US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4550

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 004550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, UN, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION TROIKA: EU LOOKS FOR U.S. 
COOPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 28, the U.S. and the EU held 
their semi-annual exchange on nonproliferation issues.  This 
discussion followed the release of the second U.S.-EU Summit 
declaration on nonproliferation.  The two sides touched on a 
wide range of nonproliferation issues and explored possible 
steps that could be taken to implement the two Summit 
declarations.  On the May Review Conference of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the EU emphasized the 
importance of Article VI and previous Review Conference 
results.  The EU remains seized with the prospect of 
resolving the Iran situation with a &grand bargain8 rather 
than a referral from the IAEA Board of Governors to the 
United Nations Security Council.  The EU is also close to 
finalizing the association agreement with Syria including a 
clause on nonproliferation. Privately, the EU Council 
Secretariat representative told the U.S. delegation 
 
SIPDIS 
(Rangaswamy) that the EU Council, in particular Annalisa 
Giannella,s office, is seeking to expand and enhance its 
profile and expertise in nonproliferation, and would be 
interested in attending G-8 meetings either in place of or in 
addition to the European Commission representative. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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2004 US-EU Statement on Nonproliferation 
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2. (C) Wilke observed that the 2004 statement demonstrates 
the EU,s growing political interest in non-proliferation. 
Rangaswamy noted the U.S. interest in developing the three 
priorities outlined in the statement: implementation of the 
UNSCR 1540, coordination leading the NPT Review Conference, 
and radioactive source security.  She stressed the importance 
of making tangible progress on these issues.  On radioactive 
source security, she mentioned the September 27 meeting 
between U.S. and EU radioactive source experts and the IAEA 
General Conference endorsement of export and import control 
guidance for sources.  The EU agreed to provide feedback on 
the U.S. suggested steps for implementing the 2004 U.S.-EU 
Summit statement on nonproliferation. 
 
3. (C) Wilke was skeptical that an initiative to restrict 
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing to additional states 
could succeed this year and observed that the atmosphere is 
too negatively charged to move forward without alienating the 
states that need to be persuaded to accept changes in the NSG 
guidelines.  The EU was sympathetic to making progress on the 
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply given the 
reference to this issue in the EU nonproliferation strategy. 
Rangaswamy asked whether a change in the French position was 
forthcoming, noting that the main opposition to the 
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply comes from 
France, Russia Brazil, and Argentina.  Wilke had "no news on 
evolution on the French position."  Kayser said that the 
Additional Protocol would be incentivized if it included 
condition of supply. 
 
4. (C) The EU reported on its September 27 troika 
consultations with Brazil.  Wilke explained that Brazil sees 
itself as championing a leadership role in the Non-Aligned 
Movement.  In the EU view, Brazil,s posturing is related to 
U.S. positions on disarmament and enrichment and 
reprocessing.  The EU does not anticipate a change in the 
Brazilian position prior to the NPT Review Conference.  The 
EU emphasized that it would continue to underscore the 
importance of Brazil,s signature to the Additional Protocol. 
 The EU also observed that U.S. influence is limited, and can 
even be counterproductive at times. 
 
5. (C) On PSI, Wilke stressed that the EU has contributions 
to make, in addition to the contributions made by individual 
EU member states.  Rangaswamy acknowledged receipt of the 
EU,s paper on competencies related to PSI and said that the 
U.S. is reviewing the document.  On universalizing the 
Additional Protocol, the EU noted that its effort to expand 
adherence has met with mixed results.  Some governments 
consider the Additional Protocol irrelevant because they do 
not possess nuclear materials.  Other governments associate 
the Additional Protocol to clandestine activity or 
noncompliance and have said that their government,s 
signature is unnecessary because it is not under suspicion. 
Wilke conceded that there is challenge in convincing states 
about the benefits and relevance of the Additional Protocol. 
Rangaswamy reported on the G-8 effort to expand adherence to 
the Additional Protocol, which are being pursued during the 
U.S. G-8 presidency.  Kayser observed that in some cases, it 
could be counterproductive for the U.S. to press for 
adherence.  Kayser argued that this message is better 
received from non-nuclear weapons states.  The U.S. and EU 
agreed to continue to exchange information on these efforts. 
 
