US embassy cable - 04MADRID4080

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PREF, MO, AG, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON POLISARIO RHETORIC, WESTERN SAHARA 
RESOLUTION 
 
REF: A) STATE 223135 B) ALGIERS 2251 
 
Classified By: Political officer Ricardo Zuniga; reasons 1.5 (B) and (D 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Spain will convey a message to the Madrid 
Polisario representative calling on the Polisario to cease 
threats to resume armed conflict with Morocco.  MFA Maghreb 
Office Director Carlos Fernandez Arias also shared Spain's 
views on the state of play in Western Morocco, including GOS 
priorities for a UN resolution on Western Sahara.  Fernandez 
Arias said Former Secretary of State Baker was the "best 
thing that ever happened" for the Western Sahara negotiations 
and made a pitch for the proposal of another U.S. figure as 
the UNSYG's special envoy.  The Socialist government still 
seems to be feeling its way on Western Morocco, generating 
some confusion regarding GOS positions on the issue.  For 
now, Spain's primary objective is simply to keep the peace 
process alive.  End Summary. 
 
//GOS AGREES WITH USG ON POLISARIO THREATS TO RESUME COMBAT// 
 
2. (SBU) Poloff met with MFA Maghreb Office Director Carlos 
Fernandez Arias on 10/18 to convey ref A points requesting 
Spain approach the Madrid Polisario representative to express 
concern regarding recent Polisario threats to resume armed 
conflict in Western Sahara.  Fernandez said the USG points 
tracked with Spain's views, noting that GOS Deputy Foreign 
Minister Bernardino Leon had warned Polisario leaders in 
August against continuing to employ aggressive rhetoric. 
Fernandez plans to meet with local Polisario representative 
Brahim Gali in the next few days and promised to relay 
another cautionary message on behalf of the GOS.  He said 
Polisario leaders are well aware that talk of renewing the 
armed struggle is unrealistic, especially since it is not in 
Algeria's interests to allow the conflict to resume. 
 
//SPANISH OBJECTIVES IN WESTERN SAHARA// 
 
3. (C) Poloff noted that there was some confusion within the 
USG concerning Spain's views on next steps on Western Sahara 
and on the mandate of the SGSR Alvaro de Soto.  Fernandez 
said he was aware that Spain's positions required some 
clarification and said that the Spanish DCM in Washington had 
recently discussed the issue with NEA DAS Philo Dibble.  He 
said that the GOS continued to improve ties to Morocco in 
hopes that better relations would help nudge Rabat (and 
Paris) towards a more conciliatory posture on the Baker Plan. 
 Fernandez acknowledged that neither Morocco nor France has 
reciprocated thus far.  He described resolution of the 
Western Sahara issue as the linchpin to broader GOS 
objectives in the region, including the progressive economic 
and political integration of Maghreb states in order to 
stabilize Spain's shaky southern flank. 
 
4. (C) Fernandez described Polisario's current attitude as 
"extremely tough," especially with respect to Alvaro de Soto. 
 Polisario had faith in Baker as an interlocutor with 
sufficient gravitas to honor commitments made to the parties. 
 They view de Soto as a mere UN functionary and associate him 
with his former boss, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, 
who led the organization during the worst period in 
UN-Polisario relations.  Fernandez said Spain agreed with USG 
views on the importance of Polisario's release of the 
remaining Moroccan POW's, but noted that the Sahrawis are 
probably not disposed to trade away one of their few 
remaining points of leverage. 
 
//SPANISH SUGGESTIONS FOR A UN RESOLUTION// 
 
5. (C) Fernandez said the GOS will soon share with the USG, 
France, and the UK proposed ideas for a resolution on Western 
Sahara, to include five key components: 
 
-- Explicit support for the Baker Plan as the "optimal 
political solution." 
 
-- An expression of support for UNSYG Annan and for his envoy 
Alvaro de Soto. 
 
-- A one-year mandate for the MINURSO mission (though 
Fernandez said six months would be acceptable to the GOS). 
 
-- Language that would give de Soto room for maneuver to get 
beyond Morocco's rejection of the Baker plan, as opposed to a 
call for de Soto to simply implement the plan without any 
possibility of modification. 
 
-- Retention of current funding levels for MINURSO. 
(Fernandez said he knew we had a different view on this 
issue, but said Spain's view is that MINURSO's presence 
creates pressure on both sides, especially Morocco, to remain 
engaged in the peace process.) 
 
//A PITCH FOR A U.S. ENVOY TO REPLACE BAKER// 
 
6. (C) Fernandez said that in his view and the view of many 
others in the MFA, Former Secretary Baker had been the "best 
thing that ever happened" for the Western Sahara peace 
process.  He said Baker's genius was in keeping the parties 
pointed in the right direction and in generating momentum for 
an otherwise stalled process.  Fernandez fears that with 
Baker's departure, the dynamic created by high-level USG 
interest will stall (especially in the case of Morocco) and 
both parties may simply retrench.  This would leave a 
festering and destabilizing wound in Moroccan-Algerian 
relations, blocking European plans to foment a more stable 
and prosperous Maghreb.  Fernandez said the best solution 
would be for another high-profile U.S. figure to take Baker's 
place as the UNSYG's personal envoy.  He asked that poloff 
inquire with the Department whether this would be possible. 
Poloff agreed to forward the inquiry, but said he was unaware 
of any consideration of another U.S. candidate for the 
position. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
7. (C) We believe the main reason for the mixed signals 
regarding GOS positions on Western Sahara is that the GOS 
itself is still working out its approach on the issue. 
Whereas Maghreb expert Fernandez has stressed continuity in 
GOS policy, his superiors in the MFA have sent positive 
signals towards Morocco and France in hopes that those 
governments would reciprocate and show greater flexibility 
towards the Baker Plan.  This strategy has not succeeded and 
the GOS now seems to be tacking towards less ambitious 
objectives.  Spain's fundamental objective is to keep the 
peace process alive and both parties at the table.  Anything 
short of a mutually-agreed solution is seen as a lasting 
threat to Spanish interests in the Maghreb. 
 
 
ARGYROS