US embassy cable - 04ABUJA1715

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001715 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, NI 
SUBJECT: DELTA QUIET (FOR NOW) 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1675 
 
     B. ABUJA 1673 
     C. LAGOS 2034 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge Rick Roberts for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  SUMMARY:  Since last week's negotiations in Abuja 
(Ref A), no major violence has been reported from Rivers 
state or the Delta region.  While one group reportedly 
"disarmed," another was a no-show.  With more talks scheduled 
to begin October 8, militia leader Asari remains wary of the 
GON's intentions.  Other observers are equally skeptical of 
the GON's sincerity and the possibility of a resolution to 
the conflicts rooted in Nigeria's flawed 2003 elections.  The 
absence of a response from the GON brings into question the 
continued viability of the Nigerian state as currently 
structured and creates an environment that could encourage 
more violent opposition to GON policies or create a martyr to 
the cause of increased autonomy for Nigeria's regions.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
SITUATION ON THE GROUND 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  Since the negotiations in Abuja that ended on 
October 2, no major flare-ups of violence have been reported 
in the oil-rich Delta region, although one helicopter attack 
on a group of Asari's "commanders" reportedly took place 
October 1 while Asari was in Abuja.  Furious initially, Asari 
reportedly calmed down and ordered no retaliatory attack by 
his group.  Asari returned to Rivers State midday October 2 
and ducked the receiving party at the airport, entering his 
vehicle and departing for one of his camps.  He returned to 
the town of Buguma, one of his primary headquarters, to 
triumphant celebrations by hundreds of armed supporters. 
 
3.  (SBU)  A scheduled militias disarmament meeting took 
place this week, but Asari's rival Ateke Tom showed up alone 
and made a show of "disarming" his militia.  Asari sent a 
message instead, that he was still "accepting applications" 
for membership in his group. (COMMENT:  Tom also publicly 
"disarmed" his militia some weeks ago to much fanfare, but to 
little military effect if he keeps having arms to turn in. 
Nobody believed Governor Odili's ally, Tom, was disarmed the 
first time either.  END COMMENT.)  At another event scheduled 
to show the reconciliation between Tom and Asari, Tom was the 
no-show.  Asari took the platform again and called for 
interested parties to apply for membership in his group. 
 
NEGOTIATIONS 
------------ 
 
4.  (U)  Asari has returned to Abuja for the next round of 
talks with the government, but his statements indicate no 
intention to disarm his fighters.  He says that he thinks the 
GON is not very sincere, and that there is "every 
possibility" that disarmament will not go ahead.  The 
Asari-GON negotiations last week covered five of the ten 
points highlighted in the talks, supposedly agreeing on: 
 
--  disbanding of all militias and total disarmament; 
 
--  immediate cessation of hostilities by militias and the 
GON; 
 
--  GON commitment to promote the development of the Niger 
delta; 
 
--  a pledge to be peaceful and law abiding; and 
 
--  a commitment to the unity of the country. 
 
Outstanding issues include: 
 
--  resolution of chieftancy issues in Okrika; 
 
--  resolution of chieftancy issues in Kalabari; 
 
--  establishment of committees to work for "wholesome 
community development" in the Delta; 
 
--  comprehensive disarmament and observance of fundamental 
rights; and 
 
--  rehabilitation and re-integration of disarmed youths into 
"productive and gainful employment." 
 
5.  (C)  Asari remained in Abuja from September 29 until 
October 2, sources near him report, but was unable to see 
President Obasanjo until late October 1 or early October 2. 
According to one source, Asari refused to meet Obasanjo 
without his own security men.  The source claimed that Asari 
threatened to walk out if his men, armed with side arms and 
hand grenades, were not allowed into the meeting.  The 
President reportedly acquiesced.  At the end of the meeting, 
Obasanjo assured Asari of his security, but Asari demanded a 
"hostage" to travel with him to Port Harcourt.  Asari chose 
Andy Uba, Special Advisor to the President on Domestic 
Affairs. 
 
QUESTIONS OF CREDIBILITY 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C)  In addition to Asari's own doubts, other observers 
remain skeptical.  The leader of an Ogoni organization, Ledum 
Mittee, told PolOff that this first Asari agreement was 
"worthless" and that he expects more trouble to follow. 
Other Ijaw leaders criticized Asari, and complained that if 
Obasanjo wanted to calm the region he would have to make 
deals with each of them in the same fashion.  The leader of 
the Ijaw Youth Council added a threat to occupy flow stations 
and "stop production" in conjunction with a labor-led general 
strike (septel) planned for October 11.  From the neighboring 
South East region, Igbo leader Chukwuemeka Ojukwu compared 
GON security services "constantly harassing" politicians on 
one hand, while negotiating with militia leaders like Asari 
on the other.  "Asari kills hundreds of soldiers and damages 
oil facilities and is treated like royalty," Ojukwu mused, 
and perhaps "we (the Igbos) need more guns to attack the 
pipelines" to get Obasanjo's attention. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (S/NF)  This outbreak of violence -- rooted in GON's 
flawed election, the disaster of GON environmental, 
development and political policies in the Delta, and the 
GON's failure to prevent the corruption-driven growth of 
militias nationwide -- brings into question the continued 
viability of the Nigerian state as currently structured.  If 
Obasanjo gives Asari a good deal, it could well encourage 
other groups with grievances to pursue their claims more 
forcefully.  If the negotiations are used instead as a tactic 
to buy time until eliminating Asari, it runs the risk 
creating a martyr to the cause of increased autonomy for the 
250 plus tribal and ethnic groups in the country, as well as 
an environment for further massacres on the level of Odi 
(2000) or Zaki-Biam (2001). 
ROBERTS