US embassy cable - 04HARARE1790

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PHUM, ZI, Parliamentary Affairs 
SUBJECT: SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT CONFIRMS ELECTORAL REFORMS, 
PREVIEWS RULING PARTY CONGRESS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1335 (B) HARARE 1157 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a courtesy call by the Ambassador on 
October 26, Speaker of the Parliament and ZANU-PF Secretary 
for Administration Emmerson Mnangagwa outlined modest 
electoral reforms under consideration by the Parliament.  He 
confirmed that the GOZ intended to implement reforms in time 
for the upcoming Parliamentary elections, which he confirmed 
would take place in March.  He recited a familiar litany of 
ruling party achievements and objectives that he expected to 
shape the December ZANU-PF Party Congress.  His reiteration 
of proposed electoral reform did not include anything that 
would address the fundamental flaws in the electoral process. 
 His prescriptions for economic recovery hearkened back to 
failed command and control policies.  All in all, the ever 
cordial Speaker broke little new ground and appeared to 
foreshadow no substantial change in GOZ policy in the run-up 
to next year's elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Implementing SADC Principles: Legislate Now, Change 
Constitution Later 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a parliamentary meeting room accompanied by Clerk 
of the Parliament Austin Zvoma and two notetakers, Mnangagwa 
reported that the current parliamentary session would wrap up 
no later than three months before the conduct of 
parliamentary elections.  Elections would be conducted in 
March, as President Mugabe had announced, although a date had 
not been set.  As speaker, Mnangagwa was coordinating the 
passage of a host of key GOZ priority bills, including an 
electoral reform bill that Mnangagwa characterized as 
implementing Zimbabwe's commitment to SADC electoral 
principles. 
 
3.  (C) Elaborating on the election, the Speaker noted that 
the Lancaster House Constitution gave the Government 
authority to run elections.  Nonetheless, "SADC trends" were 
to move away from government-administered elections and the 
GOZ had agreed to follow that trend by appointing an 
"independent" electoral commission.  The current composition 
of Parliament would prevent the ruling party from effecting 
necessary constitutional changes, but the electoral reform 
bill and other government policies would satisfy electoral 
principles agreed to at SADC's Mauritius summit.  If the 
ruling party won at least a 2/3 majority in next year's 
elections, it would enact constitutional amendments to 
solidify and fine tune the electoral changes.  Among the 
constitutional changes under discussion was the creation of 
an upper legislative house. 
 
4.  (C) Mnangagwa asserted that, in addition to legislative 
electoral reform, the GOZ was implementing additional 
relevant measures through administrative regulations.  Other 
measures, such as a code of conduct worked out by the parties 
and a constructive role for churches, could further improve 
the electoral climate.   Mnangagwa concluded that Zimbabwe 
was ahead of most SADC members in implementing the electoral 
principles and hoped that "the U.S. will see that we mean 
well for our people." 
 
Party Congress to Showcase Achievements and Failures 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5.  (C) Mnangagwa confirmed that the ZANU-PF Party Congress 
would be held in Harare December 1-5.  The Congress was 
conducted every five years to critique the ruling party's 
performance over the past five years and to chart its course 
for the next five.  Previewing this year's exercise, 
Mnangagwa indicated that the party would feature land reform 
and the broadening of the commercial farm base as its 
principal achievement of the past five years.  At the same 
time, the party would debate its shortcomings and focus on 
how to make the new economy more productive. 
 
6.  (C) Mnangagwa asserted that the GOZ's policies to combat 
HIV/AIDS, while not fully successful, were an important 
achievement.  Zimbabwe was the first country in Africa to 
implement an "AIDS levy", which even in this time of economic 
difficulty was funding critical programs to benefit infected 
and affected populations.  Anti-retro virals were now being 
produced and disseminated in the country and wider 
distribution of nevarapine was a high priority in stemming 
mother to child transmission.  The Ambassador interjected 
with a description of the levels and nature of extensive CDC 
and USAID HIV/AIDS-related assistance in Zimbabwe. 
 
7.  (C) The Speaker identified high unemployment as among the 
ruling party's perceived areas of failure.  However, formal 
sector statistics belied the significant growth of employment 
in the informal sector, where he asserted many were doing 
quite well.  One of the GOZ's challenges was to reduce 
nervousness about the informal sector and to position it to 
contribute more meangingfully to the fiscus.  Stimulating 
small operators would be a priority in rehabilitating the 
economy.  In the mining sector, for example, large tracts 
were reserved for multinational firms, such as 
Anglo-American, even thought they had been unutilized for 
years.  The GOZ intended to open up previously reserved 
dormant land for exploitation by small operators. 
 
