US embassy cable - 04AMMAN8600

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KMPI, JO 
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER SET FOR A NEW CABINET POST; HANI 
AL-MULKI TO REPLACE HIM 
 
REF: AMMAN 7862 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID HALE, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Foreign Minister Muasher informed us that 
he will leave his job with next week,s cabinet reshuffle. 
He has been offered a senior post to drive the King,s public 
sector and administrative reform agenda.  Muasher, aware of 
the considerable obstacles to the political component of 
reform, reluctantly agreed provided he is given the authority 
and title of deputy prime minister.  Current Ambassador to 
Egypt, Hani al-Mulki, is to take over the MFA.  Other 
expected changes in the reshuffle are consistent with reftel 
expectations.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Foreign Minister Muasher confirmed on October 18 to 
A/S Burns and Charge that he will be leaving the Foreign 
Ministry in the cabinet reshuffle, scheduled for announcement 
on October 23.  He is to be replaced by a former minister and 
current Jordanian Ambassador to Egypt, Hani al-Mulki. 
Muasher said the King had asked him to remain in the cabinet 
as a minister for public sector reform.  Muasher said he 
would reluctantly accept only if given the title of deputy 
prime minister.  Prime Minister al-Fayez has resisted 
retaining such a deputy position in the reshuffled 
government, but Muasher expected the King to persuade Fayez 
to accept this condition.  Although the position carries no 
constitutional authorities, Muasher felt he needed the moral 
authority of the deputy role if he is to make any progress 
across ministries. 
 
3.  (C) Another concern Muasher said he expressed to the King 
was the perception that the government was reversing course 
on political reforms, and shifting attention to public sector 
and administrative reform as a priority.  (For days, GOJ 
spin-doctors have fed precisely that line to the local 
press.)  The King reportedly expressed some alarm that 
Muasher had detected an international perception that his 
interest in political reform was flagging.  He insisted 
Muasher would be fully empowered to pursue political reform; 
the current political development ministry,s 
responsibilities would fall to Muasher.  His only 
reservation, the King claimed, was moving to a &one man, one 
vote8 electoral system with districts more representative of 
the population (versus the current gerrymandered districts 
favoring East Bankers) by the next parliamentary election in 
2007. 
 
4.  (C) Muasher said his role would be to improve the 
performance of the prime ministry, work out with each cabinet 
minister a mission work plan and be the judge of the results, 
and act as the center-point for government reforms.  The aim 
was to have a national agenda, encompassing all ministries, 
work plans, in place by June 2005.  The cabinet would 
organize itself into a number of teams, to include economic 
development, social and political reform, and security and 
defense.  Much of this performance-driven structural work 
flows from advice by an international private sector 
consultant and the British government, which has advised on 
ways to replicate aspects of the British cabinet model. 
Muasher said he would also be in charge of communications and 
information strategy; a new government spokesman would work 
for him and there would be no reconstitution of the 
Information Ministry.  Muasher would work physically from the 
prime ministry, and was focused on the pressing need of 
recruiting new staff ) he wanted fresh outsiders, rather 
than current civil servants.  Muasher expressed some dismay 
that the King was insistent that he take on duties that, in 
his words, &were not my line.8 
 
5.  (C) The cabinet reshuffle remains a work in progress, 
with much of the back and forth among aspiring ministers 
played out in the press.  Finance Minister Abu Hammour the 
same day elaborated on the cabinet structure with the Charge. 
 He said the cabinet was meeting on a daily basis in 
anticipation of the October 21 cabinet retreat and subsequent 
re-shuffle, to approve laws and regulations associated with 
the reform initiative, focused on public sector reform.  He 
claimed Finance will be gaining more authority, and described 
a three-year streamlining effort to consolidate economic 
ministries into two ministries (if this is true, the new 
cabinet is getting off in the wrong direction, as it is 
expected to grow from 20 to 26 ministers for political 
reasons).  He claimed that by 2007 Finance will gain most of 
the Planning Ministry,s functions, with the remainder going 
to the Economy Ministry.  Although this approach, if pursued, 
will change Planning Minister ) and leading reformist ) 
Awadallah,s platform, he can be counted on for now to retain 
or gain power under virtually any scenario. 
 
6.  (C) Comment: Muasher is justifiably skeptical about his 
capacity to push through both administrative and political 
reforms in this new position.  The Prime Minister has not 
shown a strong drive toward reform, and Muasher will be 
trying to corral a group of highly energetic ministers each 
keen to shine before the King.  Vigorous pursuit of this 
portfolio will make Muasher the visible scapegoat for the 
loss of jobs and patronage inherent in true administrative 
reform ) reinforcing this liberal, Christian minister,s 
unpopularity in parliament and among East Bank 
constituencies.  Muasher expected some new ministers would be 
drawn from these very anti-reform elements to satisfy the 
King,s loyalist base, further complicating  Muasher,s task. 
 Muasher will also face continued resistance from the GID, 
whose head, Saad Khayr, may have played the decisive role in 
convincing the King to remove Muasher ) a decision taken 
during the FM,s month-long absence on official travel. 
Khayr, who can tread heavily into foreign policy issues, has 
long competed with and lobbied against Muasher ) even 
accusing him, unfairly, as being &more Palestinian than the 
Palestinians.8  An August statement by Muasher that appeared 
to tone down critical comments by the King directed against 
Arafat gave Muasher,s opponents here some traction. 
 
7.  (C) The regime,s enthusiasm for political reform has 
cooled, at least for now.  The selection of Muasher for this 
overarching reform role may be aimed at creating the 
illusion, rather than the reality, of commitment to political 
change.  Another interpretation may be that the King,s 
commitment remains firm, and Muasher will serve as a credible 
symbol of that resolve, as well as a convenient lightening 
rod for domestic criticism.  In either scenario, Muasher is 
likely to face considerable difficulties and frustrations. 
But as the King has put PM Fayez on notice that his tenure 
will be short unless he moves rapidly on a) getting 
socio-economic reforms through parliament, and b) cracking 
down on the Islamic and secular opposition, this entire new 
cabinet arrangement may be provisional. 
 
8.  (C) With this change, the U.S. loses a key Foreign 
Minister partner on the whole range of policy challenges we 
face in the region.  Muasher has stood out among Arab Foreign 
Ministers for his commitment to regional reforms and played 
critical roles in forming an Arab League consensus to endorse 
the road map and in pressing his Arab colleagues to move 
rapidly in recognizing and supporting the IIG.  After the 
expected reshuffle announcement on October 23, a call from 
the Secretary to both Muasher and Mulki would be well 
received.  Mulki was described by Muasher as sharing his own 
passion for Jordanian and regional reform.  The son of a 
former Prime Minister and regime stalwart, Mulki held a 
number of technical ministries in the 1990s and was within 
the advisory circle surrounding then-Crown Prince Hassan. 
Like many of Hassan,s cohorts, he was put out to pasture 
upon Hassan,s demotion and the accession to the throne of 
Abdullah ) in his case, to the Embassy in Egypt.  He has 
clearly repaired the damage. 
HALE