US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2698

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 THE HAGUE 002698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, LY, AL, CWC 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  WRAP-UP OF THE 
38TH SESSION OF THE OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
 
REF: SECSTATE 218506 
 
This is CWC-124-04. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (U) The U.S. achieved its one essential goal at the 
October 12-15 Executive Council session -- unanimous approval 
of the proposed technical change to allow for Libyan 
conversion of the Rabta facility.  The issue dominated EC-38, 
with a record 26 delegations asking to make opening 
statements and all noting the technical change.  The concerns 
of India and Pakistan were addressed through extensive 
consultations with the U.S., UK, Italian, Libyan and Tunisian 
delegations.  The coordinated effort, led by the U.S., 
ultimately convinced Russia, the remaining hold-out, to 
finally sign on (see paras 17-23).  The actual conversion 
request regarding Rabta and the combined plans for 
destruction and verification of the Rabta factories and 
Libyan mobile units were deferred to an upcoming special EC 
session, currently set for November 24. 
 
2.  (U) The technical change thoroughly dominated the EC-38 
discussions to the exclusion of progress on other issues. 
There was no agreement on the 2005 budget, which will be 
raised at the special EC session with a view to setting the 
stage for agreement on the margins of the November Conference 
of States Parties (CSP).  Work will continue on a draft 
document for annual submissions on national programs related 
to protective purposes with the intention of reaching 
agreement at the CSP.  Unexpectedly, there was heated 
discussion on a call by many delegations for the 
establishment of a committee to address numerous complaints 
about status and privileges matters under discussion with the 
Dutch government.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 3 - Statement by the DG 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) DG Pfirter began his statement by noting that the 
Rabta conversion request and the associated technical change 
were the most important issues facing EC-38. Passage of the 
technical change, stressed the DG, would be a great service 
to the future of universal adherence to the CW Convention. 
And as the Rabta facility would produce low-cost 
pharmaceuticals of particular importance to Africa and 
developing nations, the conversion would also serve as a 
humanitarian gesture. 
 
4.  (U) The DG noted the "lean" programme and budget for 2005 
that he had forwarded for consideration.  He promised to 
provide further information required by States Parties 
involved in budget negotiations and suggested that he would 
be willing to make some adjustments to his budget proposals 
in due course.  In a later intervention, he urged SPs to 
factor in the additional costs to the Technical Secretariat 
(TS) necessitated by the implementation of the tenure policy. 
 The DG stated that the TS might be required to use the 
Working Capital Fund before the end of the year if the 
organization does not receive assessed contributions (read: 
U.S.) or reimbursements for Article IV and V inspections. 
The DG also highlighted developments in verification 
activities, industry inspections, and universality efforts. 
 
