US embassy cable - 04AMMAN8793

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 008793 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPAL, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: THE JORDAN-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY: TEN YEARS LATER 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 08145 
 
     B. AMMAN 04953 
     C. AMMAN 02165 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d 
) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) At the ten year mark, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty 
remains a cornerstone for Jordan's security and economic 
strategy.  Despite a rocky political relationship, 
intelligence and military relations between Jordan and Israel 
are solid.  Furthermore, the treaty provided the breakthrough 
which led to a dramatic deepening of our own bilateral 
security, economic and reform relationships.  The Qualifying 
Industrial Zones, the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement, and 
U.S. economic assistance -- all of which stem from the treaty 
-- are key components of Jordan's economic livelihood. 
Public opinion regarding relations with Israel, however, is 
strongly negative.  Hopes that the treaty would lead to a 
resolution of Jordan's internal Palestinian issues remain 
unfulfilled, and some critics charge that peace with Israel 
-- absent a final two-state solution for Palestine -- may 
have hampered political liberalization (in fact, absent the 
peace treaty, the security and economic climate arguably 
would have prevented any reforms).  Weary with five years of 
the intifada to the west, and with perceived Israeli slights, 
the GOJ has no official events planned to mark the 
anniversary.  The revitalized Jordanian anti-normalization 
movement, which has been emboldened by continued violence in 
the West Bank/Gaza, may use the anniversary to renew its 
campaign against the treaty.  End Summary. 
 
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PEACE BRINGS SECURITY 
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2.  (C) On October 26, 1994, leaders of Jordan and Israel 
signed a peace treaty at Wadi Araba ending the formal state 
of war between the two countries.  Ten years later, the 
treaty remains the centerpiece of Jordan's security strategy. 
 Peace along Jordan's border with Israel and the West Bank 
has been the basis of the stability Jordan has enjoyed during 
the last decade.  Just as important, strong cooperation 
between Jordanian and Israeli security forces has repeatedly 
helped thwart potential terrorist threats to both countries. 
Pragmatic Jordanian thinkers affirm this view.  The treaty 
defined the borders of the Jordanian state and cemented its 
legitimacy.  Dr. Hassan Barari, a researcher at Jordan 
University's Center for Strategic Studies who has just 
completed a book on Jordan-Israel relations, points out that 
not only do the two sides work together closely on border 
security, but counter-terrorism cooperation is exceptional, 
having led to the capture of numerous cross-border 
infiltrators in the last several years. 
Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Ureib Rintawi concludes that 
the peace treaty helped define Jordan as a state and made 
more Israelis acknowledge that "Jordan is Jordan, not 
Palestine."  (He left unsaid a mirror result:  the treaty 
reinforced the same point for East Bankers and 
Jordanian-Palestinians.)  As Rintawi and other contacts 
correctly assert, a solid security arrangement and clearly 
defined borders weaken the arguments of Israeli hard-liners 
advocating the Jordan "transfer" option for Palestinians, 
while giving Jordan an avenue through which to advocate its 
interests.  Robust military-to-military relations between the 
two countries, largely insulated from political disputes, 
further enhance Jordanian security. 
 
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ECONOMIC GAINS 
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3.  (U) The peace treaty has been a boon to Jordan's economy. 
 Strong U.S. commitment for the treaty led to forgiveness of 
$700 million in Jordanian debt and an increase in assistance 
to the point that Jordan is now one of the leading recipients 
of U.S. aid in the world.  USAID programs have helped 
restructure and liberalize the Jordanian economy, setting the 
stage for accelerated growth.  The number of foreign tourists 
visiting Jordan, though down from its peak in 2000, is up 
significantly from pre-treaty levels.  And the landmark 
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement should continue to boost 
investment and commerce in the country -- helping to anchor 
this moderate, stability-minded, pro-U.S. regime despite 
regional turmoil. 
 
4.  (C) Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), a product of the 
peace treaty, provide another engine of economic growth.  The 
QIZs in Jordan -- based on a requirement for Israeli content 
in Jordanian goods that then qualify for quota-free and 
duty-free access to the U.S. market -- grew from annual 
exports of $18 million in 1998 to over $560 million in 2003. 
The QIZs are an important source of jobs.  About 60 factories 
manufacture products for export directly to the U.S., giving 
steady employment to over 36,000 line workers (the number 
grows to over 40,000 in high season).  Approximately 45% of 
these jobs are held by Jordanians, with the rest filled by 
foreign (mostly South Asian) workers (ref a).  Other 
factories subcontracting work to QIZ exporters employ several 
thousand more, while backward linkages to Jordanian companies 
that provide goods and services to QIZs -- such as 
construction, catering, and maintenance -- account for yet 
more employment.  Due to the QIZs, relations between Israeli 
and Jordanian business persons are solid and expanding.  In 
the first seven months of 2004, Israel exported about $100 
million in goods to Jordan -- less than half of this sum was 
to QIZs.  The value of Jordanian exports to Israel for the 
same period totaled $60 million, up 15% from 2003. 
 
