US embassy cable - 04DUBLIN1632

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL, EUN 
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSES ON PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE 
 
REF: A. STATE 230353 
 
     B. STATE 228399 
 
Classified By: Poltical-Economic Counselor Mary Daly, Reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
1.  (U) On October 28, Post delivered reftels' talking points 
to Gerald Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) European 
correspondent. 
 
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Iraq 
---- 
 
2.   (C) Keown noted that Member States' foreign ministers 
were preparing for November 2 discussions in Brussels on 
measures to support Iraq's transition process, with a view to 
presenting an agreed package to Prime Minister Allawi on 
November 5.  The package, said Keown, would focus heavily on 
election assistance programs (per ref A), but would also 
include a recommendation to establish an Iraq-EU Forum.  He 
added that Member States continued to explore possibilities 
for police training, whether in Iraq or Jordan, but it was 
unclear whether this training component would be ripe for 
inclusion in the package to be presented to Allawi. 
 
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Iran 
---- 
 
3.  (C) Iranian negotiators had returned home to consider the 
proposals put forward in Vienna by the EU-3 (France, the UK, 
and Germany) in October 26-27 discussions on Iran's uranium 
enrichment activity, said Keown.  He pointed out that the 
Iranians had referred to the proposals as "unbalanced," but 
had not rejected them, as some initial press reporting had 
implied.  He noted that the EU-3 were planning a follow-up 
meeting (now set for November 5, according to October 29 
media reports) with Iranian negotiators ahead of the November 
25-26 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. 
 
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MEEP 
---- 
 
4.  (C) EU views on the current situation in the Middle East 
were not significantly divergent from U.S. positions, said 
Keown.  He noted that the EU had set forth three criteria to 
judge whether Prime Minister Sharon's planned withdrawal from 
Gaza would be consistent with the Roadmap: (1) the withdrawal 
must not lead to increased settlement activity in the West 
Bank; (2) the withdrawal must be orderly; and (3) the 
withdrawal must be conducted in consultation with the 
Palestinians.  The EU hoped to avoid a worst-case scenario in 
which the withdrawal would create a political vacuum in Gaza, 
with the Palestinian Authority unable to assume governance in 
any meaningful way.  Keown recalled that the EU had made 
clear its support for the Palestinian Authority in the 
withdrawal process during October 25 discussions in Brussels 
with Foreign Minister Sha'ath. 
 
5.  (U) In October 27 testimony before the Irish parliament's 
Joint Committee on European Affairs, Noel Treacy, Minister of 
State for European Affairs, said that the first item on the 
Irish and EU agenda with the new U.S. Administration would be 
a request for U.S. re-engagement in MEEP.  The Joint 
Committee also passed a resolution the same day calling for 
continued action beyond the Gaza withdrawal to sustain the 
peace process. 
 
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Russia 
------ 
 
6.  (C) Keown said that the November 11 EU-Russia Summit in 
the Hague would address four subject areas as agreed at the 
2003 EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg: economic relations, 
security, justice and home affairs, and 
cultural/education/research ties.  He cited EU hopes that the 
upcoming Summit would yield action plans on each subject and 
that this form of engagement would offer opportunities to 
address concerns on media freedom, civil society, 
counter-terrorism cooperation, and regional conflicts.  Keown 
also pointed out that the centralizing tendencies apparent in 
Putin's administration have a deep historical basis. 
 
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Sudan 
----- 
 
7.  (C) The EU had no differences with the United States on 
objectives for Sudan, particularly regarding the lead role to 
be played by the African Union (AU) in Darfur, observed 
Keown.  The EU's continuing impression, he said, was that the 
AU had the political will and personnel for stepped-up 
deployment in Sudan, but lacked the required infrastructure. 
The AU had thus come to the EU with extensive requests for 
assistance, and the EU had responded with commitments on 
funds and material, including basic items like boots.  Keown 
said he did not know whether the additional 80 million euros 
pledged by the EU on October 20 for Sudan would be in place 
by mid-November, but he noted the EU's intention to make the 
tranche available as quickly as possible. 
 
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Somalia 
------- 
 
8.  (C) The EU welcomed recent progress in Somalia's 
reconciliation process as good news in the making, noted 
Keown.  He added that, as the process moved forward, the 
primary challenge would be whether the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) headed by Abdullahi Yusuf, a leader from the 
northern Puntland, would be able to establish control in 
southern Somalia. 
 
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Ukraine 
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9.  (C) The EU, which was contributing a monitoring mission 
for the October 31 Ukrainian vote, shared U.S. disappoitment 
with failed attempts to promote a free and fair election 
process, observed.  He expected that the EU would continue to 
seek consultations with the United States once the election 
results were known. 
 
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Kosovo 
------ 
 
10.  (C) Keown explained that the EU was deeply engaged in 
efforts to support the economic viability of Kosovo, which 
was tightly linked to progress on political and security 
issues.  Keown was unaware, however, of any specific progress 
on EU proposals to develop an economic development strategy, 
as called for in the Eide Report.  He said that while the EU 
had welcomed the outcome of the October 23 Kosovo Assembly 
elections, the effective boycott of the polls by more than 85 
percent of Kosovo Serbs had detracted from the outcome.  The 
EU was now focused on the international community's mid-2005 
review of progress made by Kosovo's elected officials in 
meeting standards of accountability. 
 
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Cyprus 
------ 
 
11.  (C) It was unclear when there would be agreement within 
the EU on the regulation for direct trade with North Cyprus 
and on aid disbursements, acknowledged Keown.  He observed 
that progress on these fronts had been slow due to political 
and legal constraints, not because of any cooling in the EU's 
commitment to support movement toward a settlement.  These 
constraints derived from an unprecedented situation in which 
the EU was attempting to work with a region within a Member 
State that was occupied by a Candidate State.  Keown 
explained that the EU's decision before the April referendum 
to earmark funds for disbursement "pending a future 
settlement" had also complicated attempts to disburse aid now. 
BENTON