------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM 4 - General Debate 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (U) Twenty-six speakers took part in the general debate. 
Most focused on several recurring themes: the Rabta 
conversion request and associated technical change; support 
for Results Based Budgeting (RBB) but with varying positions 
on the budget itself; support for work on universality of the 
CWC; strong support (amongst NAM countries) for an increase 
in funding of international cooperative assistance (ICA); 
increased destruction activities and meeting destruction 
deadlines; and a proposed increase in inspections of other 
chemical production facilities (WEOG countries supporting and 
the NAM opposing).  The Netherlands (speaking for the EU), 
Sudan (speaking for the African Union), Japan, Iran, and 
South Africa all made reference to the problem of late 
payments by "certain" member states.  All delegations, with 
the exception of Russia and initially Pakistan, spoke in 
favor of the Rabta technical change. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 5 - Status of Implementation 
of the Convention 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (U)  The EC noted the supplement to the 2003 Verification 
Implementation Report (VIR).  The U.S. took the floor to 
thank the TS for improving the VIR reporting process and 
stated that the U.S. would provide additional comments on the 
supplement.  The EC also expressed its concern that only a 
small number of SPs had submitted annual declaration on past 
activities for 2003 on time, and urged all SPs to meet their 
obligations regarding annual declarations in a timely manner. 
 The EC also noted the document on the status of requests for 
clarification of declaration-related information for 2003. 
The U.S. obtained the clarifications requested in reftel and 
will provide information separately to Washington. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 6 - Report of the EC 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) The EC approved the report on the performance of its 
activities from 28 June 2003 to 2 July 2004. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 7 - Progress report on 
Implementation of the Article VII Action Plan 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) The EC noted the second progress report regarding 
activities under the Action Plan for Article VII.  The 
facilitator, Mark Matthews (UK) reviewed the status of 
consultations, bilateral efforts of SPs, and TS workshops and 
seminars focusing on national implementing legislation. 
Matthews requested, and the EC approved, authorization to 
review Article VII status directly to the CSP in November. 
The U.S. pressed to have the recommendations of the report 
incorporated into a separate recommendation to the CSP. 
Several other SPs spoke in support of efforts to improve the 
status of implementation of Article VII, including Russia, 
Japan, and Iran.  India, in particular, noted support for 
Article VII efforts, but voiced disappointment over progress 
achieved thus far and questioned what plans exist to 
determine how to review the status of implementation at the 
tenth CSP. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
AGENDA ITEM 8 - Progress report on 
Implementation of the universality action plan 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9.  (U) The EC noted the progress report on the 
implementation of the action plan for universality. 
Facilitator Hela Lahmar (Tunisia) summarized the informal 
consultations held in July and October 2004.  Lahmar noted 
that 15 countries have nominated Points of Contact (POC), and 
that she expected the EU to nominate a POC shortly.  She also 
stated that the External Relations Division was developing a 
calendar of activities in 2005.  The U.S. noted the generally 
poor communications between the TS and SPs to date and 
expressed concern that the TS has not interacted with POCs. 
The U.S. recommended that the TS work on a strategic approach 
to target specific subregions, which should be shared with 
POCs and others interested.  Japan recommended that the TS 
focus its efforts on smaller sub-regional events in the key 
African and Middle Eastern areas.  Japan also recommended 
that the TS invite States not Party to attend CSP-9 as 
observers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
AGENDA ITEM 9 - Effectiveness of 
verification activities and their optimization 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
10.  (U)  The EC noted the status report on optimization of 
verification.  The U.S. stated that it is pleased with the 
report, but added that due to its late publication, the U.S. 
reserves the right to return to it at a future date. 
 
----------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 10 - Report on progress 
in meeting revised deadlines for 
destruction of chemical weapons 
----------------------------------- 
 
11.  (U) Possessor states made brief reports during the EC 
discussion, drawing on the points made at the October 11 
destruction informals.  As at the informal donors meeting on 
October 11, some delegations requested that Russia provide a 
more complete and written report of the changes taking place 
with its destruction program.  Russia declined, saying it was 
already providing an abundance of information and not see the 
need to be subject to further reporting requirements.  In 
reality, and as usual, the briefings offered by Russia on 
various occasions during the week were long on pictures and 
short on useful information. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 11 - Detailed plans 
for the destruction of chemical weapons 
--------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (U)  The agreed detailed plan for the verification of 
destruction of CW at Aberdeen was deferred to the next EC 
session. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM TWELVE - Combined plans for 
the destruction or conversion and 
verification of CW production facilities 
---------------------------------------- 
 
13. (U) The Council approved the two Russian combined plans 
for verification of conversion of the DF production facility 
and the facility for preparation for filling of non-chemical 
parts, both at Volgograd.  Regarding the DF facility, the 
Russian experts from Moscow confirmed that the four pieces of 
specialized equipment in question (tanks 115 1-4) had been 
destroyed between September 2001 and March 2002.  (Note:  The 
TS also confirmed that all demilitarization activities at the 
 
SIPDIS 
DF facility had been completed.)  The TS affirmed that the 
Russian description of the disposition of commercial 
equipment at the former DF facility (now used for storage) is 
correct.  Jerry Mazur of the Verification Branch indicated 
that roughly two years ago, Russia originally intended to 
mothball the cypermethrin line with little modification, but 
that the TS insisted that Russia make significant changes in 
how the commercial equipment is "stored," including 
wholescale rearranging of items, in addition to those 
measures previously described by Russia and the TS. 
(Comment:  These two documents complete EC consideration and 
approval of Russian combined plans for conversion, and, in 
the case of these two facilities, should lead to the TS 
certifying conversion in the near future.  End Comment.) 
 
14. (U) The EC adopted the U.S. combined plan for destruction 
and verification of the DF production and fill facility at 
Pine Bluff Arsenal. 
 
