US embassy cable - 04MADRID4073

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GOS ARRESTS SUSPECTED ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS

Identifier: 04MADRID4073
Wikileaks: View 04MADRID4073 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2004-10-19 15:51:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER ASEC SP Counterterrorism
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

191551Z Oct 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/WE FOR HALL, ZIMMERMAN, AND ALLEGRONE 
S/CT 
DS/IP/EUR 
DS/ICI/PII 
DS/DSS/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, SP, Counterterrorism 
SUBJECT: GOS ARRESTS SUSPECTED ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Spanish National Police arrested eight 
Maghrebi residents of Spain on charges of planning to bomb 
Spain's High Court, which takes the lead in GOS terrorism 
investigations.  The detentions were based in part on USG 
information provided through Legatt channels.  According to 
news reports, the eight men were in the early stages of 
organizing a conspiracy that included plans to purchase 1,000 
kilos of dynamite with the aid of an imprisoned ETA bomber, 
and, police fear, plans for a number of suicide bombings.  A 
ninth suspect, reportedly the ringleader of the group, was 
arrested in Switzerland approximately one month ago.  The 
arrests were ordered by high-profile judge Baltazar Garzon, 
who is currently also prosecuting suspected al-Qa'ida 
members.  Police have not established any connection between 
the 10/18 and the 3/11 train bombers.  Spanish National 
Police requested the assistance of Legatt Madrid and other 
foreign police agencies in the course of their investigation. 
 No explosives or weapons have been discovered as yet and it 
is not clear whether the authorities have sufficient evidence 
to secure a conviction or whether they acted now to disrupt 
the extremists out of concern that they would act before the 
GOS could obtain stronger evidence for legal purposes.  End 
Summary. 
 
//EIGHT MAGHREBI DETAINEES// 
 
2. (U) On the evening of 10/18 and early morning of 10/19, 
Spanish National Police arrested eight suspected Islamist 
militants, including four in Almeria: Ismail Latrech 
(Algerian), Mourad Yala (AKA "Abu Anas")(Algerian), an 
illegal immigrant Algerian known as "Mehdi," and Magid 
Mchmacha (Moroccan).  Also arrested were: Ali Omar (AKA 
"Jelloul")(nationality uncertain) in Valencia, Djamel Merabet 
(Algerian) in Malaga, and Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed (from the 
Spanish enclave of Ceuta) in Madrid.  An eighth suspect was 
subsequently arrested in Pamplona and a ninth, reported to be 
the leader of the cell -- whose name has not yet been 
released -- has been in detention in Switzerland for the last 
month.  One suspect, Latrech, was previously known to the 
authorities as a drug informant for the National Intelligence 
Center (CNI), the main Spanish intelligence service, while 
several of the others had served prison sentences for a 
variety of crimes.  There are no indications thus far of a 
connection between the 10/18 detainees and the group that 
carried out the 3/11 train bombing. 
 
3. (U) According to press reports citing police sources, much 
of the information leading to the arrests was provided by an 
imam who is a double-agent for the Moroccan intelligence 
service and who has reported reliably in the past, including 
on the perpetrators of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid. 
 The information provided by this source led judicial 
officials to order wiretaps on the phones of the suspects, 
which allowed police to detect early planning for a terrorist 
operation.  After four months of collecting information, 
police carried out the coordinated arrests of the nine 
suspects.  During the detentions, police located a manual for 
carrying out "martyrdom operations" and other documentation 
related to the activities of the group. 
 
//PLANNING FOR "MAJOR ATTACKS" - AN ETA CONNECTION// 
 
4. (C) Police sources tell the press that the nine men were 
seeking 1,000 kilograms of dynamite with which to carry out a 
truck bomb attack against the High Court, the judicial body 
that leads GOS counterterrorism prosecutions, and other 
unspecified attacks.  Police indicated to Legatt considerable 
concern that the group would carry out suicide attacks with a 
portion of the explosives.  Apparently, these fears are based 
in part on information developed through wiretaps indicating 
that the nine suspects were attempting to identify Muslim 
common prisoners who might be willing to undertake "martyrdom 
attacks."  The discovery of the manual on suicide attacks 
also seems to justify such concerns. 
 
5. (U) Of particular note is the alleged effort on the part 
of the Maghrebi group to obtain the dynamite through 
convicted ETA terrorist Juan Jose Rego Vidal, who is in 
prison for a 1995 attempt to assasinate King Juan Carlos. 
According to press reports, the nine suspects knew Rego and 
other ETA members from spending time in prison on 
non-terrorist charges.  The Maghrebis hoped Rego could either 
provide a direct source for the dynamite or could direct them 
to another person who could help them. 
//THE U.S. CONNECTION// 
 
6. (C) In the weeks leading up to the arrests, Spanish 
National Police requested the assistance of Legatt Madrid 
with respect to correspondence between the suspects in Spain 
and Muslim extremists in U.S. prisons.  The GOS evidently 
requested similar assistance from authorities in Australia 
and other countries.  Legatt coordinated U.S. assistance and 
was able to provide information useful to the Spanish 
investigators (sensitive law enforcement information reported 
via Legatt channels).  However, the information developed by 
Legatt does not appear related to the operational planning 
aspects of the Spanish cell, nor does it point to activities 
by the cell in the U.S. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
7. (C) These arrests have the makings of a significant 
counterterrorism success for both the GOS and Judge Garzon. 
(NOTE: Garzon has been handling the case of suspected 
al-Qa'ida financier and cell leader Barakat Yarkas, arrested 
in Spain in November 2001, while another judge, Juan del 
Olmo, has led the 3/11 investigation.  END NOTE.)  GOS 
security agencies have been stung by recent revelations that 
police informants had warned police of planning for the 3/11 
train bombing, but officials did not follow up.  Given this 
context, together with lingering fears spawned by the 3/11 
bombings, it is possible the Spanish police acted to disrupt 
the cell with the full knowledge that they may have 
insufficient evidence to successfully try the suspects. 
Garzon is a particularly aggressive judge who enjoys the 
limelight.  He may have determined that the arrests were 
justified by the need to derail any plans for terrorist 
attacks (and his own need for press attention), even if 
convictions would be difficult.  The discovery of this cell, 
and the ETA connection in particular, may shake the apparent 
conviction among some Spaniards that they are safe from 
terrorists now that the GOS has withdrawn troops from Iraq. 
Unfortunately, it is clear that Spain will remain an active 
front for the extemists in the war on terror. 
ARGYROS 

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