Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 04MADRID4073 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04MADRID4073 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Madrid |
| Created: | 2004-10-19 15:51:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PTER ASEC SP Counterterrorism |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 191551Z Oct 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004073 SIPDIS EUR/WE FOR HALL, ZIMMERMAN, AND ALLEGRONE S/CT DS/IP/EUR DS/ICI/PII DS/DSS/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 TAGS: PTER, ASEC, SP, Counterterrorism SUBJECT: GOS ARRESTS SUSPECTED ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an d (D). 1. (C) Summary. Spanish National Police arrested eight Maghrebi residents of Spain on charges of planning to bomb Spain's High Court, which takes the lead in GOS terrorism investigations. The detentions were based in part on USG information provided through Legatt channels. According to news reports, the eight men were in the early stages of organizing a conspiracy that included plans to purchase 1,000 kilos of dynamite with the aid of an imprisoned ETA bomber, and, police fear, plans for a number of suicide bombings. A ninth suspect, reportedly the ringleader of the group, was arrested in Switzerland approximately one month ago. The arrests were ordered by high-profile judge Baltazar Garzon, who is currently also prosecuting suspected al-Qa'ida members. Police have not established any connection between the 10/18 and the 3/11 train bombers. Spanish National Police requested the assistance of Legatt Madrid and other foreign police agencies in the course of their investigation. No explosives or weapons have been discovered as yet and it is not clear whether the authorities have sufficient evidence to secure a conviction or whether they acted now to disrupt the extremists out of concern that they would act before the GOS could obtain stronger evidence for legal purposes. End Summary. //EIGHT MAGHREBI DETAINEES// 2. (U) On the evening of 10/18 and early morning of 10/19, Spanish National Police arrested eight suspected Islamist militants, including four in Almeria: Ismail Latrech (Algerian), Mourad Yala (AKA "Abu Anas")(Algerian), an illegal immigrant Algerian known as "Mehdi," and Magid Mchmacha (Moroccan). Also arrested were: Ali Omar (AKA "Jelloul")(nationality uncertain) in Valencia, Djamel Merabet (Algerian) in Malaga, and Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed (from the Spanish enclave of Ceuta) in Madrid. An eighth suspect was subsequently arrested in Pamplona and a ninth, reported to be the leader of the cell -- whose name has not yet been released -- has been in detention in Switzerland for the last month. One suspect, Latrech, was previously known to the authorities as a drug informant for the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the main Spanish intelligence service, while several of the others had served prison sentences for a variety of crimes. There are no indications thus far of a connection between the 10/18 detainees and the group that carried out the 3/11 train bombing. 3. (U) According to press reports citing police sources, much of the information leading to the arrests was provided by an imam who is a double-agent for the Moroccan intelligence service and who has reported reliably in the past, including on the perpetrators of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid. The information provided by this source led judicial officials to order wiretaps on the phones of the suspects, which allowed police to detect early planning for a terrorist operation. After four months of collecting information, police carried out the coordinated arrests of the nine suspects. During the detentions, police located a manual for carrying out "martyrdom operations" and other documentation related to the activities of the group. //PLANNING FOR "MAJOR ATTACKS" - AN ETA CONNECTION// 4. (C) Police sources tell the press that the nine men were seeking 1,000 kilograms of dynamite with which to carry out a truck bomb attack against the High Court, the judicial body that leads GOS counterterrorism prosecutions, and other unspecified attacks. Police indicated to Legatt considerable concern that the group would carry out suicide attacks with a portion of the explosives. Apparently, these fears are based in part on information developed through wiretaps indicating that the nine suspects were attempting to identify Muslim common prisoners who might be willing to undertake "martyrdom attacks." The discovery of the manual on suicide attacks also seems to justify such concerns. 5. (U) Of particular note is the alleged effort on the part of the Maghrebi group to obtain the dynamite through convicted ETA terrorist Juan Jose Rego Vidal, who is in prison for a 1995 attempt to assasinate King Juan Carlos. According to press reports, the nine suspects knew Rego and other ETA members from spending time in prison on non-terrorist charges. The Maghrebis hoped Rego could either provide a direct source for the dynamite or could direct them to another person who could help them. //THE U.S. CONNECTION// 6. (C) In the weeks leading up to the arrests, Spanish National Police requested the assistance of Legatt Madrid with respect to correspondence between the suspects in Spain and Muslim extremists in U.S. prisons. The GOS evidently requested similar assistance from authorities in Australia and other countries. Legatt coordinated U.S. assistance and was able to provide information useful to the Spanish investigators (sensitive law enforcement information reported via Legatt channels). However, the information developed by Legatt does not appear related to the operational planning aspects of the Spanish cell, nor does it point to activities by the cell in the U.S. //COMMENT// 7. (C) These arrests have the makings of a significant counterterrorism success for both the GOS and Judge Garzon. (NOTE: Garzon has been handling the case of suspected al-Qa'ida financier and cell leader Barakat Yarkas, arrested in Spain in November 2001, while another judge, Juan del Olmo, has led the 3/11 investigation. END NOTE.) GOS security agencies have been stung by recent revelations that police informants had warned police of planning for the 3/11 train bombing, but officials did not follow up. Given this context, together with lingering fears spawned by the 3/11 bombings, it is possible the Spanish police acted to disrupt the cell with the full knowledge that they may have insufficient evidence to successfully try the suspects. Garzon is a particularly aggressive judge who enjoys the limelight. He may have determined that the arrests were justified by the need to derail any plans for terrorist attacks (and his own need for press attention), even if convictions would be difficult. The discovery of this cell, and the ETA connection in particular, may shake the apparent conviction among some Spaniards that they are safe from terrorists now that the GOS has withdrawn troops from Iraq. Unfortunately, it is clear that Spain will remain an active front for the extemists in the war on terror. ARGYROS
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04