15. (U) At the request of Russia, the Council deferred, until 
a special EC scheduled for 24 November 2004, the three Libyan 
combined plans for destruction and verification of the CWPF 
Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 (phase 1); Rabta 
Pharmaceutical Factory 2 (phase 1); and Tripoli STO-001 
mobile filling units, citing the short time frame for review. 
 The delay was also attributed to ongoing discussions with 
experts on the margins of the EC.  Earlier in the week, the 
TS prepared three corrigenda based on FRG comments to the 
 
SIPDIS 
three plans.  U.S. experts met several times with Libyan CW 
experts and the TS to address and resolve its questions and 
comments to the plans, which resulted in a second draft 
corrigenda for each of the documents.  The second corrigenda, 
which also include Russian comments, will be published 
shortly. 
 
16. (U) The EC noted the DG's report on the conduct of annual 
inspection activities by the TS detailing the progress made 
at CWPFs that are still under conversion. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM 13 - Conversion of CWPFs 
for purposes not prohibited under 
the Convention 
------------------------------------ 
 
17. (U) On the most closely watched issue of the session, the 
Council succeeded in reaching a consensus decision to 
recommend to all SPs adoption of Libya's proposal to make a 
change to Part V of the Verification Annex in order to permit 
Libya and other SPs that join the CWC after 29 April 2003 to 
request conversion of former CWPFs.  Close and effective 
cooperation between, inter alia, the U.S., UK, Libyan, 
Italian, and Tunisian delegations succeeded in bringing into 
the fold the remaining holdouts, most notably Russia, and 
orchestrating widespread voices of support throughout the 
session. 
 
18. (SBU) During the general debate on October 12, nearly all 
of the 26 delegations that made statements, covering all 
geographic regions, offered strong support for the Libyan 
proposal, with only Russia objecting.  In order to fully 
isolate Russia, the U.S., UK, Libyan and Tunisian dels held 
negotiations with India and Pakistan on October 12 to resolve 
lingering concerns about the format and content of what 
ultimately evolved into a stand-alone EC draft decision 
document, officially presented to the EC by Tunisia. 
(Comment:  The Pakistani representative proved to be the most 
obnoxious interlocutor, continuing to insist privately that 
he believed this was not truly a technical change but was 
willing to go along for political reasons.  Until the end, he 
worked to water down EC decision text affirming the 
correctness of using the technical change process.  End 
comment.) 
 
19. (SBU) By the time the proposal was formally taken up by 
the EC on October 13, only Russia continued to object to 
pursuing a technical change, arguing that the CSP should 
instead take a stand-alone decision to permit Libya to 
convert.  Again, roughly 20 delegations, covering all 
regions, spoke up in support of the proposal.  Prompted by 
the Libyan, Tunisian, and UK delegations, Sudan, regional 
coordinator of the Africa Group, raised the prospect of a 
possible vote on the issue if consensus could not be reached 
by the end of the week, in order to further increase the 
pressure on the Russian del to seek new instructions from 
Moscow.  Prompted by the U.S. and UK, the TS Legal Advisor, 
Amb. Onate, expressed his view to the EC that the deadline on 
conversion in paragraph 72 of Part V could not be bypassed by 
a separate CSP decision, as proposed by the Russians. 
 
20.  (SBU) On October 14, Russia informed the U.S. del that 
it could join consensus on the proposal with the addition of 
treaty text to the decision document that affirmed the basic 
obligation to destroy CWPFs and that conversions may be 
requested only in exceptional cases of compelling need 
(ironic given Russia's past requests to convert 16 of 24 
facilities).  Once Russia was on board and revised text was 
circulated to EC members, the proposal was quickly adopted on 
the afternoon of October 14, much to the relief of many 
delegations who feared the possibility of a vote.  It is 
worth noting that at no time during the EC was it suggested 
that the actual text of the proposed technical change be 
modified. 
 
