US embassy cable - 04SANAA2754

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INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON RAMADAN RELEASES

Identifier: 04SANAA2754
Wikileaks: View 04SANAA2754 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2004-10-28 13:41:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON RAMADAN RELEASES 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary.  DCM pressed Interior Minister al-Alimi 
on October 26 not to proceed with ROYG plans to release all 
138 security detainees, Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna in a 
Ramadan Amnesty in the next days and weeks.  A decision to go 
forward, said DCM, may have serious consequences for 
U.S.-Yemen partnership in the GWOT..  DCM urged Alimi to 
continue to hold 30 of the 138, plus Dulqum and al-Banna, 
while we work together to investigate and build legal cases 
against them.  Alimi agreed in principle to cooperate and 
also recommended we work directly with the attorney general 
on the al-Banna and Dulqum cases to explore the possibility 
of prosecution; the MOI cautioned, however, that President 
Saleh's deadlines stood and any review of cases had to be 
accomplished within the set timeframe.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Eleventh Hour Meeting 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF)  DCM, COS, Legatt and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker) 
met with Interior Minister Alimi at 2300 on October 26 to 
discuss the pending Ramadan release of 138 security 
detainees, Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna.  DCM made clear 
the negative mood in Washington and possible consequences for 
the ROYG vis-a-vis USG cooperation and assistance on all 
fronts should Yemen release these known al-Qaida associates 
before a legal case against them can be assembled.  Alimi 
repeated the ROYG's position that the releases could be 
prevented only if the USG provided solid case evidence that 
could be used in a Yemeni court.  He added that we should 
trust the strong measures the ROYG would take to ensure that 
those releases stay out of trouble. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  COS responded that information on USG objection 
to the release of 30 of the 138 individuals would be provided 
the next morning (October 27), however, he stressed, it was 
incumbent upon the ROYG to build a legal case, according to 
Yemeni law.  DCM proposed a joint effort by USG and ROYG 
officials to review together the evidence against the 30 
detainees, Dulqum and al-Banna, in order to find a legal 
solution.  Alimi agreed in principle, but insisted that the 
ROYG had no other information and was relying on the U.S. to 
provide evidence. 
 
------------------- 
Dulqum and al-Banna 
------------------- 
 
4.  (S/NF)  In response to Alimi's claim that the ROYG 
possesses no evidence on Dulqum and al-Banna's links to 
al-Qaida, Legatt showed Alimi a 52-page dossier on al-Banna 
and promised to provide an Arabic translation within days. 
(Note:  the dossier represents the latest of several 
summaries of al-Banna's federal indictment shared by legatt 
with the ROYG.  End Note).  Information that links Dulqum 
directly to AQ, said COS, has been shared with the ROYG.  We 
do not believe that information is true, retorted Alimi, and 
we cannot try Dulqum on the evidence we currently have. 
EmbOffs pressed the danger in going ahead with the releases, 
pointed out several cases where the ROYG released individuals 
who went on to perpetrate suicide and other terrorists 
attacks in the region. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  "We have laws," said Alimi, "a Constitution, a 
Parliament to which we are responsible.  There are 
journalists, human rights groups, families of detainees we 
must answer to; we cannot continue to hold these men 
indefinitely without bringing them to trial."  DCM agreed, 
saying the U.S. is asking the ROYG to show it is serious 
about our partnership in the GWOT by not releasing known AQ 
associates while we work together to build a legal case 
against them.  "The door is open," replied Alimi, but the 
President's deadlines stand and we have to work within those 
limits. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (S/NF)  During his phone call with NSC CT Advisor 
Townsend, Saleh agreed to postpone any releases until the 
20th day of Ramadan (November 3), and to hold Dulqum and 
al-Banna until Ramadan is over.  Neither Saleh nor Alimi, 
however, are showing signs of backing-down.  The ROYG 
continues to demand the USG provide solid case evidence to 
prevent the releases.  Although Saleh has in the past offered 
to hand over al-Banna in exchange for 5 million in rewards 
for justice program funds, the current ROYG stance, that 
Yemen law prevents extradition of citizens to other 
countries, in concert with their claim that he has not 
violated Yemeni law, leaves us at a stand-still on a legal 
solution for al-Banna.  We will report further developments. 
End Comment. 
KRAJESKI 

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