US embassy cable - 04NEWDELHI6983

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INDIA ENCOURAGES DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

Identifier: 04NEWDELHI6983
Wikileaks: View 04NEWDELHI6983 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2004-11-02 08:39:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER SNAR IN BM CN India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, SNAR, IN, BM, CN, India-Burma 
SUBJECT: INDIA ENCOURAGES DEMOCRACY IN BURMA 
 
REF: A. 10/23 CAMP-PYATT E-MAIL 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 6881 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  India underlined its concerns about the 
lack of democracy in Burma during the recent visit of 
Rangoon's military leader Than Shwe, with Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh himself delivering the message, MEA Joint 
Secretary (South East Asia - I) Mitra Vashishta told us on 
 
SIPDIS 
November 1.  The decision to encourage democracy in Rangoon 
reflects the GOI belief that India is best placed to help 
Burma reform, that Aung San Sui Kyi's "time has come and 
gone," and that democracy will take root in Burma only 
through greater engagement and people-to-people ties. 
Vashishta cited the October 29-31 visit to New Delhi of UN 
Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail as evidence of India's 
resolve to stay engaged on democracy in Burma.  The GOI would 
welcome US suggestions on how to best to promote democracy 
there, and has agreed to provide grants and limited military 
equipment to Rangoon in an attempt to encourage cooperation 
against anti-India insurgents located along the Indo-Burma 
border.  However, there are no Indian plans to conduct joint 
military operations with the junta.  PolCouns stressed our 
concerns about the safety and treatment of ASSK and the 
democratic opposition under Burma's new Prime Minister (ref 
A), and urged India to continue to press for democratic 
reform in Rangoon.  End Summary. 
 
Democracy 
--------- 
 
2.  (C) Democracy topped India's agenda for the October 24-29 
visit of Burma's military leader Than Shwe, MEA Joint 
Secretary (South East Asia - I) Mitra Vashishta told PolCouns 
 
SIPDIS 
and Poloff on November 1.  Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
himself raised the issue with Than Shwe "in a much more 
intense way than could be expressed" in the media, she said, 
noting that India had decided to raise the issue of democracy 
with Burma despite potentially negative consequences for the 
relationship.  Vashishta reported that New Delhi had to 
battle for the inclusion of a joint statement paragraph 
emphasizing India's desire to see "a stable, peaceful, 
prosperous and democratic Myanmar."  She commented that the 
Burmese delegation was "willing to do anything" to have that 
paragraph removed, adding that the inclusion of the paragraph 
was a "coup for India."  The final version of the document 
released on October 29 "expressed support for national 
reconciliation and an early transition to democracy in 
Myanmar." 
 
3.  (C) Asked about New Delhi's plan to further encourage 
democracy in Burma, Vashishta responded that Rangoon 
considers India a democratic role model, and emphasized that 
the GOI has the "best credentials" to promote democracy 
there.  She mused that democracy could only be established 
through grass-roots initiatives, and stressed that India 
would do "whatever it takes" to empower the people of Burma 
in this respect.  Referring to the increased people-to-people 
ties between India and Pakistan, Vashishta said that the GOI 
plans to pursue a similar strategy with Burma by promoting 
culture and sports links between the two countries.  "We are 
much less bothered by the situation in Burma than in 
Pakistan," she noted, adding that she would welcome US 
suggestions on how to encourage greater reform in Rangoon. 
 
4.  (C) According to Vashishta, democracy in Burma is too 
closely linked with the greatly respected Aung San Sui Kyi 
(ASSK), whose "day has come and gone."  She said that Than 
Shwe had expressed a commitment to democracy during the 
visit, and speculated that he would be more apt to bring 
about democratic reform if he could do so without losing 
face.  PolCouns underlined US concerns about the lack of 
democracy in Burma and expressed the hope that India would 
continue to press this issue with the junta. 
 
Engaging Burma, Meeting India's Strategic Needs 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  (C) Describing the Than Shwe trip as "entirely devoted to 
India's interests," Vashishta stated that New Delhi decided 
to proceed with the visit, even after the ouster of former-PM 
Khin Nyunt because the GOI did not view the replacement of 
Nyunt as an indication of "which way the dust would fall" on 
democracy.  The GOI believes the coup was an "internal 
struggle," she said, speculating that the junta may be 
somewhat fragile.  As evidence, Vashishta observed that Than 
Shwe traveled with the wives of two other powerful generals, 
Thura Shwe Man and Soe Win, who she mused may have been used 
as "hostages" to ensure tranquillity among the generals in 
Rangoon during Than Shwe's absence. 
 