21. (SBU) (Comment:  The basis for Russia's objections to the 
proposal remains unclear.  At no point did the Russian del 
seek a "deal," by asking for concessions on other issues, 
such as the handling of Russian conversions.  During frequent 
contact with the U.S. del, both in the run-up to and during 
the EC session, the Russian del offered numerous, and 
oftentimes contradictory, arguments to support its position, 
clearly giving the impression that the problem was in Moscow. 
 It appears probable that Russia's position resulted from a 
combination of a lack of higher level political oversight, 
stubbornly held views among CWC implementers in capital about 
how the treaty should function, resentment at U.S. support 
for Libyan conversion in contrast to perceived U.S. 
obstruction of Russian conversion, and concerns about making 
it too easy for future SPs to gain approval to convert.  In 
the end, the combination of entrenched support among a wide 
geographic range, Russia's early isolation during the 
session, the absence of any direct Russian equity in the 
issue, the evisceration of the legal basis for Russia's 
alternative approach, and the threat of a vote appears to 
have "motivated" officials in Moscow to get out of the way of 
what had become a moving train before it ran over them.  End 
Comment.) 
 
22. (SBU) Regarding next steps, the EC Chairman, supported by 
the TS, is responsible for notifying all States Parties of 
the EC's recommendation, thereby starting the 90-day silence 
procedure for final adoption of the proposal.  The UK and 
U.S. dels suggested to TS officials that additional copies of 
the original Libyan proposal and DG evaluation should be 
sent, together with the EC recommendation, to facilitate 
consideration by States Parties.  The U.S., UK, Italian and 
Tunisian dels agreed that a low-key approach should be taken 
in regards to the silence procedure, based on the view that 
aggressively promoting the proposal could draw unwanted 
attention to the issue.  Delegations agreed to recommend to 
capitals that all posts should be notified of the EC's 
recommendation and be furnished with contingency points in 
case host governments raise any questions.  Dels in The Hague 
would keep in contact with regional coordinators to watch out 
for possible troublemakers.  Libya indicated it would be a 
little more proactive about seeking support among SPs, but 
would avoid making the "hard sell." 
23.  (SBU) The one exception is Germany, which, despite the 
objections of the U.S. and EU members, made an unhelpful 
statement following EC approval of the proposal indicating 
that it may have to object during the 90-day period if the 
Bundestag was unable to sign off on the change before it 
recesses in December.  Dels agreed to recommend that capitals 
demarche Berlin to make every effort to secure Parliamentary 
approval, and therefore avoid having to raise an objection, 
with the Libyans indicating that they will seek to raise this 
issue with Chancellor Schroeder during an upcoming visit to 
Tripoli. 
 
24.  (U) The EC, at the request of Russia, deferred the 
Libyan conversion request for the Rabta Pharmaceutical 
Factories 1 and 2 CWPFs until the special EC scheduled for 24 
November.  Russia cited the size of the document and lack of 
time provided to the EC to review the document, and further 
stated that the complex document was only available in 
English.  Earlier in the week, U.S. experts met with Libyan 
CW experts to review the USG questions and comments and to 
revise first draft corrigendum.  The changes were reflected 
in a second corrigendum.  Discussion with both the UK and FRG 
delegation indicated they were satisfied with the conversion 
request and the two corrigenda. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM 14 - Facility Agreements 
------------------------------------ 
 
25.  (U) At Russia's request, the Council again deferred the 
facility agreement for Aberdeen.  Late in the week, the U.S. 
del was hopeful a solution had been found that would satisfy 
Russian concerns with regard to the declaration of the TSDF 
as part of the declared destruction facility.  On review in 
Washington, the text was determined to be untenable and was 
abandoned.  Delegation now believes it would be advantageous 
to revert to the simpler mechanism entertained earlier of a 
blanket "no precedent" declaration in the decision documents. 
 Del will explore this option with Washington during the 
coming weeks. 
 
26.  (U) Following consultations with the U.S., the Italians 
issued six corrigenda to their six schedule 2 facility 
agreements before the EC, incorporating U.S. comments.  In 
introducing their documents, the Italians noted that the 
documents for approval are "arrangements" rather than 
"agreements" due to internal Italian requirements for their 
legislature to review "agreements".  The Council approved the 
six Italian Schedule 2 facility arrangements (and noted the 
attached TS report regarding differences between the text of 
the model facility agreement and the arrangements before the 
Council). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 15 - Chemical industry issues 
----------------------------------------- 
 
27.  (U) The EC approved report language regarding the 
marking of scheduled chemicals in the Handbook on Chemicals 
to assist SPs in making declarations.  Specifically, the 
language requests that the TS, in its next version of the 
Handbook, mark chemicals which have been declared with an 
asterisk in order to distinguish chemicals actually used and 
traded from those included in the chemical list as research, 
development or test chemicals not normally associated with 
industrial activities or trade. 
 
