US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2758

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR, DRL, AND WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH HOPE EU WILL PRESERVE 
RESTRICTIONS 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 228300 
 
     B. (B) THE HAGUE 2728 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Dutch support retaining the EU's June 
2003 measures to pressure Cuba on human rights, but as EU 
president they feel bound to seek a "consensus" position.  As 
the EU is currently split on the issue, according to Dutch 
contacts, a consensus to change the current measures may not 
be obtainable -- in which case they would remain in place. 
Dutch interlocutors asked to remain in close contact on Cuba 
and would appreciate information on U.S. approaches to other 
EU members if possible.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Poloff delivered ref A message to MFA's Cuba policy 
advisor Jan Jaap Groenemeijer October 26.  Groenemeijer said 
the Dutch agree with the line of reasoning presented, i.e. 
that Cuba should be kept under pressure to reform its human 
rights.  Groenemeijer said he believed that the fact that a 
majority of Cuban dissidents supported the June measures 
"weighs heavily" in favor of retaining them, and stated that 
the Netherlands would not suggest lifting the dissident 
invitation policy.  Nevertheless, Groenemeijer assessed that 
while several EU members are holding strong on maintaining 
the June measures, a group of others have questioned the 
measures' utility in bringing about changes in the human 
rights situation in Cuba.  Still others, he said, want to 
find a compromise position.  Groenemeijer said he believes 
that "all EU members want to maintain pressure on human 
rights in Cuba," but they disagree on which measures would be 
most effective in bringing about change.  Groenemeijer said 
that the Dutch would believe that a loss of EU consensus is 
tantamount to a loss of pressure on Cuba but also recognize 
that the EU "cannot make too many concessions." 
 
3. (C) As EU members will not formally present their 
positions on Cuba until mid-November, according to 
Groenemeijer, the Dutch are not fully aware of some states' 
positions and/or the factors behind them.  While human rights 
remains an "important" consideration, not all EU members 
believe that the June measures provide the best mechanism for 
maintaining pressure on Cuba in this area, he said -- and 
some members probably have "other interests" in mind. 
Groenemeijer asked if the Spanish position on Cuba was having 
a derogatory effect on U.S.-Spanish relations and suggested 
that that the U.S. might want to consider sharing with the 
Dutch Presidency its analysis regarding other EU members' 
positions, if possible.  He stressed that the Dutch want to 
find a way to navigate this issue in a way that satisfies 
U.S. and Dutch concerns. 
 
4. (C)  Poloff met separately on October 26 with Aleid Bos of 
the MFA's human rights office.  (Note:  Although the Cuba 
desk has the lead on this issue, Bos maintains a "watching 
brief" with regard to human rights situation in Cuba.) 
Poloff shared reftel points and emphasized that the USG is 
deeply concerned by Spanish efforts to reverse the 2003 
guidelines.  Poloff stressed that human rights issues should 
continue to take precedence over other interests when dealing 
with Cuba.  Bos agreed that human rights issues should lead 
in the discourse over Cuba, however, she noted that other 
factors, such as economic opportunities and development, must 
also be considered.  She was aware of the efforts but not the 
details of the proposals now under discussion in Havana under 
the leadership of the Dutch Ambassador there.  Bos said she 
would coordinate with the Cuba desk to make sure that our 
common human rights concerns are taken into account. 
 
5. (C) POLCOUNS also raised the issue on October 26 with 
Director of Political Affairs Jaap Werner.  Werner echoed 
Groenemeijer's statement that the EU is divided on the Cuba 
issue, with some members pushing for a "harder" line and 
others demanding a "softer" position.  Werner stressed that, 
as EU president, the Dutch had an obligation to seek a common 
position.  If no consensus developed to change the current 
strategy, he noted, then one likely outcome would be to leave 
the previously agreed measures in place.  While such an 
outcome would not bother the Dutch, Werner stressed that 
others would find this an unsatisfactory result and would 
therefore push hard for a new "compromise" position.  Werner 
did not expect a decision to be made before mid-November, and 
thought the discussion would probably drag on for some time. 
He urged us to remain in close contact on this issue. 
SOBEL