US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2766

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002766 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, IZ, NL, NATO 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: DUTCH WITHDRAWAL POSITION 
HARDENING 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Dutch government is determined to end 
the current deployment of Dutch troops in Al-Muthanna in 
mid-March in accordance with assurances provided to 
parliament last June.  Defense Minister Kamp will send a 
letter to parliament in the next two weeks reaffirming that 
Dutch forces will leave Al-Muthanna on schedule.  Key reasons 
include preserving opposition party support for peacekeeping 
operations in general, freeing up capacity for other 
operations, and the strong conviction that The Netherlands 
has already done more than its share in Iraq.  The Dutch are 
also determined not to repeat the disaster of Srebenica, 
which many attribute to the Dutch failure to set a clear exit 
strategy and stick to it.  The Foreign and Defense ministers 
would like a smaller Dutch presence in Iraq to continue under 
the auspices of the NATO and EU training missions.  The 
British and Japanese are pushing the Dutch to remain in 
Al-Muthanna in a more limited capacity, but face stiff 
opposition.  There is little evident support in the Dutch 
government, parliament, or public for a further extension 
(although a delay in holding elections might also delay the 
Dutch departure slightly.)  While the Dutch do not want to 
disengage entirely from Iraq, there is a deeply-felt need to 
close the chapter on the Al-Muthanna mission before even 
beginning to consider a possible future deployment outside 
the NATO and EU context.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C)  Dutch Defense Minister Kamp and other senior Dutch 
officials are increasingly firm in reaffirming that the Dutch 
deployment in Al-Muthanna will conclude at the end of its 
current extension on March 15.  In Iraq, Kamp recently 
announced after meeting with IIG MP Allawi that "staying 
longer is no option," noting that having 1,400 troops in the 
region for 20 months had been a "major effort."  On October 
27, Kamp told Ambassador Sobel that he intended to send a 
letter to parliament in the next two weeks making clear that 
the deployment will end on schedule; the letter is expected 
to prompt a debate in parliament on Dutch involvement in 
Iraq.  According to Kamp, the need to maintain solid and 
broad support in parliament is a major driving factor in the 
government's deliberations.  He was adamant that a 
significant majority -- including the main opposition party 
-- is necessary to endorse military deployments; forcing a 
decision on an extension with a small parliamentary majority 
("fifty percent plus one") could have serious negative 
repercussions in the future deployments.  Kamp also stressed 
that the Dutch feel overextended with forces in Afghanistan 
and Bosnia, and need flexibility to deal with other 
contingencies.  (A parliamentary contact told us separately 
that many members would like to see the Dutch become more 
active in Africa.  End Note.)  Kamp acknowledged that a slip 
in the election schedule might justify a slight extension of 
the Dutch deployment, but only by a matter of weeks. 
 
3. (C) Dutch MFA POLDIR Hugo Siblesz separately told 
Ambassador Sobel on October 27 that Foreign Minister Bot and 
Defense Minister Kamp had met the previous evening to discuss 
the Dutch presence in Iraq and to agree on the contents of 
the government letter to parliament.  According to Siblesz, 
Bot and Kamp were in agreement that the current Dutch 
deployment in Al-Muthanna would end on March 15 barring 
extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances.  Only a delay in 
holding the elections, Siblesz said, might convince the Dutch 
to stay in Al-Muthanna longer, and then only for a "very 
limited time" (e.g., a few weeks at most.) 
 
4. (C) Siblesz stressed that Kamp and Bot considered the 
government bound by its commitment to parliament last June 
that the current extension of the Dutch mission would be the 
last.  There is no discernible interest in parliament or 
among the Dutch public for extending the mission beyond 
March, and the coalition government is in no position to be 
seen going back on its word.  In addition, the Dutch are 
increasingly worried that an open-ended commitment in a 
deteriorating security environment could lead to another 
Srebenica-type disaster, which must be avoided at all costs. 
Many in The Netherlands blamed the Srebenica disaster on the 
Dutch government's failure to set and stick to a clear exit 
strategy.  Siblesz noted that appeals to the Dutch based on 
the fact that no one else is prepared to take on the Dutch 
mission were therefore likely to backfire. 
 