----------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 16 - Lists of new 
validated data for inclusion in the 
OPCW Central Analytical Database 
----------------------------------- 
28.  (U) The Council approved the DG's note on the lists of 
new validated data. 
 
------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM 17 - Fostering of 
international cooperation for 
peaceful purposes in the field 
of chemical activities 
------------------------------ 
 
29.  (U) The EC Chairman noted that there had been no 
informal consultations on this topic due to lack of a 
facilitator and urged that volunteers come forward urgently. 
India supported this request, noting the importance of 
negotiating an action plan for Article XI, and asked 
delegations to show flexibility.  Iran, supported by 
Pakistan, noted the importance of fully and effectively 
implementing Article XI.  Article XI activities should not be 
limited to workshops and seminars.  SPs need to strengthen 
their compliance and enhance their transparency with this 
Article.  The Council adopted report language submitted by 
Brazil and Mexico. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 18 - Assistance 
and protection against chemical weapons 
--------------------------------------- 
 
30. (U) Facilitator Gabrielle Kruger (UK) updated the EC on 
her efforts to reach agreement on a standard format and 
procedures for SPs to make annual submissions of information 
on national programs for protective purposes.  She indicated 
that, with the latest version recently circulated, they were 
close to having an agreed document ready for approval at the 
upcoming CSP.  In discussions on the margins of the EC, the 
U.S. and UK dels discussed the current status of negotiations 
and agreed to remain in close contact as this issue moves 
toward a conclusion.  The UK agreed to provide the U.S. an 
updated version of the format, taking into consideration 
concerns raised about the previous version, as well as draft 
procedures related to the making of annual submissions. 
 
------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 19 - Reports of the 
External Auditor 
------------------------------- 
 
31. (U) The EC agreed to note the report, and the U.S. 
arranged for acceptable report language, fending off calls 
for payment schedules.  The U.S. made a comment from the 
floor welcoming the External Auditor's report, expressing 
appreciation that the report is more in-depth than in recent 
years, and urging an increased emphasis on "value-for-money" 
audits in future years. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 20 - Implementation of 
the recommendations of the External Auditor 
and of the Office of Internal Oversight 
------------------------------------------- 
 
32. (U) The Council agreed to note the reports.  The 
facilitator, Chiho Komuro (Japan), provided an oral report, 
noting that greater detailed information should be provided 
in future status reports and also suggested the inclusion for 
a specific timeline for completion of the recommendations. 
The U.S. expressed regret that these reports provide only 
cursory information on implementation of the External Auditor 
and OIO recommendations and should be improved upon in the 
future.  Del also noted with disappointment that the TS made 
no improvements to the type of information provided in these 
status reports. 
 
----------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 21 - Draft OPCW 
Programme and Budget for 2005 
----------------------------- 
 
33. (U) There remain clear disagreements among member states 
regarding the proposed budget for 2005.  The issue will be 
raised at the upcoming special EC on November 24, but chances 
for agreement there are slim.  Instead, the special EC will 
be the starting point for final budget negotiations, which 
will likely take place on the margins of the upcoming CSP. 
From sidebar conversations and information in opening 
statements, all delegations, except the U.S., appear to want 
a reduction in the proposed overall budget increase of 4.8%. 
Other discussions on the proposed budget will be reported 
septel.  The Council decided to further consider the Draft 
Medium-Term Plan for 2005-2007 at a meeting prior to CSP-9. 
 
------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 22 - Administrative 
and financial issues 
------------------------------- 
 
34. (U) The Council noted the DG's income and expenditure 
reports for the OPCW.  The EC also agreed to forward to the 
CSP the DG's report on transfer from and replenishment to the 
Working Capital Fund.  It also noted the DG's information on 
the implementation of recommendations made by the 16th ABAF. 
The Council noted the report of the 17th ABAF, as well as the 
information from the DG on the implementation of the 
recommendations made by the 17th ABAF.  Finally, the EC noted 
the resignations of certain ABAF members and approved the 
appointments of successors. 
 
