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| Identifier: | 04SANAA2754 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04SANAA2754 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2004-10-28 13:41:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002754 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014 TAGS: PTER, PREL, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI ON RAMADAN RELEASES Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S/NF) Summary. DCM pressed Interior Minister al-Alimi on October 26 not to proceed with ROYG plans to release all 138 security detainees, Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna in a Ramadan Amnesty in the next days and weeks. A decision to go forward, said DCM, may have serious consequences for U.S.-Yemen partnership in the GWOT.. DCM urged Alimi to continue to hold 30 of the 138, plus Dulqum and al-Banna, while we work together to investigate and build legal cases against them. Alimi agreed in principle to cooperate and also recommended we work directly with the attorney general on the al-Banna and Dulqum cases to explore the possibility of prosecution; the MOI cautioned, however, that President Saleh's deadlines stood and any review of cases had to be accomplished within the set timeframe. End Summary. --------------------- Eleventh Hour Meeting --------------------- 2. (S/NF) DCM, COS, Legatt and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker) met with Interior Minister Alimi at 2300 on October 26 to discuss the pending Ramadan release of 138 security detainees, Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna. DCM made clear the negative mood in Washington and possible consequences for the ROYG vis-a-vis USG cooperation and assistance on all fronts should Yemen release these known al-Qaida associates before a legal case against them can be assembled. Alimi repeated the ROYG's position that the releases could be prevented only if the USG provided solid case evidence that could be used in a Yemeni court. He added that we should trust the strong measures the ROYG would take to ensure that those releases stay out of trouble. 3. (S/NF) COS responded that information on USG objection to the release of 30 of the 138 individuals would be provided the next morning (October 27), however, he stressed, it was incumbent upon the ROYG to build a legal case, according to Yemeni law. DCM proposed a joint effort by USG and ROYG officials to review together the evidence against the 30 detainees, Dulqum and al-Banna, in order to find a legal solution. Alimi agreed in principle, but insisted that the ROYG had no other information and was relying on the U.S. to provide evidence. ------------------- Dulqum and al-Banna ------------------- 4. (S/NF) In response to Alimi's claim that the ROYG possesses no evidence on Dulqum and al-Banna's links to al-Qaida, Legatt showed Alimi a 52-page dossier on al-Banna and promised to provide an Arabic translation within days. (Note: the dossier represents the latest of several summaries of al-Banna's federal indictment shared by legatt with the ROYG. End Note). Information that links Dulqum directly to AQ, said COS, has been shared with the ROYG. We do not believe that information is true, retorted Alimi, and we cannot try Dulqum on the evidence we currently have. EmbOffs pressed the danger in going ahead with the releases, pointed out several cases where the ROYG released individuals who went on to perpetrate suicide and other terrorists attacks in the region. 5. (S/NF) "We have laws," said Alimi, "a Constitution, a Parliament to which we are responsible. There are journalists, human rights groups, families of detainees we must answer to; we cannot continue to hold these men indefinitely without bringing them to trial." DCM agreed, saying the U.S. is asking the ROYG to show it is serious about our partnership in the GWOT by not releasing known AQ associates while we work together to build a legal case against them. "The door is open," replied Alimi, but the President's deadlines stand and we have to work within those limits. ------- Comment ------- 6. (S/NF) During his phone call with NSC CT Advisor Townsend, Saleh agreed to postpone any releases until the 20th day of Ramadan (November 3), and to hold Dulqum and al-Banna until Ramadan is over. Neither Saleh nor Alimi, however, are showing signs of backing-down. The ROYG continues to demand the USG provide solid case evidence to prevent the releases. Although Saleh has in the past offered to hand over al-Banna in exchange for 5 million in rewards for justice program funds, the current ROYG stance, that Yemen law prevents extradition of citizens to other countries, in concert with their claim that he has not violated Yemeni law, leaves us at a stand-still on a legal solution for al-Banna. We will report further developments. End Comment. KRAJESKI
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