US embassy cable - 04MADRID4115

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 004115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR DAS FISK 
WHA/CCA FOR WHITAKER, SIBILLA, BEAN 
USEU FOR HUIZINGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU, SP 
SUBJECT: CUBA: SPAIN CONFIDENT IT CAN OVERTURN EU MEASURES 
ON SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Spain is determined to roll back key 
elements of the June 2003 EU "restrictive measures" on Cuba 
implemented in the wake of Castro's crackdown on the 
opposition.  MFA officials are confident they have sufficient 
support within the EU to do so.  The GOS counts the UK, 
France, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Austria, and Finland allies 
in their efforts to abolish the policy requiring EU missions 
to invite dissidents to national day celebrations.  Deputy 
Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon told visiting EUR DAS Glyn 
Davies that Spain wants to reestablish contacts with GOC 
officials in order to be able to influence the post-Castro 
leadership.  MFA Director General for Latin America Javier 
Sandomingo will travel to Cuba on 10/27, in part to explain 
Spain's inititative to the dissident community.  Sandomingo 
would like to brief USG officials in Washington as well, 
perhaps in late November.  Popular Party members are critical 
of Zapatero's approach on Cuba, but do not seem to have the 
political weight to rein in GOS policy on Cuba. 
 
2. (C) Madrid cannot be moved on this issue.  We believe the 
only way to blunt Spain's ambitions on EU Cuba policy is to 
energize Cuba critics within the EU, such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic, in order to prevent an EU consensus in 
Brussels in favor of Spain's new approach. End Summary. 
 
//SPAIN SHIFTS EMPHASIS FROM CIVIL SOCIETY TO CUBAN 
GOVERNMENT// 
 
3. (C) Shortly after Zapatero came to office, MFA and other 
government officials indicated they wanted to take a "new" 
approach on Cuba out of frustration with their lack of access 
to Cuban Government interlocutors.  They blamed the June 2003 
EU measures in support of Cuban dissidents -- especially the 
policy of inviting dissidents to EU national day celebrations 
-- as a major impediment to normal diplomatic relations with 
the GOC.  Deputy FM Leon told EUR DAS Davies on 10/19 that 
Spain wants to eliminate the EU policy on invitations in 
order to regain access to, and perhaps influence, GOC 
officials who could lead Cuba once Castro is gone.  Leon said 
Spain's objective is to prevent chaos in Cuba in the 
post-Castro era.  He told Davies that MFA Director General 
for Latin America Sandomingo would travel to Cuba soon and 
would also like to visit Washington at a later date to brief 
USG officials.  Davies underscored USG policy on Cuba and 
warned against policies that would allow Castro to simply eat 
"carrots" handed him by foreign interlocutors without 
requiring Castro to ease political and economic restrictions. 
 
 
//MFA - EU MEASURES WERE "A MISTAKE FROM THE START"// 
 
4. (C) Poloff met with MFA Deputy Director General for the 
Caribbean Pablo Gomez de Olea on 10/21 to get a readout on 
the 10/19 EU Latin American Committee (COLAT) meeting on Cuba 
and to express USG concern regarding the direction of GOS 
policy towards Cuba.  Gomez said that, contrary to press 
reports, the COLAT meeting had gone well from Spain's 
perspective.  The GOS had not expected a vote on its proposal 
to "modify" the June 2003 measures on Cuba and was content 
with the COLAT's decision to request input from resident EU 
missions in Havana for a November 16 discussion.  Gomez 
listed the UK, France, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Austria and 
Finland as strong backers of the Spanish proposal. 
 
5. (C) In an effort to block new EU members states viewed as 
hostile to Cuba from scuttling Madrid's plans, Spain asked 
that only countries with an embassy in Cuba (i.e. - those 
affected by the Cuban "freezout" of EU diplomats) vote on 
whether to eliminate the invitation of dissidents to national 
day events.  Poloff noted that Finland - a GOS supporter on 
Cuba - has no embassy in Havana, while the Czech Republic and 
Poland do have missions in Havana and could have a different 
view.  Gomez said Poland and the Czech Republic are coming 
around to Spain's view on the issue. 
 
6. (C) Gomez, a holdover from the Aznar administration, 
complained that the 2003 EU measures were "a mistake from the 
start" and argued that even had the Popular Party (PP) won 
the March elections the GOS would still seek to roll them 
back.  He said the Greek EU Presidency had rammed the 
measures through in 2003 without proper consideration and 
without leaving the EU an exit strategy in case the measures 
backfired.  Gomez said that the EU should simply have enacted 
the measures without announcing them and should have made the 
invitation of dissidents voluntary in order to leave EU 
missions some wiggle room.  He said it was regretable that 
some EU missions had broken EU discipline by canceling 
national day events in order to avoid conflict with the GOC, 
citing Austria as a particularly egregious example. 
 