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DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES 
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5.  (C) Despite the benefits Jordan enjoys from its relations 
with Israel, formal diplomatic relations between the two 
states are rocky, with the GOJ often feeling slighted or 
ignored by the GOI.  Israel's Ambassador similarly has a 
litany of perceived and real slights.  "There is no question 
but that we are facing today a difficult political 
relationship," stated outgoing Foreign Minister Muasher in a 
recent interview with Israeli daily Haaretz.  "When we signed 
the treaty in '94, we had expected 2004 to be a totally 
different era in the Middle East."  Jordan continues to hold 
off returning its ambassador to Tel Aviv, and one reason is 
GOJ inability to obtain the release of several Jordanians 
jailed in Israel for pre-treaty killings (ref c).  The fact 
that Hizballah was able to negotiate the release of its 
prisoners is an embarrassment for the Jordanian government. 
It is regularly assailed in the press by kin of the detainees 
and, more recently, by the Islamist opposition (ref b) for 
its inability to aid the Jordanian prisoners. 
 
6.  (C) A prime advantage of the treaty for most East Bankers 
was that it permanently would bury the concept of Jordan as 
Palestine.  For may Jordanian-Palestinians, signature of the 
treaty evoked complex emotions but also offered the hope that 
with basic issues of Jordan's relations with Israel and 
Palestine put to rest by the treaty, their own status in 
Jordan could be regularized and improved.  Unfortunately, in 
the absence of a resolution of peace process final status 
issues for Palestine, issues of national identity continue to 
bedevil Jordanian politics.  Comments by Likud hard-liners in 
Israel that "Jordan is Palestine" still turn stomachs in 
Amman, while recent public statements by PM Sharon advisor 
Dov Weisglass stoked GOJ fears that Israel is not serious 
about a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue.  "When 
Weisglass says that Israel's aim is to freeze the peace 
process and to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, we have to take this very seriously," Muasher told the 
Israeli press.  "The prospect of killing the two-state 
solution is threatening the interests not only of the 
Palestinians, but of Jordan as well."  Uncertainty on these 
points continue to play into the hands of East Bank 
hard-liners who are reluctant to move forward on expectations 
that with Jordan once and forever disconnected from 
Palestine, it was safe to begin to enfranchise fully 
Palestinian-Jordanians. 
 
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THE JORDANIAN PUBLIC: DOWN ON ISRAEL 
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7.  (C) Outside the government, sentiment on the street 
toward Israel is uniformly negative.  A continued diet of 
television images of destruction and death in the West 
Bank/Gaza, along with press editorials slamming Israel as, 
for example, "an extremist and deformed society," help keep 
such anti-Israel feelings among Jordanians strong. 
Reflecting widespread public opinion, MP Odeh Qawwas 
(Christian West Banker ) Amman, 3rd District) told PolOff he 
sees little positive in Jordan's peace treaty with Israel. 
He says Israel's disrespect for Jordan's interests has become 
particularly clear and believes that Israel takes its 
relationship with Jordan for granted.  Like most other MPs, 
he laments Jordan's inability, though diplomatic channels, to 
win the release of its citizens from Israeli prisons. 
Several contacts expect popular views of Israel to grow even 
more critical the longer the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
continues.  Dr. Barari says Israelis have a hard time 
understanding that there will not be a real, warm peace 
between the two countries until the Palestinian issue is 
resolved.  &We are part of the same people,8 he says, &for 
us, Palestine is a domestic issue.  You cannot separate us.8 
 
 
8.  (C) Many Jordanians, influenced by anti-Israel sentiment, 
dismiss the benefits Jordan derives from its relations with 
Israel or regard them as insufficient to justify cooperation 
with a state they see as oppressing the Palestinian people. 
Because the strong security relationship works behind the 
scenes, Jordanians do not naturally identify this as a plus. 
On an economic level, numerous contacts have contended that 
the benefits of the treaty have not been as significant as 
the GOJ or the Jordanian populace had (unrealistically) 
anticipated.  Vocal anti-normalization campaigners have 
prompted many Jordanians outside the business sector to 
dismiss the positive impact of the QIZs and to claim that 
they do not create "good" jobs.  Some also ask where are the 
railway systems, electricity grids and dozens of other 
projects that Israel promised Jordan at publicized meetings 
in Casablanca and Amman.  Shimon Shamir, Israel's first 
ambassador to Jordan, was recently quoted in Israeli daily 
Haaretz as saying that peace with Jordan should have been a 
"display window" for the Arab world, but "from Jordan's 
perspective, disappointment is the main motif of this peace." 
 
