US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2789

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TK, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: TURKEY/EU - FM GUL TO EU: GIVE US OUR DATE WITH 
DESTINY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a low-key visit to The Hague on October 
25, Turkish FM Gul reportedly complained about provisions of 
the EC's October 6 report that highlighted Turkey's "unique" 
situation.  He worried it was still uncertain that the 
European Council would set a date in December to begin 
accession negotiations or that negotiations would be left 
open-ended rather than designed to anticipate eventual 
accession.  Dutch POLDIR Hugo Siblesz told Ambassador Sobel 
on October 27 that Gul did not appear to understand that 
pressing the EU at this point to go beyond the EC report was 
a non-starter; if anything, he said, the European Council's 
decision would be even "narrower" than anticipated by the 
report.  Siblesz added that FM Bot also had been up front in 
warning Gul to stop complaining about Turkey's "unique" 
treatment by the EU -- Turkey is a unique country with a 
unique set of circumstances that must be taken into 
consideration.  Gul might have ultimately agreed to keep 
Turkey's worries in private EU channels, but he reminded the 
Dutch that Turkish public opinion must also be taken into 
account.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Hannie Pollman-Zaal, MFA director for western and 
central Europe, told the DCM on October 27 that the Gul 
meeting was "good and open" and that he understands the 
bottom line answer will be a "yes" reflecting the Commission 
report and drawing language from it.  The Turks might not 
like some of the language, Pollman predicted, adding that in 
her estimation they seemed resigned to living with it. 
Turkish Ambassador Ildem separately told DCM he understood 
that "this is the ballast we need to keep the "yes" from 
being swamped by skeptics in the EU."  Pollman said Gul came 
into the Bot meeting with a list of complaints about the 
Commission report and seemed ready to go public with them, 
Pollman-Zaal said.  Pollman added that the Dutch had 
"objectively explained to the Turks that they should abandon 
plans for a public push-back campaign" since it would not 
play well to the EU 25 decision makers or publics. 
 
3.  (C)  "Turkey also has a public opinion to take into 
account," Gul reportedly warned the Dutch, according to Sule 
Gurel (protect), first secretary at the Turkish Embassy and 
notetaker at the Gul/Bot meeting who shared her notes with 
Poloff on October 27.  She confirmed that Gul's EU strategy 
was now to express Turkey's concerns "privately," that is, 
choosing to share them closely with the EU Presidency (the 
Dutch), not more openly with the press or even other member 
states at this time.  Gul's concerns about the report's 
procedures included especially those for "permanent 
safeguards" and the "braking mechanism, she said. 
 
4. (C)  Gurel reported that Gul asked the Dutch to ensure a 
start date for negotiations including "a clear prospect of 
membership," signaling that Turkey had problems with the 
Commission's formulation for "open ended negotiations." 
Pollman predicted to the DCM that "the starting date will be 
the very last thing the Council will decide, after the 
operative decision language is hammered out."  Pollman 
indicated that elements of a draft a draft "paragraph" are 
making the rounds in the EU and had been discussed -- 
although not necessarily shared -- with Gul.  Pollman allowed 
that the paragraph put on the table at the Council meeting in 
December "might not be the one that comes out of the 
meeting."  Pollman concluded that she has wagered with 
colleagues that the European heads will need a second Council 
(she guesses December 22) because they will be unable to come 
to consensus on Turkey at the December 17 EU Summit. 
 
5.  (C)  Gurel revealed that her Embassy's assessment of the 
Council's December decision is that it will include 
unpalatable elements for Turkey, including the "open-ended" 
negotiations and "permanent safeguards."  She confirmed that 
Turkey was aware that others (like the USG) believed Turkey 
"should take yes for an answer" and be prepared to move on 
past December.  The packaging of the Council's decision had 
to be just right, she cautioned.  (Comment:  As one Dutch 
colleague put it, "It is like an invitation to a meal; Turkey 
should be glad to have been invited to the table and not 
complain about what is served, even if there are unsavory 
bits on the plate.")  Gul and Bot concluded the meeting by 
agreeing to stay in "regular" contact, aiming for the 
November 24 EU Troika with Turkey and the November 29-30 
EUROMED meeting, both in The Hague. 
 
6.  (C)  Speaking with Poloff on October 29, Pollman asked if 
the USG would share with the Dutch what we had heard or 
learned from other EU member states regarding their feelings 
about the accession process, this as a way to help the Dutch 
strategize the end game negotiation.  At the same time, she 
asked if the USG were planning any new diplomatic initiatives 
on Turkey before December, gently reminding that U.S. 
reticence on the subject would play best to the EU at this 
critical time. 
 
7.  (C)  Finally, on Cyprus, Pollman said the Dutch were 
handling the Government of Cyprus very carefully in the weeks 
before December's Council.  This meant the Dutch would not be 
pressuring them on the trade package issue until after the 
December 17 Council resolved Turkey accession.  "The Turkey 
question is very serious for Cyprus," she said, "and they see 
the trade issue the same way.  We do not want to give them 
too much to handle at one time." 
SOBEL