//SPAIN STILL CARES ABOUT THE OPPOSITION, BUT...// 
 
7. (C) Poloff said the USG has significant reservations about 
the change in Spanish policy towards Cuba, fearing Castro 
will interpret it as a victory for Cuban intransigience on 
human rights.  Gomez insisted that Spain remains committed to 
pressing for improvements in Cuba's human rights practices. 
He reiterated previous assertions that Spain's plans 
including ramped up contacts with the opposition in meetings 
other than national day events.  He said DG Sandomingo's 
primary reason for going to Cuba on 10/27 is to meet with the 
opposition and seek their understanding with respect to 
Spain's new direction.  He asserted that most dissidents had 
already indicated their acceptance of Spain's rationale, with 
only "right wing" activists Oswaldo Paya and Martha Beatriz 
Roque refusing to budge in part because the GOS had failed to 
engage them sufficiently on the issue.  Poloff challenged 
Gomez on this point, noting that center-left activist 
Vladimiro Roca had recently sent a scathing letter to the GOS 
accusing Spain of abandoning the opposition.  Gomez said the 
Spanish Embassy in Havana had spoken with Roca and convinced 
him of Spain's good intentions.  (NOTE: In a separate 
meeting, the brother of Oswaldo Paya told poloff that 
Sandomingo had asked him in August how Paya would view the 
termination of invitations to national day events.  The 
brother responded that Paya would reject the shift in policy, 
since it was the EU's only concrete measure in support for 
pro-democracy activists in Cuba.  END NOTE.) 
 
8. (C) Poloff noted FM Moratinos' recent comments to the 
press suggesting that Spain's policy shift had led to the 
release of seven jailed dissidents since mid 2004, saying the 
USG saw no connection between Spanish diplomacy and the 
release of the dissidents.  Gomez replied that Moratinos' 
comments had been misinterpreted.  What he meant to say was 
that the EU measures had not led to the release of any 
dissidents and that they were only let go when Spain began 
speaking of the need for dialogue with the Castro regime. 
However, Gomez agreed with poloff's point that Castro more 
likely had his own reasons for releasing the detainees, 
irrespective of any Spanish initiatives. 
 
9. (C) Asked about Cuban Foreign Minister Perez Roque's 
recent favorable comments regarding Zapatero's Cuba policy, 
Gomez said neither the statements of the GOC nor those of the 
opposition had an influence on Spanish policy.  He said Spain 
feels no sense of urgency and will adjust its Cuba policy at 
a pace determined by Madrid's long-term objectives in Cuba. 
Poloff raised rumors circulating through Madrid's exile 
community that political prisoner Raul Rivero would be 
released by the GOC in order to reward Zapatero and give him 
leverage to ease EU policies towards Cuba. Gomez discounted 
the rumors, saying Rivero is too big a prize for the GOC to 
release at the moment, given Castro's personal dislike for 
the jailed poet. 
 
 //PP A GADFLY ON CUBA, BUT CAN'T SWAY GOS POLICY// 
 
10. (C) On 10/21, DCM, the political counselor, and poloff 
met with PP Parliamentarian and chief of the PP's 
International Affairs DepartmentJorge Moragas and PP Senator 
Luis Fraga to discuss foreign policy issues, including Cuba. 
Moragas, who made front page news in Spain when he was denied 
entry to Cuba on 10/16 for planning to meet with dissidents, 
said GOS policy on Cuba is a "disaster."  He said Spanish and 
EU policies may not be able to influence Castro, but they 
should at the very least fall on the side of a principled 
defense of human rights.  Moragas, who appears close to both 
PP leader Mariano Rajoy and former President Aznar, favors a 
"scorched-earth" style of opposition and said the PP would 
keep Cuba at the forefront of its differences with the 
Socialist government.  He called on the USG to encourage 
Central European EU members to block Spanish initiatives in 
Brussels and make clear to Zapatero Washington's differences 
with Spain on Cuba. 
 
11. (C) Fraga, who is friendly with FM Moratinos and recently 
traveled with Socialist officials to Chile and Colombia and 
says he will travel with Zapatero's delegation to the Ibero 
American Summit in Costa Rica, was more conciliatory, saying 
he is attempting to broker joint PP-PSOE positions on policy 
towards Cuba (as well on policy towards relations with the 
U.S.)  He agreed with the GOS thesis that there are figures 
within the GOC who could be influenced by Spain, but thought 
the GOS had taken the wrong approach in adjusting its policy. 
 He said the PP should balance PP "sticks" (i.e. - Moragas) 
with "carrots" such as his pursuit of a common policy on 
Cuba.  Interestingly, both Fraga and Moragas described MFA 
officials Sandomingo and Gomez de Olea in favorable terms, 
saying that GOS direction on Cuba was driven by PSOE 
operatives around FM Moratinos and President Zapatero. 
Neither legislator seemed optimistic that the PP would be 
able to alter Zapatero's Cuba policy. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
12. (C) We are not going to be able to convince the GOS to 
refrain from taking the lead within the EU to revamp policy 
towards Cuba.  MFA hands may be counseling a correct 
diplomatic approach in making this shift, but they 
nevertheless strongly support the decision to terminate the 
invitation of dissidents to national day celebrations.  We 
are not swayed by GOS assertions that they will ramp up other 
contacts with dissidents since there is no reason to believe 
the Spanish ambassador in Havana would approach such contacts 
with any enthusiasm. 
 
13. (C) However, Spain's efforts may still be blunted at the 
EU level if a country such as Poland or the Czech Republic 
were able to block consensus on Spain's proposals during the 
November 16 COLAT.  Such a loss in momentum might be enough 
of a setback to convince Zapatero and FM Moratinos that 
changing EU Cuba policy is not worth the political effort.  A 
loss in Brussels would also open the door for domestic 
critics of Zapatero's approach towards Cuba, which would act 
as a further brake on Socialist activism on Cuba. 
ARGYROS