US embassy cable - 04LAGOS2134

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 002134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF, INR, DS, AND EB 
STATE PASS DOE FOR DAS JBRODMAN AND CGAY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2009 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EPET, PINR, NI 
SUBJECT: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE DELTA - A LAGOS 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
REF: ABUJA 1675 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne per 1.4 b and d 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Supplementing the views expressed reftel, 
this message provides Lagos' perspective of the Delta crisis. 
This latest gush of violence is a moment of acceleration in a 
negative spiral that began years ago.  The eruption is a 
byproduct of not only the 2003 elections but also of economic 
stagnation, rivalries among local political actors, the 
deracination of traditional social structures, criminality, 
and an inchoate Ijaw nationalism that seeks to express itself 
in strident terms due to the coarse environment the Delta has 
become.  Because the Delta crisis is such a complex ensemble 
of factors, a quick fix is illusory.  Without sustained 
government attention to the political and economic 
underpinnings of this crisis and flexibility from Delta 
militants, we may see only a very brief respite before the 
temperature heats once more.  Because the crisis is in 
Nigeria's oil patch, it is the country's most significant 
internal national security threat.  End Summary. 
 
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Ijaw Nationalism- An Evolving Dynamic 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Ijaws claim to be Nigeria's fourth-largest ethnic 
group. They comprise a near majority in the oil-producing 
Delta region.  Rival Ijaw militant leaders Al Haji Dokubo 
Asari(Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force - NDPVF) and Ateke 
Tom (Niger Delta Vigilante Group -NDVG) have been behind much 
of the violence that has occurred in Rivers State over the 
past several months.  While Tom is generally dismissed as a 
political thug empowered by Rivers State Governor Odili in 
the 2003 elections, Asari's leadership pedigree is more 
nuanced and his ultimate ambitions more veiled than his 
rivals.  Like Tom, Asari was employed to do local dirty work 
by the PDP (Obasanjo's party) during the 2003 election 
season.  He performed the job with relish.  Thus, that the 
2003 election was plush with fraud was not the reason that 
Asari broke allegiance with the local power structure.  It 
was the failure of Asari, Governor Odili, and Ateke Tom to 
reach a mutually satisfactory division of the spoils of 
victory that ended their relationship and put Asari on his 
present course. 
 
3.  (C) Odili had helped Asari obtain the presidency of the 
Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) in 2001.  However, Asari apparently 
was more ambitious than Odili would willingly accommodate. 
Asari reportedly got involved with labor contracts at the 
port in Port Harcourt.  He hired out his men as protection 
squads to Odili rivals within the PDP.  He also put his hand 
in chieftaincy squabbles, thus challenging what Odili felt 
was his gubernatorial prerogative.  Moreover, Odili reduced 
his subvention to Asari and his minions once the 2003 
elections were over. 
 
4.  (C) Only after the break with Odili did Asari assume the 
mantle of militant Ijaw nationalist leader as the essence of 
his persona.  We believe the assumption of this role was more 
tactical than principled.  Yet, it has generated a certain 
dynamic that controls Asari perhaps as much as he controls 
it. 
 
5.  (C) Civil society sources in Rivers State say Asari has 
managed to dissociate himself in the public's eye from his 
foul play during the 2003 elections.  Many perceive Asari as 
a legitimate rebel leader with an attractive political 
platform -- sovereign national conference and greater 
resource control.  Jaye Gaskia, president of the 
Environmental Rights Association, told us Asari represents a 
blend of Ijaw nationalism, personal ambition, and economic 
opportunism.  One's final opinion of Asari rests on which 
element you grant the greatest weight, Gaskia maintained. 
 