6.  (C) Vashishta reiterated India's belief that only 
constructive engagement of the military regime could bring 
about any meaningful change, saying sanctions have only 
isolated Burma, and have not encouraged democratic reforms 
there.  Burma is so isolated that members of Than Shwe's 
delegation wondered whether they would have to "go nuclear" 
to get US attention, she remarked, noting the comparison to 
Pakistan.  She emphasized that if India also isolates Burma, 
no one will be able to engage Rangoon on democracy or other 
issues. 
 
7.  (C) Flagging that the timing of UN Special Envoy for 
Burma Razali Ismail's October 29-31 visit to New Delhi was 
not coincidental, Vashishta expressed India's desire to work 
with the UN on Burma.  However, she argued that the 
organization "has lost credibility" in the eyes of developing 
countries and should at least make an attempt to be more 
"pro-Myanmar."  The EU is too "obvious, shabby, shortsighted 
and full of contradictions" to play a meaningful role in 
Burma, she argued, while Thailand takes a pro-active approach 
to Rangoon only "because one of their ministers wants to be 
the next UN Secretary General." 
 
Counter-Terrorism Agreement 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Billing the Memorandum of Understanding on 
"Non-Traditional Security Issues" as an agreement on counter 
terrorism "whatever they call it," Vashishta said the MOU 
outlines Rangoon's obligations to crack-down on anti-India 
militants operating out of Burmese territory.  The GOI does 
not believe that Rangoon is fueling the insurgents to 
pressure New Delhi because "it is not in Burma's strategic 
interest," but New Delhi is growing increasingly concerned 
about insurgent activities in the border regions.  The GOB 
agreed to move troops to the Indo-Burmese border "not because 
of their interests, but because some of India's interests are 
now tied up with theirs," Vashishta said, citing economic 
development as an example.  She expressed optimism that Burma 
was taking India's request seriously, unlike in the past. 
She noted that Soe Win, Burma's new PM, had previously 
commanded forces along the border with India.  PolCouns 
stressed our concerns about the safety and treatment of ASSK 
and the democratic opposition, given Soe Win's direct 
involvement in the May 30, 2003 attack on ASSK and her 
followers (ref A).  Vashishta had different information, 
alleging that some of the opposition parties were hopeful 
about a near-term political opening. 
 
No To Military Exercises, Yes To Grants 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Although the India-Burma joint statement on Than 
Shwe's visit mentions the "possibilities of expanding 
cooperation" in defense, Vashishta categorically stated that 
joint military exercises "are absolutely ruled out," saying 
this is "a big, firm no."  She indicated the GOI could 
provide limited military equipment to Rangoon, "on par with 
what the rest of ASEAN provides," but is "very careful" when 
it comes to military cooperation with Burma. 
10.  (C) Vashishta confirmed plans to provide Burma with a 
USD 20 million dollar grant to be used for energy, gas, and 
upgrading refining facilities, and said the money would be 
used to entice Rangoon to reform.  She explained that the 
junta would not receive the funds unless "they do certain 
things," saying that India hopes to "engage them (with the 
grant) and slowly lay down conditions for reform."  She cast 
this as part of New Delhi's people-to-people strategy. 
 
China 
----- 
 
11.  (C) Expressing concern about Chinese influence in Burma, 
Vashishta said that the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) has been "learning from the master about how to 
hoodwink the international community" on human rights.  She 
said that China would like an Indian Ocean port and hopes to 
project its influence "everywhere India does."  Vashishta 
argued that "what you hear about the PLA in Burma is only the 
tip of the iceberg," as US intelligence must know.  Burmese 
engagement with India stems in part from Rangoon's belief 
that "China takes them for granted," she asserted. 
 
Religion 
-------- 
 
12.  (C) Commenting on the delegation's visit to several 
important Buddhist shrines in India, Vashishta noted that 
over the last three years, Than Shwe had repeatedly requested 
a pilgrimage to the sites and speculated that the religious 
journey was a major factor behind the trip.  She claimed that 
this pilgrimage was not just aimed a burnishing the junta's 
Buddhist credentials, but rather was related to Than Shwe's 
personal sense of mortality.  But she added, the Burmese 
military did not think they had done anything wrong, and do 
not need to atone for their sins. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (C) Led by Foreign Secretary Saran, a former Ambassador 
to Rangoon, the GOI has embarked on a major diplomatic 
initiative with Burma.  India's policy toward the GOB is 
pragmatic, based largely on New Delhi's security interests, 
but also reflects the GOI's desire eventually to see a 
democratic Burma to its east.  India has welcomed US input 
about how best to encourage democracy there, presenting an 
opportunity that we should seize upon to expand the US-India 
regional dialogue to include developments in Rangoon. 
MULFORD 

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