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UNSCR 1540 
---------- 
 
6. (C) On the UNSCR 1540, Rangaswamy requested that the U.S. 
and the EU consult on next steps after reports are submitted 
to the 1540 Committee.  Wilke said that the EU was aiming to 
meet the deadline.  He emphasized that implementation of the 
resolution is among the EU,s competencies.  The EU sees its 
role as filling the gaps where national reporting is 
incomplete or insufficient.  There is confusion in the EU 
about the resolution,s references to national control lists. 
 The EU is concerned that this language could result in the 
creation of national control lists and undermine the 
application of the regime control lists.  Further, the EU 
expressed concern about vague language in the resolution 
which, in the EU,s view, could result in different 
interpretations and differing standards in reporting national 
implementation measures. 
 
7. (C) Rangaswamy responded that the EU had made this 
observation previously, during G-8 meetings.  The U.S. does 
not believe that the resolution encourages the proliferation 
of control lists, the resolution was intended to reinforce 
the existing regime control lists.  Given the EU,s concerns, 
Rangaswamy suggested this issue be discussed further by 
experts along with consideration of possible next steps. 
 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (C) The EU welcomed the U.S. suggestion to consult prior 
to and during the NPT Review Conference.  Wilke observed that 
weak WEOG coordination during the April Preparatory Committee 
lead to disappointing consequences.  Wilke and Kayser 
repeatedly sought a firm U.S. commitment to Article VI and 
pressed hard for confirmation of the U.S. commitment to 
previous RevCon outcomes, referring in particular to the 2000 
RevCon,s 13 steps.  Kayser complained that the U.S. position 
on Article VI sends a bad message, especially considering the 
willingness of non-nuclear weapons states to undertake 
additional obligations by signing on to the Additional 
Protocol.  This willingness had to be matched with a 
willingness on the part of nuclear weapons states to fulfill 
their end of the bargain.  Kayser was skeptical that the 
RevCon could succeed without flexibility on the part of the 
U.S.  Rangaswamy replied that the U.S. could not support a 
2005 RevCon agenda that recognized only the 2000 outcome and 
not subsequent developments.  The U.S. has emphasized 
compliance because we are concerned that noncompliance 
threatens the Treaty and all of its benefits.  Wilke 
criticized the U.S. emphasis on compliance, observing that 
the NPT is a balance, and that actions such as the 
development of 'new nukes' undermine the basic pillars of the 
Treaty.  He cautioned about negative atmospherics at the 
RevCon.  He added that a U.S.-EU "alignment of views 
presupposes flexibility", and that U.S. flexibility is 
necessary on issues such as disarmament.  Wilke expressed the 
hope that the disappointing results coming from the most 
recent PrepCom would not be repeated. 
 
9. (C) Kayser began by reaffirming the that the EU is "not 
engaged in the context of negative assurances".  He said that 
only once there is universal compliance with NPT and the AP 
can there be a discussion about the assurances. 
 
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DG Succession 
------------- 
 
10. (C) In response to the EU,s inquiry about the U.S. 
position on Dr. ElBaradei seeking a third term as Director 
General of the IAEA, Rangaswamy referred to the effort to 
establish term limits in the UN system.  She explained that 
the U.S. believes that a two term limit is a sound policy. 
The EU warned that if the U.S. eventually opposes ElBaradei, 
it could have a detrimental effect on relations with the 
Agency.  It will set a negative tone and could be damaging on 
efforts related to Iran and other issues.  Wilke said that 
while the DG is fair, he believes that a battle over 
succession could lead to hard feelings which would be 
difficult to overcome. 
 