6.  (C) Patterson Ogon (Director of the Ijaw Council for 
Human Rights) and Chief Edwin Clarke (traditional Ijaw ruler 
in Warri, Delta State) told us separately that Asari enjoys 
the moral support of many Ijaw elders.  They remarked that 
his demands are not distinct from claims the elders have been 
putting forth for years.  However both leaders reserved their 
prerogatives as elders to "negotiate" for the Ijaw people. 
7.  (C) Comment:  Whatever the true motives behind Asari's 
actions and rhetoric, he is now riding the undisciplined 
tiger of Ijaw nationalism, which makes him both a leader and 
a captive. He must move carefully.  If he tarries too long in 
negotiations in Abuja, people will begin to see him as a 
sell-out or ineffectual. However, if he does not show 
flexibility, further confrontation with the GON military is 
likely.  The adulation has probably caused him to start 
believing much of his own propaganda.  He will try to use 
this climb in his popularity to secure a position as the 
single most important Ijaw leader. However, rival Ijaw 
leaders -- militant and mainstream -- are not likely to cede 
easily to him.  End Comment. 
 
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Limited Ability to Disrupt Oil Production 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) As most recently demonstrated by Asari, militia 
groups in the Delta have the capacity to disrupt normal 
business operations in the energy sector.  Even without the 
direct threats of kidnappings, and sabotage, militants can 
quickly manufacture such an environment of instability that 
certain areas become "no-go" zones for companies, hindering 
necessary repairs and maintenance work, which might 
precipitate eventual production losses.  More to the point 
regarding the threat posed to Nigeria's national security, 
there are some tracts within the Delta that are ungovernable 
from Abuja because of the weak, short arms of the central 
government and its security apparatus. 
 
9.  (C) While any diminution in production could hurt Nigeria 
and rattle international markets, the extent of the potential 
disruption is limited by a range of factors, including 
facility distance from shore, security measures in place at 
oil facilities, and the heretofore unproven capability of the 
militias to conduct operations over a large distance. The 
independent research institution Menas of the United Kingdom 
assessed in its September 30 report that at most, crude 
supplies of 150,000 - 200,000 bpd of supplies are at risk 
from Asari out of the 2.4 million bpd produced by Nigeria. 
 
10.  (C) Extension of militia activity into Delta State, 
Bayelsa State, and other areas of Rivers State where Ijaws 
are a significant portion of the population could cast a 
shadow over more of Nigeria's oil production.  However, the 
quick expansion of this threat is unlikely for several 
reasons.  Primarily, it would imply a copycat or that Asari's 
influence has spread to these areas.  For now, we do not 
sense that other competing local militia leaders are willing 
to subordinate their ambition to Asari's just yet. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
GON Willingness To Talk - Good Political 
Strategy If Nothing Else 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) In the meantime, senior-level GON officials have met 
with NDPVF leader Asari in recent weeks. A contact with ties 
to the GON told us Obasanjo sees the recent flare-up as 
essentially a localized political spat that just happened to 
take place in the oil patch.  Obasanjo's aim is to talk Asari 
down to size and to hopefully revive the more moderate, older 
Ijaw leadership with whom he feels more comfortable and able 
to control. 
 
12.  (C) The level of distrust between the GON and Asari is 
palpable.  Ijaw community leader Patterson Ogon told us Asari 
felt President Obasanjo would stop short of addressing the 
fundamental Ijaw demands.  Patterson maintained that Asari's 
signature of the September 29 cease-fire document was thus 
"tactical," designed to test how far Obasanjo would go. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Lots Of Aggrieved, But Few Carry The 
Punch Of Those In The Oil Patch 
------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) While Asari has not gotten what he wants from Abuja. 
 Just by meeting with Obasanjo, he has gotten more than most. 
 Asari's pilgrimage to Abuja and triumphal return home has 
sparked a lot of criticism, particularly by mainstream 
political opponents of the Obasanjo regime.  They have cried 
that the reward received for trying to work nonviolently 
within the system has been Obasanjo's silence.  Conversely, 
by brandishing weapons, Asari has gotten Abuja's undivided 
attention. 
 
