US embassy cable - 04ABUJA1793

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001793 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO AF/RSA BITTRICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, KPKO, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN FORCE GENERATION FOR DARFUR 
 
REF: A. E-MAIL AMBROSE TO ROBERTS 10/12/2004 
 
     B. SANDUSKY E-MAIL 10/15/2004 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
1. (S)  Summary.  Nigeria has already deployed one reinforced 
company to Sudan's Darfur region as part of the AU-authorized 
protection force and has committed to providing additional 
troops once authorized by the AU.  Initially, this was 
thought to be a full additional battalion.  During the first 
week of October, Defense Headquarters identified the 72d Para 
Battalion as their likely choice for deployment.  This unit 
has been implicated in the Benue State massacre in 2001. 
Post has expressed concern about selection of 72d Para at all 
levels of the GON.  It may be reluctant to back away from 
deployment of 72d Para because of operational considerations. 
 There may also be issues of face-saving involved.   End 
Summary. 
 
2. (S)  On October 10, 2004, PolMilOff and ODC Chief told a 
highly-placed officer in the office of the Chief of Defense 
Staff that selection of the 72d Para Battalion would be 
problematic for the USG.  This officer became agitated at 
this, claiming that the actions in Benue State were an 
internal political matter handled by the military under 
lawful orders from President Obasanjo.  He went further to 
say that what happened at Benue is what happens when civil 
authorities decide to send the military in to restore order 
where the police are unable, especially when soldiers have 
already been killed. 
 
3. (S)  On October 12, 2004, DAO and PolMilOff met with 
General Ogomudia, the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), where the 
USG position on 72d Para was reiterated.  The CDS expressed 
concern about our designation of 72d Para as a problem 
because we were "only considering one side of the story."  He 
said that he performed his own investigation into the 
activities in Benue State and that there was a judicial 
review.  Both found no inappropriate actions that could be 
blamed on either the unit or its leadership. 
 
4. (S)  An Army officer in the room during the meeting added 
that most, if not all, of the unit's leadership has changed, 
either through retirement or reassignment, since 2001.  At 
the end of the discussion, the CDS said no final decision 
about which unit to deploy had been made, and the Chief of 
Army Staff (COAS) would propose to the CDS which unit could 
be spared from its primary responsibility (internal stability 
and security).  If 72d Para was selected, the COAS would be 
asked for another unit.  If no other unit is available, and 
the U.S. is unwilling to support 72d Para, the CDS said that 
we would have to find another country to go to for troops 
(Note:  DAO interpreted the CDS comment as meaning that 
Nigeria would find another country to support the deployment, 
not as the U.S. having to find another country to contribute 
troops.  End Note.) 
 
5. (S) On October 15, 2004, the highly-placed officer from 
the office of the CDS told PolMilOff that a different unit, 
from the Kaduna area, had been selected for deployment to 
Darfur.  Later that day, DAO and the UK DATT met with COAS, 
LG Agwai, to get an update on Army planning for the Darfur 
deployment.  Agwai feigned surprise that the U.S. would not 
be able to support 72d Para and wanted the two DATTs to 
believe that this meeting was the first time he had heard of 
the problem.  He claimed that a month's worth of planning was 
potentially wasted because they did not know about U.S. 
objections to this unit's human rights record.  (Note:  The 
UK DATT said Obasanjo may be working directly with COAS and 
leaving CDS out of loop.  If this is the case, then this 
could have been the first time COAS heard about the problem. 
More likely is that the Army had already put time into 
planning for 72d Para deployment and would lose face by 
backing away from this unit over U.S. objections.  End Note.) 
 COAS asked for a listing of Army battalions to which the 
U.S. might object so as not to waste more time selecting 
another untouchable unit.  He indicated he had very few 
battalions to choose from given commitments to UNAMSIL, 
UNMIL, the Bakassi, and the Niger Delta.  Even if a new 
battalion could be immediately selected, the deployment 
schedule had already slipped by a month due to time needed 
for integrating non-organic elements, training, and equipping 
the force.  He noted that while supporting Obasanjo's efforts 
as AU President and participation in AU PKOs were extremely 
high priorities, if no suitable replacement unit could be 
identified, some other African country would have provide the 
troops.  When asked if anything could be done to rehabilitate 
or absolve a unit associated with human right abuses, DAO 
said a thorough, transparent, and credible investigation and 
judicial process that held those responsible for Benue 
accountable would be a good start. 
 
6. (S)  On October 19, PolMilOff, DAO, and IO/PHO Director 
met with the Chief of Training and Operations at Defense 
Headquarters, General I.A. Dikko, to discuss peacekeeping 
operations.  He noted that every unit receives 8 weeks of 
intensive training once it is earmarked for a PKO mission. 
He also said that Nigeria is considering deploying two 
companies to Darfur which, when combined with the company 
already deployed, would form a (small) battalion.  During the 
conversation, DAO asked if 72d Para was still being 
considered for the Darfur deployment and reiterated U.S. 
concerns about this unit. 
 
7. (S)  General Dikko argued that 72d Para was not the unit 
responsible for the massacre in Benue State, and that the 
soldiers from the 3d Armored Division, specifically those 
based in Yola, were involved.  In any case, Dikko said, the 
unit was only following orders.  Therefore, he continued, if 
anyone should be punished, it should be those giving the 
orders, not the unit as a whole.  He also said that the unit 
had already been punished by three years of IMET suspension. 
DAO stated that the "chain-of-command" argument was not valid 
and that everyone in a unit has a personal responsibility to 
respect human rights. 
 
8.  (C)  Later on October 19, PolMilOff, DAO, and IO/PHO 
Director met with Brigadier General Hassan, Director of 
Peacekeeping Operations for Army Headquarters.  Hassan 
discussed the overall operational tempo of the Nigerian Army 
(septel) and stated the Army was stretching to meet all of 
its commitments.  He also said that units receive six weeks 
of training once identified for a peacekeeping deployment, 
including two days by the ICRC on human rights issues and Law 
of Land Warfare.  (Comment: This train up period, identified 
by Hassan, is two weeks shorter than the training requirement 
identified by Defense Headquarters.  End Comment.) When asked 
about 72d Para, he said that a decision from MOD was expected 
soon, and that he would forward the U.S. concerns to his 
higher headquarters. 
 
9. (S)  On October 22, the Minister of Defense telephoned 
A/DCM to discuss U.S. reservations regarding deployment of 
72d Para.  He said that deployment of troops is an urgent 
priority and 72d Para is the most convenient unit to deploy. 
Given these considerations, he requested that the U.S. drop 
its objections and support the deployment of 72d Para.  A/DCM 
said that the U.S. is unable to support this deployment, 
regardless of the urgency of the priority or the convenience 
of the unit.  A/DCM emphasized that this is an important 
priority for the U.S. and that all parties need to work 
harder to find a solution. 
CAMPBELL