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Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Wilke informed the group that China had submitted its 
application for membership to the MTCR.  He added that the EU 
position is still under consideration and hoped that a fully 
coordinated position would emerge by the time of the Seoul 
plenary.  EU priorities for Seoul include admission of new 
countries; discussion of the relevance of UNSCR 1540; and 
consideration tabled proposals.  Rangaswamy said that the 
U.S. hopes that MTCR Partners will give regional 
nonproliferation priority attention at the plenary and 
referred to the U.S. proposal on Syria.  Wilke replied that 
the EU is still reviewing the U.S. proposal. 
 
12. (C) Given the operation of the EU,s common market, Wilke 
believes that not having all EU member states in the MTCR 
could undermine the Regime.  The EU informed Rangaswamy of 
its impending demarche on this issue and provided an advance 
copy of the letter that would be presented to the U.S. in 
Washington.  A similar demarche will also be undertaken in 
Moscow.  Rangaswamy recalled that the U.S. supported the 
membership of the new EU member states and confirmed that the 
U.S. position has not changed.  She inquired whether the EU 
had previously contacted Russia or Turkey about their 
positions.  Wilke affirmed that the EU had weighed in with 
Ankara, and asked the U.S. to use any opportunity to do the 
same. 
 
13. (C) Wilke regretted that membership of the new EU member 
states was being linked to other issues, including the 
admission of other states.  On this point, the EU mentioned 
the possibility that Russia would offer a trade, Russian 
support for admission of the new EU member states in exchange 
for Kazakhstan,s membership.  Rangaswamy responded that, on 
Kazakhstan, the U.S. position is unchanged.  We would not 
endorse membership for Kazakhstan since it is not a 
significant potential supplier of missile-related technology. 
 
14. (C) Wilke said that Russia was already providing 
pre-launch notifications, and asked whether the U.S. would do 
the same.  Rangaswamy replied that the issue is still under 
U.S. inter-agency review.  She suggested that he discuss the 
issue on the margins of Seoul plenary with the U.S. head of 
delegation, Vann Van Diepen. 
 
15. (C) The EU intends to move forward with a UN resolution 
endorsing the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile 
proliferation.  The EU reported on their outreach efforts and 
are optimistic that a majority of UN members will cosponsor 
the resolution. 
 
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Libya 
----- 
 
16. (C) Rangaswamy provided the EU with information on the 
U.S.-UK effort to redirect Libyan WMD scientists.  The EU 
expressed an interest in participating in this initiative. 
Pointing out that the U.S. had not lifted all sanctions, 
Kayser said that the U.S. should give greater recognition to 
what Libya has done.  Van Reidhead, poloff at USEU, delivered 
a demarche on COREPER's decision to lift the arms embargo on 
Libya.  Wilke responded to U.S. concerns that "Libya will not 
get the same treatment as some other countries do", but he 
did not respond to Reidhead's question on which member states 
agree with the COREPER decision. 
 
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Syria 
----- 
 
17. (C) Rangaswamy inquired about the status of the WMD 
clause in the EU,s association agreement with Syria.  Wilke 
confirmed that agreement at the COREPER level is close.  The 
clause has been agreed ad ref by the two sides but some EU 
members states have not seen the new language.  According to 
Wilke, the new language is similar to an earlier draft.  He 
seemed confident that this language would be acceptable to 
the member states and said it "will go through the 
institutions without much problems."  He emphasized that the 
association agreement is a key part of the EU,s approach to 
foreign policy -- engagement.  Wilke said that the agreement 
itself will drive "a wedge in the system that upholds power 
in Syria" by opening the economy.  The EU views engagement 
(with Syria, and Iran) as an instigator for progress along 
the lines of Western efforts to push economic and political 
liberalization in the USSR, and Eastern Europe. 
 