14.  (C) The possibility of other groups taking a page from 
Asari's playbook cannot be discounted.  Noting the success of 
Asari's tactics in gaining the president's attention, some 
groups murmur they should take up arms as well.  However, 
other groups would find it difficult to approximate Asari's 
impact.  First, most do not operate in the oil-rich Delta and 
therefore lack the same strategic leverage.  Second, would-be 
guerrilla fighters from outside the delta region do not enjoy 
the same topographical advantages afforded by the Delta's 
murky swamps and creeks.  Militia groups from non-delta areas 
would likely find it more difficult to combat government 
forces.  Last, many of the grumbling organizations do not 
have the present capacity or funding to mount any significant 
tactical military operations. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Calls for National Conference Ever Present - 
But Will it Happen Or Matter? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
15.  (C) Agitation for a sovereign national conference is 
increasing in Nigeria.  At the forefront of this effort are 
regionally or ethnically-based groups such as the Yoruba 
Afenifere, the Ohaneze Ndigbo (Igbo), Southern Minorities 
Movement, and Middle Belt Progressive Movement.  Members of 
these groups have formed an umbrella organization, the Ethnic 
Nationalist Forum, for the primary purpose of garnering 
support for a national conference.  President Obasanjo has 
consistently resisted a national conference, concerned it 
would become a venue for secessionist demands as well as to 
wrest power away from him.  Against this backdrop came the 
successful August 2004 stay-at-home strike organized by the 
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB) in the Southeast.  Given the tragedy of the 
attempted Biafra secession, this strike caused the government 
to take notice. 
 
16.  (C) In an attempt to dampen agitation for a conference, 
presidential political advisor Jerry Gana publicly raised in 
early October the possibility of a "national dialogue."  This 
trial balloon was also a chunk of bait.  The GON is 
attempting to see how many pro-national conference supporters 
it can co-opt.  Even if the government earnestly supported a 
conference, the planning would take months.  While there 
would be militant agitation at such a conference, the 
attendees would likely be carefully vetted to ensure the vast 
majority opposed any form of secession.  Even among the 
southern groups who endorse a conference and oppose Obasanjo, 
support for secession is not strong.  However, among these 
groups there are varying degrees of support for reducing 
presidential power within the national government, devolving 
power from federal to state institutions, reassessing 
resource allocation between the different tiers of government 
and reviewing the federal and presidential system of 
governance in favor of a parliamentary system. 
 
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Comment 
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17.  (C) The outbreak of violence in the Delta region is 
rooted in economic stagnation, fighting over the spoils of a 
flawed electoral process, rising criminality, Ijaw 
nationalism, and the breakdown of traditional structures. 
Because this agitation comes from within Nigeria's oil patch, 
it represents a significant, highly visible challenge for the 
government.  This problem will not go away soon. GON 
willingness to talk appears to have been a good tactical move 
in the short run.  It might also have been the only true 
avenue open.  The attempt at dialogue has ushered in a moment 
of relative quiet. 
 
18.  (C) However unless substantive progress is made, raised 
expectations will metastasize into renewed frustration and 
possibly violence.   In the end, Obasanjo will temporize as 
much as possible and concede little.  The militants will want 
more, fast.  For talks to work, both sides will have to 
exercise a degree of statesmanship to which each is 
unaccustomed.  Given the level of distrust and gamesmanship, 
we suspect the new rounds of talks to yield little progress. 
 
19.  (C) Groups in other regions of Southern Nigeria will be 
closely watching how these talks unfold.  However, we do not 
predict that these other groups will imitate Asari's 
confrontational tactics.  Agitation for a national conference 
will likely be more of a political force in most of the south 
than will be armed aggression.  While political frictions 
exist throughout the southern tier of the country, most 
contacts do not see the continued viability of the Nigerian 
state as under imminent threat. 
 
20.  (U) This message has been cleared by Embassy Abuja. 
BROWNE