US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1911

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Congo-Kinshasa Annual Certification of Consular Management Controls

Identifier: 04KINSHASA1911
Wikileaks: View 04KINSHASA1911 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2004-10-15 07:28:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: CMGT CVIS CG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001911 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT, CVIS, CG 
SUBJECT: Congo-Kinshasa Annual Certification of Consular 
Management Controls 
 
Ref: State 201680 
 
1.   Vice Consul James Fennell, FS-04, Acting Chief of the 
Consular Section, completed review of consular management 
controls on October 8, 2004.  Deputy Chief of Mission 
certified the review on October 13, 2004.  Answers are keyed 
to para four of reftel. 
 
(a) Standard Operating Procedures: Conoff and backup officer 
have online access to FAM, CMH, SOP cables and the CA 
intranet websites, both classified and unclassified.  Hard 
copies of FAM, CMH and key SOP cables are also available for 
quick reference. 
 
(b) Consular Shared Tables Management: CST active user list 
reflects only those users present at post with a need for 
access.  Only consular section employees have consular 
roles, and adjudicatory and management roles are limited to 
Americans with consular authority.  All users are assigned 
the appropriate access levels.  Passwords are reset at least 
every six months, are randomly chosen by the individual and 
known to no one else. 
 
(c) Access: Physical access to the working areas of the 
consular section are controlled and limited to consular 
section staff or escorted visitors. 
 
(d) Physical Inventory of Accountable Consular Items: Conoff 
conducts a physical inventory of all accountable items 
approximately every quarter.  The last such count was 
conducted in October 2004.  Results of inventories are 
submitted in writing to the file. 
 
(e) Control and Reconciliation of Accountable Items: 
Internal section procedures ensure that accountable consular 
supplies are properly controlled, handled, destroyed and 
accounted for.  Daily/Monthly Reconciliation and 
Accountability Log is used for reconciling daily usage of 
all visa foils, passports and CRBAs. 
 
(f) Cash Accountability: Accountable officer is familiar 
with CMH 700.  Daily and monthly reconciliation of consular 
fee receipts are properly implemented. 
 
(g) Referral System: Post visa referral system complies with 
current regulations.  Referral procedures are available in 
writing and reviewed at least yearly with American officers. 
Referrals are few -- only one was submitted in FY04. 
 
(h) Training: Consular staff are adequately trained for 
their responsibilities.  Fraud information from CA, other 
agencies and outside sources such as local police and other 
embassies is shared with all staff.  Post will nominate 
additional local staff for fraud training in FY05. 
 
(i)  Standards of Employee Conduct: Conoff has reviewed 
"Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch" and Chapter 600 of the CMH.  Ethics issues are 
discussed in consular staff meetings and individually with 
local staff during employee review sessions. 
 
(j) Name Check and Clearance Reviews: Namecheck returns are 
rigorously reviewed and consistent standards are applied 
when determining whether a hit warrants further action. 
 
(k) Visa Lookout Accountability (VLA): All issuing officers 
fully understand VLA provisions.  Post submitted VLA 
compliance cable in September 2004. 
 
(l) Intake, Screening and Processing: Intake, screening and 
processing procedures are in compliance with department 
regulations with the exception that the physical structure 
of the Consular Section impedes FSO line-of-sight 
supervision of LES.  Remodeling to provide such oversight 
has been approved for FY05. Fingerprinting is conducted by 
consular officers. 
 
(m) Interview and Adjudication: All applicants for whom a 
personal appearance is required appear for interviews. LES 
review applications for completeness, but do not 
preadjudicate visa applications. 
 
(n) Photo Standards: Photo standards are rigorously applied 
for visa applicants. 
 
(o) Review of Visa Refusals and Issuances: Visa refusals are 
regularly reviewed by supervisor and issuances are spot 
checked by same. 
 
(p) Visa Shopping: Consular staff are alert to possible visa- 
shopping.  Due to low levels of third-country national 
applicants, however, no trends have been identified at post. 
 
(q) Files: Consular files are being retained in accordance 
with "Record Retention Guidelines" and 9 FAM Exhibit F. 
(r) Post passport and CRBA issuances are periodically 
audited by consular manager. 
 
(s) Anti-Fraud Program: Conoff serves as fraud prevention 
manager and oversees LES investigators.  When fully staffed, 
two LES conduct fraud investigations.  Conoff periodically 
validates random investigation results and requests other 
LES to investigate same case in order to compare results. 
LES staff investigations provide factual information only 
and do not influence cases in other ways.  Note:  Staffing 
shortages and travel restrictions due to civil war and poor 
infrastructure limit anti-fraud efforts.  However, any anti- 
raud work is actively supervised by an FSO. 
 
DOUGHERTY 

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