 
9.  (C) Many Jordanians opposed the signing of a peace treaty 
independent of a resolution to the Palestinians' final status 
issues, such as Dr. Hussam Shiyyab, who headed the 
International Relations Committee of the lower house of 
Parliament at the time of the treaty and is now a professor 
of political science.  Ten years later, he claimed to PolOff 
that the treaty failed to define the "national identity" of 
Jordanians vs. Palestinians as had been hoped.  He further 
contended that the Jordanian government is in a weaker 
position domestically and regionally due to overarching 
sentiment against cooperation with Israelis.  A few 
commentators have speculated that peace with Israel hurt the 
cause of political pluralism and reform in Jordan.  They 
assert that in order to defend its relations with Israel from 
popular opposition, the GOJ has stifled public dissent and 
clamped down on Islamists and other groups challenging its 
policies toward the Jewish state.  In the words of one senior 
Jordanian-Palestinian, Adnan Abu Odeh, the hope was that 
Jordan, reassured about its border and territorial integrity, 
would turn to internal political reform.  While there have 
been many reasons for the slow progress on this front, it is 
true that failure to reach a permanent two state solution 
provides tensions and pretexts blocking moves toward strong 
Jordanian-Palestinian representation in parliament and 
government.  However, critics overlook the prospect that 
without a peace treaty, Jordan would hardly have had a 
security or economic climate conducive to liberalization. 
 
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PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES RARE 
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10.  (C) Reflecting the tense official relationship, 
people-to-people interactions are extremely limited.  Barari, 
who spent three years in Israel learning Hebrew, notes that 
he personally used to meet Israelis frequently, including in 
Jordan.  However, he said the potential repercussions against 
him professionally for such open meetings at home are too 
great now.  He instead arranges to meet with Israelis in 
Europe.  According to Barari, Jordan's "peace camp" -- made 
up of activists, academics, and business people enthused by 
the possibilities after the treaty -- has gone to ground. 
Few want to risk their reputations by speaking out in favor 
of the peace treaty.  Gen. Mansur Abu Rashid, a former 
Jordanian general who now heads up a think-tank in Amman, has 
taken a different approach.  Although his organization's 
activities are discreet, he continues to meet Israelis in 
Israel and Jordan, organizing workshops and lectures 
emphasizing co-existence. 
 
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A LOW-KEY ANNIVERSARY 
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11.  (C)  Outgoing Foreign Minister Muasher confirmed to us 
that given public sentiment, the GOJ has chosen not to 
sponsor any official events to mark the anniversary of the 
peace treaty.  There may be a few low-key, private events, 
while several newspapers will carry articles related to the 
treaty.  Muasher will contribute at least one such article 
defending Jordan's decision to establish relations with 
Israel, while English-language daily The Jordan Times asked 
Charge, A/S Bill Burns and former U.S. Ambassador to Jordan 
Wes Egan to submit statements or op-ed pieces for the 
occasion.  Muasher also met last week with a group of Israeli 
journalists brought to Jordan to tour a QIZ and other sites 
via a program coordinated between the Peres Center for Peace 
and the Amman Center for Peace and Development (headed by 
General Rashid). 
 
12.  (C) Anti-normalizers (and, increasingly, Islamists) will 
attempt to use the tenth anniversary to keep themselves in 
the spotlight as champions of the Palestinian cause.  A 
demonstration is planned for October 26 at the headquarters 
of the highly-politicized professional associations 
(prominent for their blacklisting of Jordanians doing 
business with Israelis) to assail the treaty and call for its 
annulment.  The Islamic Action Front, the political wing of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, issued a public statement October 24 
condemning the peace agreement and claiming that it "harmed 
the nation drastically."  Articles in the Arabic press, 
particularly the sensationalist weeklies, can likewise be 
expected to demonize the treaty. 
 
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COMMENT 
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12.  (C) Despite diplomatic squabbles and deep concern over 
Israeli intentions in the West Bank/Gaza, the GOJ has never 
regretted its strategic choice for peace and remains 
committed to its relationship with Israel.  The benefits 
resulting from the Wadi Araba treaty, while invisible to 
some, are clear to the palace and ruling elite.  However, 
five years of intifada are making it ever more difficult to 
justify to Jordanians the GOJ-GOI relationship. 
HALE