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Iran 
---- 
 
18. (C) The EU presented conflicting views.  On the one hand, 
Wilke and Kaysar complained that Iran had not cooperated 
fully, that Iran had cleverly manipulated the system to 
include language in the IAEA reports that supported their 
case.   Wilke complimented the U.S.-drafted list of questions 
related to the latest report.   On the other hand, Wilke 
suggested that efforts to push Iran to the UNSC would force 
Iran to take a decision to withdraw from the NPT.  They view 
the Iranian announcement on uranium conversion as a "we're 
not bluffing" move.   Reflecting on this, he said that we 
need to figure out a way to ensure that that Iran does not 
withdraw.  Wilke recommended further consideration of a 
"grand bargain" as a way out.  Kaysar expressed frustration 
with Iran,s delays and commented that if Iran withdraws, it 
would undermine its own position, if you don't have anything 
to hide, then why withdraw? 
 
19. (C) The EU asked for clarification on the next steps 
after a possible UNSC referral.  What would the UNSC be able 
to do and how would that help?  EU members remain reluctant 
for a UNSC referral without having a plan for succeeding. 
The EU is concerned that the language from the various 
reports is not robust enough to enable the UNSC to act. He 
said that using making a case for non-compliance based on 
national intelligence services would be risky and risk a 
repeat of UNSC debates on Iraq. He added that it would be 
preferable to have an international case advanced at the 
UNSC, not a national one.  He stated his preference for 
improving IAEA reports and making them more relevant to UNSC 
discussions. 
 
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EU Funding for Nonproliferation 
------------------------------- 
 
20. (C) The EU reported on their efforts to establish a line 
item for nonproliferation.   The EC would like to separate 
their nonproliferation and nuclear safety assistance.  It is 
not clear whether this line item would result in additional 
funds for nonproliferation, and the Global Partnership.   The 
issue still needs to be approved by member states and the 
European Parliament. Both Wilke and Defrennes suggested that 
the slow budgetary cycle means that we will have to wait 
until 2007 "to get serious money", and current efforts to 
secure funding are "like a hunting expedition".  Defrennes 
said that he was hopeful that non-proliferation will be 
included in the proposal for a new "Instrument for 
Stability", which would also allow the EU to fulfill its 
commitments.  Defrennes said that the EU, working with a 
local think tank, had launched an extensive review of EU and 
member state programs on non-proliferation, border security, 
and export 
 
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COMMENT 
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21. (C) This routine exchange produced a surprising outcome: 
a clear sense of disappointment from the EU side that 
well-known U.S. positions remained unchanged.  The EU 
repeatedly urged the U.S. delegation to consider flexibility, 
and underscored their interest in working closely with the 
U.S.  The message was unambiguous )- rigid U.S. positions 
prevented closer collaboration with the EU and these 
divisions, in the EU view, are not constructive in advancing 
nonproliferation. 
 
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Participants 
------------ 
 
22. (U) EU Delegation: 
 
Netherlands (current EU Presidency): 
 
Paul Wilke, Head of Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation 
Division, MFA Hague 
Elke Merks-Schaapveld, Policy Officer, Nuclear Affairs and 
Non-Proliferation Division, MFA Hague 
 
Luxembourg (successor to Netherlands in EU Presidency): 
 
Paul Kayser, Ambassador on special mission 
Tim Kesseler, Charge de mission, Security Department 
 
European Commission 
Marc Deffrennes, Head of Non-proliferation Team 
Andrew Denison, Desk Officer for USA and Canada, DG-RELEX 
 
EU Council Secretariat 
Stephan Klement, Administrator 
 
U.S. Delegation: 
 
Michael McKinley, Charg, U.S. Mission to the EU 
Roopa Rangaswamy, Senior Adviser for G-8 and U.S.-EU 
nonproliferation issues, Bureau of Nonproliferation, 
Department of State 
Van Reidhead, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the EU 
Sean Kimball, Assistant, U.S. Mission to the EU 
 
 
Schnabel