US embassy cable - 04BEIRUT4423

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

PARLIAMENT SPEAKER WANTS LARGE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

Identifier: 04BEIRUT4423
Wikileaks: View 04BEIRUT4423 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Beirut
Created: 2004-10-12 08:44:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV LE SY
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
P 120844Z OCT 04
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4440
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 004423 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, LE, SY 
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT SPEAKER WANTS LARGE NATIONAL UNITY 
GOVERNMENT 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Lebanese Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, in a 
10/11 meeting with the Ambassador, said that he wanted the 
next cabinet to be a national unity government.  Only by 
getting sufficient representation from the Christian 
opposition and Walid Jumblatt's bloc, he said, could Lebanon 
face the challenges posed by UNSC 1559.  PM Hariri, he 
reported, met with him earlier that day, seeking Berri's 
support for a narrow, technocratic government; Berri rebuffed 
the PM, saying that broader political participation was 
essential to the new cabinet's ability to deal with the 
legislative elections law as well as other issues.  Berri 
said that, public comments from Walid Jumblatt and Christian 
opposition figures notwithstanding, he believed it was 
possible to lure their representatives to the cabinet.  Asked 
by the Ambassador about next steps, given widely divergent 
views among leading Lebanese figures on the next cabinet, 
Berri noted that Hariri would see President Lahoud again 
during the evening of 10/11 in an attempt to hammer out a 
cabinet deal.  Berri would not predict what Lahoud and Hariri 
might decide, or even whether they could agree, but he 
emphasized that no deal on a cabinet is possible without 
Berri's parliamentary blessing. 
 
2.  (C)  On spring 2005 legislative elections, Berri said 
that he cared less about the type of electoral districts to 
be drawn -- large (favored by Hariri) or small (favored by 
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir) -- as long as the same standard was 
applied across the country.  But when pressed, Berri 
acknowledged that he preferred the larger governorate 
("muhafeza") system as opposed to small "qada" districts. 
The governorates, he said, are more consistent with the Taif 
accord and, by inclusion of more than one sect in each 
governorate, help move Lebanon away from a confessional 
system of representation. 
 
3.  (C)  Much of the hour-long meeting was devoted to Berri 
decrying UNSC 1559 as interference in Lebanon's domestic 
affairs and to Berri's attempt to convince the Ambassador 
that French and U.S. views toward implementation of UNSC 1559 
have already diverged (with the U.S. softening its line, 
according to this theory).  The Ambassador pushed back that 
the U.S. wants to see UNSC 1559 fully implemented, with a 
functioning cabinet addressing the needs of the Lebanese 
people rather than answering to Damascus.  After giving a 
strong condemnation of Sunni extremism in Iraq and al-Qaida's 
activities worldwide, Berri also lamented what he described 
as U.S. neglect of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 
arguing that what he believed to be the absence of U.S. 
strong leadership in pushing the Israelis and Palestinians 
toward a two-state solution fanned the flames of extremism. 
 
4.  (C)  Comment:  In arguing for a national unity 
government, Berri is more likely to be motivated by what is 
best for Berri and his Amal movement than what is best for 
Lebanon.  Hariri's proposal for a narrow, technocratic 
government would likely leave out Amal figures; a 
technocratic government is also more likely to pursue 
Hariri's reform agenda at the expense of Berri's spoils and 
patronage instincts.  In a larger, national unity government, 
however, Berri will have Amal ministers who potentially can 
be deal makers or deal breakers, giving the Shia leader more 
influence on the direction of policy and debate with the 
cabinet.  As the Ambassador told Berri, whether the cabinet 
is narrow and technocratic or larger and drawn from a broad 
political spectrum is not of interest to the USG.  What we 
want to see is a cabinet that earns credibility among the 
Lebanese people by starting to address their needs.  This 
would signal to us that Lebanon is beginning the process of 
moving toward compliance with UNSC 1559. 
 
FELTMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04