35.  (U) (Note: the original agenda item twenty-three in the 
notional schedule -- agreements on the privileges and 
immunities of the OPCW -- was dropped from the draft report 
as there was no action on the item.  End Note.) 
 
------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 23 - Implementation 
of the Headquarters Agreement 
------------------------------- 
 
36. (U) After a heated debate from the floor, with the 
African Group and the Latin American Group indicating support 
for the establishment of a committee on this agenda item and 
most Western countries requesting information from the DG and 
opposing the establishment of a committee, the Council 
reached consensus on report language.  The EC noted the 
report by the DG on implementation of the Headquarters 
Agreement and requested that the DG provide supplementary 
information. 
 
----------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 24 - Any other business 
----------------------------------- 
 
37.  (U) The Council set the dates for the forty-third 
session of the EC as 5-9 December 2005.  The EC also approved 
the DG's proposal to increase the number of members of the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to 25 members.  Several 
delegations, including France, Germany and the UK, spoke in 
support of increasing the number of representatives on the 
SAB due to increased workload and the need to adequately 
reflect the geographic diversity of SPs relative to the 
increase in SP membership. 
 
38.  (U) There was much discussion (none of which made its 
way into the report) regarding the EU's joint action plan on 
challenge inspections.  As a result of the July 2004 seminar 
held in Austria regarding challenge inspections, the EU 
generated a general agreement calling for consultations on 
administrative and logistical issues associated with 
challenge inspections.  This proposal was resoundingly 
rejected by most of the NAM, with India, Brazil, and Iran 
leading the charge.  There appeared to be a general suspicion 
among opposing SPs that the EU proposal was designed to 
increase the likelihood or direct a challenge inspection. 
The EU proposal was confusing, given that it called for 
consultations already provided for in the EC's plan of 
activities.  Due to this fact, the EU needs only to offer or 
identify a facilitator to begin discussions.  In the end, 
after much positioning, the EU agreed to withdraw the text. 
 
------- 
ALBANIA 
------- 
 
39. (U) While not discussed as a formal agenda item during 
the Council session, the question of destruction of Albania's 
stockpile of chemical weapons was discussed on two occasions. 
 During the informal destruction meeting on October 11, both 
the Albanian and the U.S. delegation made brief interventions 
to the effect that the two parties were working closely 
together under the auspices of the U.S. CTR program.  The 
U.S. further indicated that at this stage of the process, we 
are awaiting Presidential signature on the certification that 
will permit CTR funding to begin flowing. 
 
40. (U) On October 12, the Swiss delegation hosted a luncheon 
to discuss the issue of destruction of Albania's stockpile. 
The meeting was attended by the UK, U.S., Albania, Italy, 
France, Netherlands and Germany.  The U.S. introduced the 
subject of cooperation with Albania by briefly describing how 
CTR came to be involved in the Albania destruction program. 
The Delegation also expressed, as it had during the October 
11 destruction meeting, that the hesitation previously 
expressed by the U.S., through the Albanians, to receive 
"outside" funding, had passed.  Now that the U.S. has a 
better idea of its own involvement and the scope of the 
project, we believed it was possible to begin a dialogue 
about possible assistance from, for example, the EU. 
 
41. (U) In its capacity as EU President, the Netherlands 
intervened that the EU had recently concluded, based on the 
response received from Tirana on this issue, that Albania did 
not need any funding other than what the U.S. was providing. 
As part of its recent decision, the EU had essentially "red 
lined" Albania from consideration for receiving funding 
during FY 05, an action that would have to be reversed if 
Albania was to receive such consideration.  (Note: The EU has 
allotted approximately 1.8 million Euros to be expended under 
the general heading of "chemical weapons destruction". 
Lacking any other object for the expenditure of these funds, 
the EU had decided to give all 1.8 million to OPCW.  End 
Note.)  The Dutch representative stated that if Albania in 
fact wanted to be considered for receipt of FY 05 funds, the 
EU should receive a letter immediately from Albania stating 
this.  The Albanian Ambassador said he would provide such a 
letter the next day.  After the meeting, the Albanian 
requested U.S. support in drafting the letter, which the 
delegation provided.  The letter was delivered to the EU 
Presidency on October 13 and, delegation was informed, was 
sent to the appropriate working group in Brussels for 
consideration and discussion. 
 
