US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2728

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NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH TALK THE TALK, BUT STILL LOOK FOR EU UNITY

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE2728
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE2728 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-10-22 11:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM CU NL EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR AND WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH TALK THE TALK, BUT 
STILL LOOK FOR EU UNITY 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 4080 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Cuba's refusal to allow entry to two Dutch 
MPs and one Spanish MP on October 15 focused public attention 
sharply on Cuba's human rights record and the EU's Cuba's 
policies, with many MP's weighing in in favor of a stronger 
EU approach.  FM Bot called in the Cuban Ambassador to 
complain about the incident, and an MFA spokesman called for 
a more "effective" EU approach to human rights in Cuba.  In 
their national capacity, the Dutch position is that the tough 
EU restrictions imposed after the March 2003 crackdown should 
remain in place; as EU president, however, the Dutch are 
limited by their desire to maintain EU unity.  If other 
states -- e.g. Spain -- build momentum for "softening" the 
EU's Cuba policy, the Dutch will not break consensus.  End 
Summary. 
 
Dutch Furious about MPs Denied Entry to Cuba 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) FM Bot summoned the Cuban Ambassador on October 18 to 
demand an explanation of Cuba's decision to deny entry to 
three MPs (two Dutch, one Spanish) on October 15.  (The 
pre-arranged trip was organized by a local NGO to commemorate 
the "Remolcador" tragedy and included meetings with prominent 
dissidents.)  After the meeting, Bot's spokesman 
characterized the Cuban Ambassador's explanation -- that the 
MPs had traveled on tourist passports "inappropriately" -- as 
"unacceptable" and stressed that the Dutch would seek an EU 
policy "most effective in bringing about change in the human 
rights situation in Cuba."  The story of the 
parliamentarians' aborted journey gripped the Dutch media for 
days, with Dutch newspapers running op-eds by the MPs 
highlighting the plight of dissidents in Cuba and calling for 
tougher EU measures to induce Cuba to respect human rights. 
Spanish-driven efforts to develop closer relations with the 
Cuban government (perceived as being at the expense of Cuban 
dissidents) were characterized as "totally unacceptable." 
 
3. (C) In a meeting on October 21 with Poloff, Jan Jaap 
Groenemeijer, MFA Cuba policy advisor in the Office of 
Western Hemispheric Affairs, said that Cuba clearly wants the 
EU to sever contact with dissidents.  During his meeting with 
Bot, the Cuban Ambassador reportedly referred to dissidents 
as "mercenaries" and argued that Europeans should not meet 
with them.  Recalling the Cuban Ambassador's explanation for 
denying entry to the MPs, Groenemeijer commented wryly this 
could create the "false impression" that Cuba might ever 
issue a visa expressly for the purpose of meeting dissidents. 
 Groenemeijer added that Spanish MP Maragas had earlier 
called for the recall of Spain's ambassador in Havana after 
the latter had suggested publicly that the EU should stop 
inviting dissidents to national day receptions, and surmised 
that this might be one reason for the Cuban decision. 
(Groenemeijer noted with concern that the Spanish 
Ambassador's statement contradicted EU policy but appeared to 
be in line with Spanish efforts to change it.) 
 
Revision of EU Policy? 
---------------------- 
 
4. (C) Groenemeijer confirmed that the Dutch want to maintain 
a hard line on Cuba, particularly after the snub from Havana. 
 Solo Spanish efforts to soften EU policy might not succeed, 
he suggested, but he cited a recent EL PAIS article in which 
Spanish FM Moratinos claims to have the support of both 
London and Paris for a softer approach.  Groenemeijer argued 
that the Dutch remained resolute that Cuba must improve the 
human rights situation before the EU could return to the 
pre-2003 "constructive engagement."  As EU President, 
however, the top priority for the Dutch is to maintain EU 
unity.  He deplored a split in EU policy as "the best present 
to give Cuba," and said the Dutch "would do anything to 
prevent it."  Groenemeijer stressed that Spain alone could 
not turn the EU onto a more lenient course with Cuba, but if 
it finds allies it certainly could build momentum in that 
direction.  Groenemeijer confirmed that Cuba will be on the 
agenda November 16 at the EU's next  Latin America working 
party meeting (COLAT).  (It had been on the October agenda 
but COLAT referred it back to EU Heads of Mission in Havana 
for recommendations.) 
 
5.  (C) On October 22, Wouter Plomp, deputy director of the 
MFA's Human Rights office, told POLOFF he was "not aware of 
any efforts to soften the EU policy on Cuba."  Separately, 
Aleid Bos, HR officer covering Latin America in the same 
office, "noted U.S. concerns" with regard to a possible shift 
in the EU's approach to Cuba but said that "that is all I can 
say for now."  (Note:  Both Plomp and Bos confirmed that 
Groenemeijer's office has the lead on Cuba policy within the 
Dutch MFA, although they frequently provide input with regard 
to human rights.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (C) While the publicity generated by the MP incident has 
hardened domestic Dutch opposition against a softer line on 
Cuba, the Dutch -- as EU president -- will not stand in the 
way of a developing EU consensus driven by a determined 
member state.  As the Cuba debate within the EU progresses, 
it will be important for the Dutch to hear strong voices 
opposing a change to enable them to declare that such 
consensus does not exist. 
SOBEL 

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