiations based on the 
ISGA and the Oslo Declaration.  Thamilchelvan also said he 
feared the NAC could be a diversion from the negotiations. 
 
8.  (C) Further on this subject, during a lunch hosted by the 
UNP's Milinda Moragoda for Akashi later that day, Milinda 
noted press reports that Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga would 
meet the same day but said that this did not mean -- contrary 
to some media speculation -- that the UNP would participate 
in the NAC.  Milinda said that he hoped, however, that the 
meeting would be the start of a bilateral consultation 
process between the two leaders.  Moragoda also noted that it 
took nine months from the establishment of the CFA until the 
UNP government was able to begin talks with the LTTE. 
 
Federalism or Not? 
------------------ 
 
9.  (C) During Akashi breakfast there was also extended 
discussion of the LTTE's refusal to reaffirm commitment to 
federalism, especially in context of the forthcoming book by 
LTTE ideologue Balasingham in which he reportedly states that 
LTTE has not made a commitment to federalism and has not 
given up on independence if federalism fails.  Consensus was 
that this was less dramatic than it seemed: 
 
-- Oslo Declaration is itself not a firm commitment (parties 
committed themselves only to "explore a solution based on a 
federal structure"). 
-- The LTTE has always maintained it has other options if 
talks failed to find an acceptable solution. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C) It is not quite clear why Akashi pronounced himself 
"somewhat encouraged" -- perhaps only because he found no one 
eager to resume fighting.  Our opinion, which Ambassador 
conveyed to Akashi, is that GSL ability to move forward on 
peace process is largely stymied by internal Southern 
political factors: President's reliance on the JVP, intense 
personal rivalry between President and Wickremesinghe and the 
closely-linked desire of Kumaratunga to abolish the Executive 
Presidency.  In our view the President needs to find a 
comfort level to move ahead with or without the JVP, and 
Ranil and Kumaratunga need to establish at least a modus 
vivendi in support of the peace process.  If this happens, 
the LTTE will have to either return to the talks or show that 
its ostensible reasons for not returning -- lack of Southern 
consensus and GSL unwillingness to discuss ISGA -- are a 
facade. 
LUNSTEAD