US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI3190

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PUTS POSITIVE SPIN ON PRC REJECTION OF 
10/10 SPEECH 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 3077 
 
     B. TAIPEI 3162 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Taiwan officials tried to put a positive spin 
on the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reported rejection of 
President Chen Shui-bian's October 10 inaugural address. 
National Security Council (NSC) and Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC) officials say that TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing's 
statement largely mirrored the PRC's May 17 Taiwan policy 
line and signaled that "the door to dialogue remains closed, 
but not necessarily locked."  MAC Senior Vice Chairman Chiu 
Tai-san told reporters that the TAO spokesman's October 13 
remarks would not alter Taipei's commitment to easing 
cross-Strait tensions.  Officials admit that President Chen's 
assertion on October 10 that "the Republic of China is 
Taiwan" likely provoked the negative PRC statement, but claim 
that Chen needed to emphasize Taiwan's sovereignty to avoid a 
domestic backlash to his "1992 Framework" offer.  One senior 
presidential advisor downplayed the significance of the PRC 
reaction, asserting that Chen's real audience on October 10 
was Washington, not Beijing.  End Summary. 
 
TAO Rejects 10/10 Message 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Taiwan officials responded cautiously to media reports 
about PRC TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing's rejection of 
President Chen's 10/10 speech.  NSC Senior Advisor for 
cross-Strait policy Chen Chung-hsin told AIT that Zhang's 
remarks were, in substance, largely a reiteration of the May 
17 PRC policy statement on Taiwan.  Chen stated that Zhang's 
comments suggested that "the door to dialogue remains closed, 
but not necessarily locked."  MAC Planning Bureau Chief Chang 
Shu-ti offered a similar assessment, noting that Zhang 
responded to most questions during the TAO press conference 
with established policy formulations.  Chang said that the 
similarities between the October 13 TAO press conference and 
the May 17 policy statement may indicate that the PRC 
leadership remains in an observation mode awaiting the 
outcome of elections in the United States and Taiwan. 
 
Self-Inflicted Wound? 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) Chen administration officials say that the negative 
tone of the October 13 TAO statement was likely provoked by 
the president's emphasis on the sovereignty of the "ROC" and 
its 23 million people during his 10/10 speech.  The NSC's 
Chen said that he fully understands why the PRC would be 
"allergic" to the president's "ROC equals Taiwan" 
formulation, but added that he is also sympathetic to the 
domestic political pressures the president faces from within 
his own camp.  Chen said he hoped that Beijing would 
understand that, just as they have to make aggressive noises 
towards Taiwan to satisfy their own hard-liners, President 
Chen needs to also address his own fundamentalist base. 
"Perhaps this is wishful thinking," Chen added, "but I hope 
they can differentiate between what is meant for them and 
what is for domestic consumption." 
 
4. (C) Executive Yuan (EY) Research, Development, and 
Evaluation Council (RDEC) Vice Minister Chen Chun-lin put a 
slightly different spin on the president's sovereignty 
formula, asserting that the PRC should understand that Taiwan 
also has its "bottom line."  "Beijing needs to realize that 
we are ready to talk," he stated, "but only if they accept 
that we are an equal partner, not a local government."  Chen 
added that if Beijing's precondition is that Taiwan accepts 
that it is part of Beijing's "one China," no president will 
be able to gain the necessary public support to open a 
political dialogue. 
 
Taiwan Response: Patient and Maybe Even Unified 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5. (C) The NSC's Chen said that the Chen administration will 
remain low-key on the TAO statement to see how things evolve 
over the coming weeks.  When asked about the October 13 TAO 
comments, MAC Senior Vice Chairman Chiu Tai-san told 
reporters that Taiwan would continue to send positive signals 
to Beijing to show Taipei's sincerity.  Chiu said that Taiwan 
did not expect Beijing to immediately accept Chen's overtures 
and promised that Taipei would give Beijing more time to 
consider ways forward.  A MAC press release issued later in 
the day offered a similar message, and reiterated an October 
11 offer to initiate talks on two-way direct charter flights 
for the Chinese New Year.  MAC Planning Bureau Chief Chang 
told AIT that Taipei will continue to pursue the New Year 
charter plan, despite the TAO's reiteration that any 
cross-Strait links be considered domestic in nature.  Chang 
asserted that Taipei is prepared to authorize private 
entities to negotiate two-way charter flights, but said that 
MAC would not explicitly announce this until there was some 
signal from Beijing that talks on the subject may be possible. 
 
6. (C) The NSC's Chen told AIT that the immediate challenge 
facing the government is to get everyone back on the same 
page.  Chen complained that Premier Yu Shyi-kun and MAC 
Chairman Joseph Wu should not have engaged in rhetorical 
debates with opposition legislators over the existence of a 
"1992 consensus" in the days following the president's 10/10 
speech.  Immediately after the October 13 TAO press 
conference, Chen said he personally called EY Spokesman Chen 
Chi-mai and MAC Chair Wu to ensure that everyone used the 
same talking points in their public comments. 
 
7. (C) While NSC and MAC officials search for small signs of 
flexibility from Beijing, Presidential Office Deputy 
Secretary General James Huang told AIT that the major 
 
SIPDIS 
objective of President Chen's speech -- satisfying Washington 
-- had already been achieved.  Huang said that whether or not 
Beijing wants to talk to Taiwan is of secondary importance. 
"That's their decision," he asserted, "our main concern is 
reassuring the United States that we are trying to be 
constructive."  Huang dismissed the domestic political debate 
over the "1992 consensus" that arose from Chen's 10/10 
speech.  "His reference to a '1992 Framework' had nothing to 
do with any '92 consensus," Huang stated, "he used the 1992 
formulation to respond to (EAP) Assistant Secretary Kelly's 
April 21 description of the cross-Strait situation that 
existed in 1992." 
 
Comment: Mixed Messaging Strikes Again 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) President Chen's decision to use the same speech to 
achieve contradictory policy goals scuttled an important 
opportunity for cross-Strait progress yet again.  It is not 
clear whether this was his intention to start with, 
carelessness, or simply force of habit.  It is certainly 
consistent with his past behavior.  In any event, it appears 
from the October 13 TAO statement that Beijing has chosen, 
unsurprisingly, to focus on the portion of the speech Chen's 
aides say they were supposed to ignore.  Given the negative 
tone of Beijing's public reaction to 10/10, we are not as 
optimistic as officials here that the PRC will reopen the 
door to contacts on New Year charters and other forms of 
dialogue any time soon. 
PAAL