US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1345

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
COLOMBO FOR ECON MANLOWE 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014 
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PINR, MOPS, ETRD, ECON, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA'S GRUNTS VS. MI: ROUND ONE? 
 
REF: RANGOON 1337 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: An apparent up-country attack by the Burmese 
army's regular forces on a once untouchable interagency unit 
including military intelligence officers has led to 
speculation that long-simmering hatred between MI and the 
regular troops has begun to heat up.  The incident is quite 
extraordinary, but we are not quite ready to attach major 
political significance to what could turn out to be an 
isolated incident. End summary. 
 
The Shot Heard 'Round Muse 
 
2. (C) We've heard from a number of reliable sources about an 
unprecedented attack in mid-September by elements of a 
regional military command on a unit of NaSaKa officers at a 
checkpoint near the Burma-China border at Muse.  The soldiers 
surrounded the NaSaKa unit, roughed them up, and arrested its 
leadership.  NaSaKa is an interagency group including 
Customs, Immigration, and Military Intelligence (MI) that 
operates, often corruptly and with impunity, in the border 
regions.  According to an active China border trader, this 
particular unit controlled the Pang Hpak Man checkpoint just 
south of Muse and was notorious for its corruption, 
smuggling, and ruthless treatment of competing smugglers. 
 
3. (C) Because of MI's control of information and its secret 
files on all military officials, members of regional commands 
are traditionally reluctant to take action against their MI 
colleagues no matter the offense.  This status quo has 
apparently been approved at the highest levels -- where Prime 
Minister General Khin Nyunt commands MI and SPDC #2 Vice 
Senior General Maung Aye controls the regional military 
commands.  No one with whom we spoke about this incident 
could remember another such attack occurring. 
 
4. (C) The trigger for this action is not exactly clear. 
There are rumors that this NaSaKa unit had knowingly 
intercepted convoys carrying smuggled goods for very senior 
VIPs in Rangoon.  Other rumors claimed that the unit had 
brutally killed a young Kachin smuggler who turned out to be 
a relative of a senior official of one of the Kachin 
cease-fire groups in Myitkyina.  In either event, our sources 
reported that the local military commander complained to 
Rangoon about the actions of this NaSaKa unit.  The word came 
down from the highest level, then, that action should be 
taken. 
 
Comment: Nevermind Why 
 
5. (C) Most of our sources insist that this move has 
political significance as an attack by Maung Aye and Than 
Shwe (representing the regional commands) against Khin Nyunt 
(representing MI and NaSaKa).  Indeed such an attack is 
apparently unprecedented and would certainly require 
authorization from the very top of the SPDC.  However, we 
haven't seen enough evidence to convince us this is the first 
blow in a long-predicted open power struggle between the 
military and MI.  It could just be punishment of a previously 
untouchable group of officials who went one step too far. 
Further attacks along these lines, or any acts of "revenge" 
by NaSaKa or MI, could add credence to the theory that turf 
battles among the "Big Three" are escalating.  End comment. 
Martinez