42.  (U) Based on information from Washington, delegation 
also cited three general areas in which such assistance might 
be usefully applied: support for destruction activities; 
offset of inspection costs; and conduct of analyses. 
Delegation highlighted the concern expressed by Albania over 
the daunting prospect of having to pay the 250,000-500,000 
USD that we estimated it would cost for the TS to perform 
inspections over the life cycle of the Albanian destruction 
program.  Switzerland made reference to the 60,000 euros it 
had already pledged for inspection costs, which Albania 
acknowledged, but also reckoned would not fully cover 
anticipated costs. 
 
43. (U) Delegation also cited selected items from the list of 
specific areas in which assistance might be needed to support 
the actual destruction effort, including road improvement and 
purchase of fuel for generators and the incinerator.  All 
present, particularly the Swiss, took copious notes.  The 
request from most delegations after the meeting was for more 
specific information about areas where assistance might be 
offered.  Delegation had stated during the meeting that we 
would have more specific ideas about where help could be 
offered, costs, timelines, and the modalities for turning 
offers of assistance into concrete actions, once the 
Presidential certification had taken place and "spade work" 
could begin in earnest.  All present took the point, but 
reiterated that something in writing from the U.S. that they 
as the EU or as individuals could use for the own 
decision-making process would be highly prized.  Delegation 
concluded its substantive remarks by stating that it was 
optimistic that a more fulsome dialogue could be undertaken 
soon, including information along the lines they were 
requesting. 
 
44. (U) Based on an informal request from Washington, 
delegation availed itself of the opportunity to talk to the 
director of the Spiez laboratory in Switzerland, Dr. Marc 
Cadisch, about the analysis Spiez performed on some samples 
of Albania's CW.  In particular, the delegation asked whether 
Spiez had tested for the presence of heavy metals in the 
agent, and was informed it had not.  In answer to a follow-up 
question, Cadisch indicated he would be happy to conduct 
further analysis of the agent samples if we would provide 
very specific parameters for the testing.  Delegation 
informed him we would respond. 
 
45. (U) Also on the margins of the meeting, Swiss delegate 
and employee of Spiez, Dominique Werner, spoke to the 
delegation at length about Switzerland's experiences and 
"lessons learned" while working in Albania.  Werner offered 
and recommended that initial assessment or technical teams 
going into Albania in preparation for establishing a CW 
destruction operation should stop over in Switzerland.  The 
Swiss have a large body of practical experience that would be 
useful to convey. 
 
-------------- 
DONORS MEETING 
-------------- 
 
46. (U) This session of the informal donors meeting produced 
little of substance, though politically two things seem 
noteworthy.  First, to universal annoyance, Russia provided 
virtually no enlightenment with regard to the changes in its 
destruction program and the bureaucracy charged with 
overseeing it.  In response, Italy made an impassioned appeal 
to Russia for such information and, in particular, a reliable 
point of contact to sign contracts and discuss substance. 
During the meeting and in a subsequent bilateral meeting with 
DATSD (CD&TR) Mr. Patrick Wakefield, the Italian delegation 
expressed extreme frustration that it had contracts that, 
once signed, would permit funds to begin flowing to Russia's 
destruction program, but they could not find a Russian to 
sign them.  The offices they had dealt with in the past were 
apparently defunct and no one even answered the telephone. 
Magnifying Italy's frustration was the fact that the current 
contracts are small compared to the roughly 330 million euros 
Italy has committed to give Russia for CW destruction.  If 
the situation did not improve with regard to the small 
contracts, the much larger sum might be jeopardized. 
 
47. (U) The second issue, related to the first, was the 
discernable lack of collegiality toward Russia that has 
characterized these meetings in the past.  In its own full 
frontal assault, the Canadian delegation, drawing on points 
apparently provided by Ottawa, also stated that difficulties 
with identifying contractors had become an obstacle to the 
provision of assistance by Canada.  He also took the Russians 
to task over public assertions by Russian officials that by 
complaining about problems with Russia's bureaucracy, Canada 
was creating "pretexts" for Canada not delivering the 
assistance it had pledged.  Delegation also intervened to 
cite U.S. contribution figures to date and anticipated in FY 
05, and to also complain about difficulties created by Russia 
with respect to contractors and the issuance of visas to U.S. 
contractors. 
 
48.  (U)  Ito sends. 
 
 
 
SOBEL