US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT3547

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARPI WORMAN, INR KIRSCH, S/CT MILLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KU, PK, IZ 
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN BAN ON DRIVERS TO IRAQ 
 
REF: KUWAIT 03465 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron.  Reasons 1.5 (b) AND (d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY.  Post was informed the evening of October 12 
that the Pakistani Embassy had requested that the GOK prevent 
Pakistani drivers from entering Iraq, and was immediately in 
touch with CFLCC regarding the situation.  It remains unclear 
whether the ban will be enforced by the Kuwaitis, who are 
torn between their support for the coaltion (and Kuwaiti 
contractors) and their desire to accommodate third country 
concerns.  If enforced, the ban will seriously impact the 
coalition's ability to supply materiel, as Pakistani drivers 
account for 90 percent of the fuel haulers under contract and 
15 percent of drivers overall.  Ambassador contacted the 
Pakistani Ambassador in Kuwait, who claimed the decision had 
come from Islamabad and suggested that an approach be made 
there.  Meanwhile, Ambassador asked that the Pakistani 
Ambassador transmit back to Islamabad our grave concerns 
about this action.  END SUMMARY 
 
MFA Senior Officials Surprised 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C)  The MFA Chief of Protocol, who has been handling 
issues surrounding expat drivers for Iraq convoys, called 
Ambassador evening of October 12 to inform him that the MFA 
had received a request for GOK assistance in instituting a 
ban on Pakistani drivers working in Iraq.  The official 
stated that the note containing the request had not been 
immediately seen by senior MFA officials, and had been 
transmitted by lower levels of the MFA to the Ministry of 
Interior for action.  Ambassador made it abundantly clear 
that the USG would prefer that this ban not come into force. 
The Chief of Protocol said in a conversation on October 13 
that he had managed to obtain a 24 hour delay, pending 
further review of the issue. 
 
3.  (C)  As of noon on October 13th the ban had not been 
enforced, and Pakistani drivers were entering Iraq unimpeded 
at the Kuwait-Iraq border crossing.  The CFLCC General in 
charge of Movement and Distribution, Brigadier General 
Johnson, advised Embassy that such a ban would have a serious 
effect on convoy capability as Pakistani drivers account for 
more than 15 percent of the total driver workforce and 90 
percent of the fuel haulers going into Iraq.   There are 
currently over 350 Pakistani drivers under contract for the 
convoys, making them the third largest nationality after the 
Egyptian and Turkish drivers. 
 
Pakistani Ambassador: Acting on Instructions 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Ambassador spoke to Pakistani Ambassador to Kuwait 
just before noon on 13 October to ask for clarification of 
the request by the Pakistani Embassy to the Kuwaitis to halt 
the flow of Pakistanis between Kuwait and Iraq.  Amb. Niazi 
said the decision, (as reflected in an October 5 note to the 
Kuwait MFA from the Pakistani Embassy), had been taken in 
Islamabad.  It had been decided in response to situations in 
which Pakistani drivers complained that they were being 
forced to drive to Iraq by Kuwaiti contractors, and they then 
asked the Pakistani Embassy for refuge and repatriation. 
Eventually they were repatriated.  When asked, the Ambassador 
said about twelve drivers were involved in this repatriation. 
(Note: out of hundreds of drivers.)  The Pakistani Ambassador 
also said that Pakistani drivers had failed to heed a 
Pakistani travel advisory which warned against travel to Iraq 
and this had been another factor in the GOP decision to ask 
the Kuwaiti Government to prevent them from entering Iraq. 
The Ambassador said that he had visited his Consular Section 
this morning and found four drivers who were complaining 
about the decision and who wanted freedom to pursue their 
livelihoods through driving to Iraq.   He said he sympathized 
with them but said the decision was not his. 
 
5.  (C)  Ambassador LeBaron asked that the Ambassador convey 
to Islamabad in the strongest possible terms that 1) we would 
have appreciated some advance warning of this decision in 
order to do contingency planning,  2) this decision has the 
potential to be very disruptive for our supply chain to Iraq, 
especially since many of the drivers are driving fuel trucks, 
and 3) we would like to see this decision reversed, 
postponed, or delayed.   The Ambassador seemed to be 
sympathetic to our arguments, and not relishing facing more 
angry truck drivers forced out of work.  Ambassador LeBaron 
also reminded Amb. Niazi that we had passed considerable 
information to him in September on treatment of drivers, as 
supplied by CFLCC Gen. Speer.  Niazi said he had passed this 
back to the Pakistani MFA.   (Ambassador subsequently shared 
the content of the conversation with the senior Kuwaiti MFA 
official who first alerted us to this problem.) 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) Post has been in touch with Embassy Islamabad earlier 
in the day to provide advance briefing, and understands that 
clarification is being sought in Islamabad. 
LeBaron