US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2757

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PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE: DUTCH RESPONSES

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE2757
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE2757 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-10-26 18:19:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL NL EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2014 
TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE:  DUTCH RESPONSES 
 
REF: STATE 228399 
 
Classified By: Pol Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  PolCouns and PolOff met with Jaap Werner, 
Director, Political Affairs, MFA, and Adriaan Palm, MFA 
Political Affairs Officer, on October 26 to deliver points in 
reftel.  Werner said the only addition to the agenda as set 
forth reftel was the African Great Lakes, where the Belgians 
under "AOB" will give a report on tbeir minister's recent 
visit to the region.  On Iraq the GAERC will finalize the 
"package" of EU projects, for conveying to Iraqi PM Allawi at 
the Nov 5 Council.  The GAERC will take its cue on Iran and 
Sudan from the EU-3 and UN respectively.  With regard to 
Russia, the EU hopes to issue a counter-terrorism 
joint-statement at the EU-Russia summit but is worried about 
Russia's unwillingness to engage on regional issues.  Solan 
will brief the GAERC on the Middle East and Somalia.  End 
summary. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
2. (C) Per reftel, the November 2 GAERC will finalize the 
EU's aid package for conveying to Allawi in November 5.  At 
this time there are still a few details to be cleared up on 
the package, such as the location of training.  Most training 
will definitely be outside Iraq, according to Werner, but the 
Dutch are trying to identify elements (such as the selection 
of training participants) that can be done in Iraq.  Werner 
characterized the package as "so-so," clearly falling short 
of where the Dutch had hoped to be.  For the elections, there 
are no plans to have an observer mission in-country (the 
"security concerns are overwhelming"), and Werner was not 
sure exactly how many election experts would be offering 
advice.  He said three, but there might be more in areas he 
had not heard about and said Brussels would have the most 
accurate information.  The question of supporting the UN 
protection force remains the same;  Werner asked about plans 
for the "middle ring" and whether there remained any 
alternatives to the MNF. 
 
3. (C) Werner did not know what Allawi's additional travel 
plans in Europe might be.  The Dutch are arranging several 
bilaterals for him on the side of the Nov 5 Council meeting, 
which should, in the practical Dutch opinion, reduce his need 
to travel around Europe. 
 
Iran-EU-3 
--------- 
 
4. (C) Werner said the presidency is "in a waiting mode" on 
Iran and would not predict what direction the GAERC 
discussion would take.  Much would depend on the Iranian 
response to the EU-3 proposal, which he expected would be 
delivered at the October 27 meeting in Vienna.  The EU-3 will 
report the results of those discussions to the PSC this week 
and will also brief the GAERC.  Werner indicated that if the 
Iranian response were "serious," the EU-3 would probably meet 
with Iran again before the GAERC, possibly at a "higher 
level."  He suggested that if the Iranian response was 
unsatisfactory, then the GAERC and/or the November 5 Council 
might send a "strong signal" to Iran, but no decision on 
whether or not to endorse referral to the UNSC at the 
end-of-November IAEA BOG meeting was likely before the 
November 22 GAERC, he said. 
 
MEPP 
---- 
 
5. (C) The GAERC will receive a Solana think piece, or 
pieces, on the EU role in moving forward.  Solana will be 
suggesting short-term vs longer-term concerns.  At the GAERC 
will be an oral briefing;  no paper will be circulated prior 
to the meeting. 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
6. (C) Contact continues with the Russians following up the 
Troika ministerial, but the Dutch do not expect to complete 
the four "common spaces" in time for the EU-Russia Summit on 
November 11.  Werner noted that the EU "is not desperate" to 
complete this as a deliverable for the summit.  There may be 
provisional implementation of some agreed parts of the 
package while other parts are being completed, but they will 
"stay linked" as a single package.  For the summit the EU 
hopes to issue a joint statement on terrorism (which Gijs de 
Vries will try to negotiate in Moscow in early November), but 
Werner admitted it is likely to be "more words than deeds." 
The agenda is the four spaces, terrorism, and regional 
issues, where there will be only an exchange of views.  The 
Russians, he said, continue to balk at any substantive 
discussion of regional issues (such as Moldova and Georgia), 
and are adamant about not discussing Chechnya in any context 
other than counter-terrorism. 
 
7. (C) Werner added that a growing number of member states 
are becoming worried both about Putin's domestic policies and 
the Russian "attitude" in the region.  There is a fundamental 
difference in the Russian and European approaches to Russia's 
"near abroad" and the EU's "near neighborhood", which turn 
out to be the same countries but with little or reluctant 
Russian acceptance of a legitimate EU interest in them. 
(Palm commented that what the EU considers a "neighborhood" 
Russia sees as its own "backyard.")  The EU wants to see the 
states of the FSU stable and prosperous, while Russia seems 
to believe its interests are best served by the opposite, 
according to Werner.  Some member states have complained that 
the EU "lacks a strategy" for dealing with Russia; the Dutch 
are toying with working on something during their presidency, 
but have made little progress (and time is running out.) 
 
Sudan 
----- 
 
8. (C) No action is expected, pending UN decisions.  The EU 
evaluation is that the situation is "stuck" though perhaps 
there has been net progress, since the security situation is 
about the same while the humanitarian situation is better. 
Werner opined that the Bot meeting two weeks ago in Khartoum 
(where he encountered a fierce reaction to the mention of 
possible sanctions and left shaking his head over the 
unprecedented nature of his meeting) is evidence that the 
Sudan government believes it is "off the hook" and the 
international community is "off their backs."  Cooperation 
with the African Union enables the Sudanese to buy time from 
international action. 
 
Somalia 
------- 
 
9. (C) The GAERC will be briefed on Solana's recent trip to 
the area and his meetings there. 
SOBEL 

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