US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2691

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU PRESIDENCY:  THE HALF-WAY POINT 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 1670 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel for reasons 1.4(B) and (D). 
 
 1. (C)  Summary.  With three months down and three to go, 
the Dutch no doubt view the first half of their presidency as 
a qualified success.  They have made measurable progress on 
most of their priorities and effectively navigated two 
unexpected developments (the crisis in Darfur and PM 
Balkenende's illness).  From the US standpoint, having the 
Dutch in the presidency is a good thing for the transatlantic 
partnership.  However, the Dutch Chair's predisposition 
toward neutrality will continue to limit their willingness to 
be assertive on issues of concern to the U.S. The Dutch 
successfully pushed the EU to become more involved in Iraq 
and clearly share US objectives for US-EU cooperation in 
counter-terrorism and the transatlantic agenda.  Dutch 
support for the recent Ridge and Ashcroft visits was key to 
their achieving concrete results.  On issues such as the 
China and Libya arms embargoes or Iran, however, Dutch 
determination to play the role of "honest broker" means that 
we cannot count on them to stand in the way of a developing 
consensus that runs counter to U.S. or Dutch national 
positions. With several of the most important presidency 
events -- the EU-China summit, two EU Councils, U.S.-EU 
ministerial -- still to come, our experience suggests that 
the Dutch will continue to be most useful in providing 
insights into EU decision-making and in conveying accurately 
U.S. views in EU fora.  On the economic front, the Dutch have 
made a priority of the EU's Lisbon agenda of reinvigorating 
the European economy, while remaining open to US ideas and 
suggestions -- hosting a major transatlantic conference on 
innovation in November, for example.  End summary. 
 
Working with the Dutch 
---------------------- 
 
2. (C) With three months of their EU presidency completed on 
October 1, the Dutch have reached a half-way point of sorts; 
as August is a "down month" for most of Europe, the EU 
calendar is heavily skewed toward the second half.  So far, 
the Dutch presidency has largely lived up to expectations 
(reftel):  well-organized, "realistic" ambitions (the Dutch 
use the word consistently), and stringently neutral. 
Certainly working with them is, in the main, easy:  they are 
accessible, considering the demands of the presidency, and 
continue their tradition of transparency.  (An exception has 
been their odd reluctance to permit US observers to have 
access to the informal Councils held in the Netherlands; they 
have willingly granted access only to the foreign ministers 
and agriculture ministers Councils.)  They listen to US 
arguments.  Especially when the US has been timely in its 
demarches (as in at least a week before a GAERC), they have 
expressed strong appreciation.  Even the unexpected illness 
of Prime Minister Balkenende -- which reportedly will keep 
him out of commission until late October -- has been managed 
effectively, with Deputy PM Zalm or (as in the case of the 
ASEM and Korea Summits) Luxembourg PM Juncker stepping in to 
handle protocol functions while the Dutch MFA manages 
day-to-day affairs.  Balkenende's illness and other events 
outside Dutch control have, however, complicated Dutch plans 
for a series of successful summits.  While the Ukraine and 
S.Korean summits passed relatively uneventfully, the India 
summit was postponed and appeared in danger of slipping away 
from the Dutch, the planned Canada summit was postponed 
beyond the Dutch presidency, and the question of Burmese 
participation at ASEM attracted unwanted controversy for the 
Dutch.  The two biggest third party summits -- Russia and 
China -- remain on the horizon, as well as the U.S.-EU 
ministerial and the two European Council summits. 
 
3. (C) On a few issues, such as their high priority 
deregulation campaign and their equally high priority desire 
to introduce better analysis in the EU's budget process, the 
Dutch have exercised decisive leadership. They merit 
considerable praise for their role in moving the EU toward 
more cooperation on Iraq and in coordinating timely responses 
to developments in Sudan.  Despite their somewhat compromised 
position as a member of the coalition, they have actively 
used their presidency to encourage an EU role in Iraq, partly 
through pushing a reportedly reluctant Commission to send its 
"exploratory missions" to Baghdad, and to develop specific 
project proposals for the EU.  On Darfur they have kept the 
pressure on for a responsible EU role, though here they are 
pretty much in the mainstream of the member states and have 
stayed with the bounds of maximizing "effective 
multilateralism," i.e., waiting for decisions in New York. 
On many issues, though, the Dutch are very attentive to their 
belief that the proper presidency role is to foster consensus 
while remaining "neutral" themselves.  Thus even when the 
Dutch, as the Dutch, express sympathy for US positions, we 
cannot count on them to stand in the way of a developing 
consensus running in the other direction.  China (where the 
Dutch are prepared, reluctantly, not to break a consensus in 
favor of lifting the arms embargo) and Iran (where the Dutch 
have made no effort to lead the EU toward supporting referral 
of the nuclear issue to the UNSC) are examples of this 
tendency.  Dutch leadership was also ineffective in 
controlling the debate on lifting the arms embargo on Libya 
(although the Dutch made an effort to implement a partial 
lift, they did not break consensus when it became clear they 
stood alone) and the Palestinian push in New York to endorse 
the ICJ ruling on the Israeli Security Barrier. With regard 
to Burma/ASEM, the Dutch appear to have been critical both in 
working out the "compromise" allowing Burma to participate at 
a lower-level, and in pushing the EU to commit to imposing 
additional measures on Burma if it fails to live up to 
earlier human-rights commitments (which the EU did at the 
October 11 GAERC). 
 