8.  (C) The Speaker indicated that agriculture would remain 
the nation's principal engine of growth once confidence in 
the sector was restored.  Most of the sector would rest on 
99-year leases, although private ownership would remain to 
some extent.  For government-owned leaseholds, the GOZ would 
dictate crop choices and set production targets for each 
province, but would leave portions of each property for 
personal use. 
 
9.  (C) Foreign relations was another subject that would 
require discussion at the Party Congress.  The Party would 
have to account for the deterioration of relations with the 
United States, the UK, the EU, the World Bank and the IMF, 
which he attributed to Western opposition to land reform and 
how it was implemented.  Notwithstanding existing tensions, 
though, the Speaker said the Party wanted to improve the lot 
of ordinary Zimbabweans and would "be delighted if old 
partners were with us, not against us." 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador welcomed the Party's apparent shift 
of focus from the history of land reform to the challenge of 
how to make the economy more productive.  He questioned the 
utility of government production targets and urged Zimbabwe 
to exploit market mechanisms to unlock the land's true 
potential.  The Speaker accepted the Ambassador's offer to 
share with him a book by developmental economist Hernando de 
Soto on such issues.  Finally, Mnangagwa expressed 
appreciation for the USAID-funded State University of New 
York program, which he said was making important 
contributions to the growing effectiveness of the 
Parliament's committee system. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C) The Speaker's tone and substance conveyed an 
interest in better bilateral relations consistent with other 
recent encounters with senior GOZ officials.  Nonetheless, 
there was nothing here to suggest the GOZ intends to engage 
in more than superficial gestures and public relations geared 
principally with SADC audiences to rehabilitate its stature. 
Mnangagwa's preview of the ruling party's economic policy 
prescriptions, with its heavy state role and atomization of 
the private sector, was especially disappointing.  Conjuring 
up images of decades-old failed communist experiments 
elsewhere, it testified to the continued priority of 
political control over economic recovery within the 
leadership and the dearth of meaningful strategies to 
rehabilitate the once productive economy. 
 
12.  (C) We see no indication that Mnangagwa is any more 
willing than other senior ZANU-PF officials to countenance 
measures that could undermine the party's political 
dominance.  However, the pragmatic political operator may be 
prepared to show a more moderate face, perhaps learning 
lessons from his 2000 loss to an MDC candidate for Parliament 
and his loss of the party chairmanship race the same year to 
John Nkomo.  An NGO contact from Kwekwe reported that 
Mnangagwa recently instructed local party structures that he 
wanted to run a tolerant, non-violent MP election campaign 
that would not alienate those inside or outside the party. 
In the same vein, he has urged themes of tolerance and 
non-violence in national media broadcasts.  Other NGO 
contacts have characterized him as "constructive" on numerous 
issues in the Parliament as long as ruling party control was 
not at stake.  Local lawyers credit him as being the most 
effective Minister of Justice the nation has seen, although 
standards for that position have not been particularly high. 
 
 
13.  (C) Mnangagwa continues to be a central figure in the 
publicly quiet but fractious jockeying for position in the 
ruling party's putative succession race.  Handicapping his 
chances are his reputed unpopularity among party rank and 
file and his pivotal role in the Matabeleland massacres of 
the 1980s.  Nonetheless, he retains considerable control over 
the party's pursestrings and reportedly commands the loyalty 
of many in the party's provincial hierarchies (who will be 
crucial in selection of a Vice-President to succeed the late 
Simon Muzenda) and the security apparatus.  In any event, as 
with all pretenders to power here, his relative strength will 
hinge for now on the will of the President.  The President 
reportedly allowed investigations of alleged Mnangagwa 
corruption to proceed earlier this year but ultimately 
intervened to save him from substantial damning evidence.  If 
true, such reports imply that the President may intend to 
keep all pretenders off balance but in play, defending 
themselves and undercutting each other while he remains above 
the fray.  As always, Mugabe has positioned himself to play 
the ball either way: should he ultimately pick Mnangagwa as 
his successor he can fireproof the Speaker against corruption 
charges by claiming that the allegations have already been 
investigated and dismissed as groundless. 
 
DELL