5. (C) On the other hand, Siblesz said that Bot and Kamp were 
committed to maintaining a Dutch "presence" in Iraq after 
March, albeit in a different form.  The Dutch decision to end 
its current deployment should not be seen as a desire to 
distance The Netherlands from the U.S. or a sign of 
dissatisfaction with the Iraqi mission.  According to 
Siblesz, the Dutch are prepared to contribute trainers to the 
NATO training mission in Iraq (Siblesz suggested a "few 
dozen") and also a security contingent (approximately 130 
troops in total).  Kamp separately indicated that the Dutch 
are also prepared to contribute to a future EU training 
mission. 
 
6. (C) According to the British Embassy here, the British are 
actively engaged in seeking to convince the Dutch to remain 
in Al-Muthanna, but recognize that they face stiff 
opposition.  British efforts are currently focused on the 
possibility of retaining a smaller Dutch contingent in 
Al-Muthanna supported by other, non-Dutch forces.  According 
to the British Ambassador, even such a limited Dutch presence 
would depend on "unforeseen" developments occurring to 
justify the extension.  (FM Bot reportedly told FM Straw that 
it will not be possible to claim that events were 
"unforeseen" unless they occur closer to the proposed date of 
departure, i.e. in January or February.)  PM Blair is 
expected to approach PM Balkenende on this issue on October 
29 on the margins of the signing ceremony for the EU 
Constitutional Treaty in Rome.  The Japanese have also been 
very active (Kamp told us that he has had six different 
meetings with the Japanese Ambassador on this issue) but are 
pessimistic on the prospects of a continued Dutch presence. 
Kamp will travel to Tokyo in the next few weeks, where he 
intends to "explain" to the Japanese why the Dutch feel 
impelled to end their Al-Muthanna deployment, and why the 
task of finding a replacement force (assuming the Iraqis are 
not ready to take this task on themselves) is, in Dutch eyes, 
primarily a British responsibility. 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
7. (C) Since August, Kamp has been consistent in stating that 
the current deployment would end as scheduled on March 15. 
Bot also appears to be determined to stick to ending the 
deployment on schedule barring extraordinary circumstances. 
Given the fact that there is no discernible public or 
parliamentary support for a further extension (other than a 
few op-ed pieces focusing on the humanitarian costs to the 
Iraqi people), it is not surprising that PM Balkenende has so 
far shown no willingness to take the political heat of 
pressing his cabinet to break the government's "promise" to 
parliament by proposing an extension.  It is worth noting 
that in the Dutch system, the Prime Minister (technically the 
"Minister for General Affairs") is expected to build 
consensus positions between independent ministers rather than 
force decisions on the cabinet.  (All ministers -- including 
Balkenende -- technically report directly to the crown.) 
 
8. (C) As a mission, we have been extremely active in the 
past few weeks canvassing government and parliamentary 
contacts (including the floor leaders and foreign policy 
spokesmen of all coalition parties and the primary opposition 
parties) on the political implications of an additional Dutch 
extension in Al-Muthanna.  Nearly all assess that such a move 
would have serious negative repercussions for the coalition 
government and would make it difficult to develop support for 
future peacekeeping operations.  With the exception of the 
parliamentary leadership of the conservative Liberal Party 
(Kamp's own party), the mood in parliament is firmly against 
an extension.  Technically, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of the government winning a slim majority for an 
extension, but only if Balkenende and perhaps Bot undertake a 
major effort to strong-arm their Christian Democrat Party 
into advocating an extension.  The government, however, is 
firmly committed to obtaining a super majority and appears 
unlikely to change.  The more limited, NATO and EU-linked 
missions described by Siblesz would face far fewer hurdles 
gaining parliamentary approval as they can be presented as 
"new" missions based on "new" realities.  Such missions, in 
the government's view, would prove that the Dutch remain 
actively engaged in supporting Iraqi reconstruction without 
breaking faith with parliament or jeopardizing the consensus 
on overseas deployments.  It is clear, however, that before 
the Dutch will consider an additional national mission to 
Iraq, they feel they must first decisively close the book on 
the Al-Muthanna mission. 
 
9. (C) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
 
 
SOBEL