4. (C) Even on issues where the Dutch are uncomfortable 
diverging from a developing EU consensus, the Dutch have 
generally been transparent with us regarding developments 
within the EU and in highlighting areas of concern.  We 
anticipate that this trend will continue.  For the remainder 
of the EU presidency, we should expect the Dutch to inform us 
of what their own problems are in dealing with the member 
states.  Though their activism clearly is constrained by 
their adherence to the principle of presidential neutrality, 
their sense of responsibility in the presidency means they 
will also continue to accurately communicate the US position 
in the Councils (at least in the corridors) and to ensure 
that that US views are taken into account when possible.  The 
Dutch have been and will be a good channel for the US to 
assure that timely arguments achieve resonance in the 
Councils.  This is, of course, especially true on those few 
issues that the Dutch appear ready to move off their neutral 
presidency stance (but we should not expect that there will 
be very many such instances). 
 
Heavily loaded calendar for second half 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Dutch agenda (deregulation and other aspects of 
progress on the Lisbon agenda, laying the foundation for the 
"right" EU budget decisions, accomplishing "successful" 
summits with China, India and the ASEM countries, etc.), plus 
the big EU events (two Councils at the summit level, with the 
second making the Turkish accession decision) -- just the 
most prominent among many meetings -- mean the Dutch will be 
very busy through December.  They will want to have 
measurable progress on their economic priorities at the 
Councils, and a good (meaning defensible) decision on Turkey 
in order to judge their presidency a success. The US interest 
in Turkish accession to the EU has been well-served by the 
Dutch presidency thus far.  The real test is yet to come, of 
course, but despite strong domestic sentiment against Turkish 
accession -- including divisions within the governing 
coalition -- the Dutch leadership seems to be ideally suited 
to facilitating a positive EU decision.  The Dutch, we 
believe, are not just saying the goal posts should not be 
moved (i.e, that there is an implied contract between Turkey 
and the EU on what has to be done), but really believe it. 
We expect that they will work to see that the Council 
decision is made on that basis. 
 
Transatlanticism 
---------------- 
 
6. (C) The Dutch believe relations with the US are important 
and need improving, and without saying so, will include 
improved working relations with the US as a measure of their 
presidency's success.  They have worked to use JHA contacts 
from the working level to the recent ministerial contacts to 
improve counter-terrorism cooperation.  Dutch support for the 
recent Ridge and Ashcroft visits was a good demonstration of 
their ability to transform good intentions into concrete 
results.  They are welcoming the Innovation Conference in 
November as not only a demonstration of transatlanticism, but 
a contribution to their Lisbon agenda goals as well.  Iraq 
and Darfur are areas where they want an EU role complementary 
to US objectives.  While perhaps the EU follow-up on some of 
the June Summit agreements (stakeholder consultations comes 
to mind) has not been as rapid as we might have liked, we 
remain confident that whenever we can point out an area of 
potential for improved US-EU cooperation, the Dutch will be 
ready to carry the ball. 
 
Conclusion: 
---------- 
 
7. (C) On balance the Dutch presidency has worked to U.S. 
advantage.  The Dutch have successfully managed issues of 
concern to both sides, such as the budding EU role in Iraq, 
and have been ready to let the US succeed on others (such as 
the China Arms Embargo) as long as their presidency 
"neutrality" can be preserved.  We would expect the Dutch to 
continue to communicate effectively U.S. positions and 
concerns to the best of their ability, and to work with us to 
avoid conflicts or misunderstandings.  We should continue to 
take full advantage of the relative transparency of the Dutch 
presidency to push our agenda, while understanding that Dutch 
national sympathy for specific U.S. will remain constrained 
by the perceived obligations of their presidency role. 
 
 
SOBEL