US embassy cable - 04ROME3958

S E C R E T  ROME 003958 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y.  CHANGING CLASSIFICATION 
REASON FROM 1.5 (B) (D) TO 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR PM DAS SUCHAN, JCS FOR BG REMINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, PHUM, CI, IT, EUN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON CHINA ARMS 
EMBARGO: DAYLIGHT BETWEEN MFA AND PRIME MINISTRY POSITIONS 
 
REF: STATE 214023 
 
Classified By: A/DCM SCOTT KILNER.  REASON: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
1. (S) Summary: MFA officials told PM DAS Suchan and JCS BG 
Remington that while Italy is "not out in front" it will 
likely join EU consensus to lift the China embargo, assuming 
that a review of China's human rights situation shows that 
"the conditions are right."  PM Berlusconi's diplomatic 
advisors took a different tack, suggesting that Italy would 
work with the US to ensure the embargo would not be lifted if 
shared strategic interests would be compromised.  End summary. 
 
2. (S) MFA officials took a fairly hard line on Italy's views 
regarding upcoming China Arms embargo discussions in 
Brussles.  Deputy Director for Multilateral Political Affairs 
Claudio Bisognero, Acting Asia DG Cristina Ravaglia, EU CFSP 
Director Luigi Mattiolo and Armaments Authorization desk 
officer Enrico Padula reiterated that while Italy is "not out 
in front" it will likely join EU consensus to lift the 
embargo, assuming that a review of China's human rights 
situation shows that "the conditions are right."   Bisognero 
and Mattiolo urged the USG to work with the EU to ensure that 
the improved EU Code of Conduct and "toolbox," currently 
under discussion in Brussels, address concerns underlined by 
DAS Suchan regarding the potential for creating a strategic 
imbalance in the China Sea/Taiwan Straits.  When asked how a 
Code with worldwide scope could be improved to be the 
functional equivalent of a country embargo, Mattiolo 
suggested that the EU, Russia, Israel and US coordinate on 
common guidelines for arms transfers to China. 
 
3. (S) PM Berlusconi's diplomatic advisors for Europe, 
Francesco Talo, and for Asia, Paolo Dionisi, had a somewhat 
more understanding view of the difficulties that lifting the 
embargo would cause for US strategic interests, and 
ultimately for US-EU relations. Dionisi said Italy has to 
strike a balance between trade and political considerations. 
Talo said Italy will not support lifting the embargo unless 
China's human rights are "respected" and unless it is clear 
that removing the embargo would not increase China's security 
threat.  They both suggested that Italy will cooperate 
closely with the US in working to convince its EU partners 
not to lift the embargo if shared strategic/military concerns 
would be compromised.  "We will do our best" in Brussels, 
promised Dionisi.   Dionisi and Talo agreed that the EU Code 
of Conduct had serious shortcomings, and acknowledged that 
the embargo provided political cover for countries that want 
to say no to arms deals with China.  They also acknowledged 
the possibility that lifting the EU embargo would spur non-EU 
countries such as Russia and Israel to exercise less 
restraint in arms deals with China.  Dionisi emphasized that 
"at the end of the day, you know we are with you on political 
military issues." 
 
4. (S) Dionisi reacted most to the potential impact on 
US-Italy defense cooperation.  In this context, he brought up 
the Augusta/Westland effort (teamed with Lockheed Martin) to 
supply the new Presidential helicopter for the White House 
fleet.  He said he had heard reports that DOD had delayed the 
decision in order to give US manufacturer Sikorsky more time 
to improve its bid.  DAS Suchan emphasized that the decision 
on the helicopter had not been made, but more importantly, 
that if the embargo were lifted, the US Congress would very 
likely impose restrictions on technology transfer to Europe, 
making future cooperation on other projects, such as the 
Joint Strike Fighter, very difficult. 
 
5. (S/NOFORN)  COMMENT:  The comments by MFA officials to 
DAS Suchan and BG Remington were less encouraging than we 
have heard before, while the more positive remarks from 
Berlusconi's diplomatic advisers were the first concrete 
statement we got from the PM's office after several months of 
working the issue.  We need to close the clear daylight 
between Prime Ministry and MFA views by persuading PM 
Berlusconi of the importance the US attaches to this issue. 
Persuading the Italians to take up our cause in Brussels may 
require a direct order from Berlusconi to Foreign Minister 
Frattini (a Powell-Frattini pull-aside may occur in 
 
 
Washington Oct. 14-16).  At this point, key Italian officials 
have heard all our arguments, but are only likely to be moved 
toward our position by a direct message from a high NSC 
official to Berlusconi's senior Diplomatic Adviser, Giovanni 
Castellaneta, putting the priority of this issue in the 
context of the close working and personal relationship 
between PM Berlusconi and President Bush.  End Comment. 
 
6. (SBU) DAS Suchan and BG Remington have cleared this 
message. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME03958 - Classification: SECRET