US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI3224

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC, KMDR, KPAO, TW, Domestic Politics, Cross Strait Politics, Foreign Policy 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, 
PRESIDENT CHEN'S OVERTURE 
 
 
1. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
"The Remarks about Coming to Help Defend Taiwan in 12 
Days" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" said in an 
editorial (10/14): 
 
"Legislator Lee Wen-chung said a high-ranking U.S. 
defense official has given him a guarantee that so long 
as Taiwan buys defensive weapons [from the United 
States], U.S. carrier battle groups will arrive in the 
Taiwan Strait if Taiwan can resist an attack for at 
least 12 days. 
 
"The remark about coming to help defend Taiwan in 12 
days sounds [like he is using too conservative a time- 
frame].  The United States' Seventh Fleet has a carrier 
battle group stationed at Japan's Yokosuka port, which 
could rush to Taiwan's rescue in two days and nights. 
Besides, there are B-52 heavy bombers stationed in 
Guam, too, which could fly to the Taiwan Strait in a 
few hours.  What really matters is that the United 
States' fundamental position is very clear: the Taiwan 
Straits' status quo must be maintained. 
 
"If Taiwan did not do anything but Beijing used force 
against Taiwan, the United States, without a doubt, 
would send its troops to help defend Taiwan.  And it 
would not take 12 days.  The troops would definitely 
arrive in 48 hours.  It would be another story, 
however, if Taiwan plays with fire.  The United States 
is a democratic country, and it requires U.S. 
congressional support for issues like the dispatch of 
troops to fight Beijing.  If Taiwan plays with fire and 
thereby triggers a war, the answer would be very 
obvious as to whether U.S. congressmen would agree to 
sacrifice the lives of American soldiers [for Taiwan]. 
. 
 
"Surely Taiwan needs to purchase essential defensive 
weapons to defend itself.  But the purchase of 
defensive weapons should not be made as a provocative 
move, nor should it be used in exchange for an 
impractical `guarantee.'" 
 
2. President Chen's Overture 
 
A) "China's Inflexibility Blocks Progress" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
editorialized (10/15): 
 
". But what political dispute is left between the two 
sides once Taiwan accepts `one China' and negotiates on 
that basis?  In view of [Beijing's Taiwan Affairs 
Office Spokesman] Zhang's usual rhetoric, it is clear 
that China isn't ready to deal with Taiwan in any 
manner until Taiwan acknowledges that it is part of 
China.  This was, of course, not the first time that 
Beijing has rejected goodwill gestures made by Taiwan. 
Under the circumstances, one cannot help but wonder: 
why should Taiwan bother to extend an olive branch to 
China?" 
 
B) "President Chen Needs to Review His Beijing Policy" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" editorialized (10/15): 
 
". Chen's mainland policy could be divided into two 
aspects: strategic and tactical.  At the tactical 
level, he often used cross-strait relations as a tool 
to gain electoral advantage, manipulating various 
methods contingent on the needs of different elections. 
. 
 
"At the strategic level, Chen's cross-strait policy 
could be summarized into one of using legitimacy to 
protect illegitimacy.  Under this strategy, the 
legitimate status of the ROC would be used as a cover 
to promote an independence agenda. . 
 
"But by this time President Chen must have realized he 
cannot continue a pro-independence policy without 
provoking a strong backlash from Beijing.  He now may 
have to examine carefully whether such a mighty 
neighbor who has repeatedly threatened to smash any 
moves by Taiwan to change its political status. ." 
 
PAAL