US embassy cable - 04AMMAN8402

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2009 
TAGS: PREL, JO 
SUBJECT: TENSIONS APPARANT ON HANDLING OPPOSITION 
 
REF: AMMAN 7619 
 
Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES DAVID HALE, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Interior Minister Habashneh, taking his cue 
from the King, has continued to apply pressure on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, with a series of arrests of activist preachers 
and threats to prosecute certain MPs.  Each step he takes 
seems to be reversed the following day by PM Fayez, who 
continues to advocate dialogue and compromise with the 
Islamist opposition.  The debate over handling the opposition 
is beginning to take East Bank/West Bank colorings, as East 
Bankers accuse the opposition of pursuing &foreign8, i.e. 
Palestinian agendas.  Palestinians rebut that the East 
Bankers, paranoid about the long-term consequences of a 
stalled peace process, are embarked on a campaign of pressure 
and discrimination.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Recent weeks have seen intensified interaction 
between the government and the Islamist opposition, as 
Interior Minister Habashneh pursues the King,s command to 
ensure that only the &proper8 message of Islam is spread 
from pulpits.  In order to dampen vitriolic anti-western, 
radical sermons, large numbers of unlicensed Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) preachers were arrested.  The MB has fought 
back rhetorically, confirming an intent to obey the law while 
critiquing the government,s heavy handed tactics and 
launching a counteroffensive attacking longstanding, 
restrictive GOJ policy on granting nationality to certain 
categories of Palestinians (reftel). 
 
3.  (C) Contrary trends within the cabinet on handling the 
opposition are apparent, however.  With each hard swing from 
the Interior Minister, the Prime Minister a day later extends 
the olive branch, insisting on releases of detainees, the 
dropping of charges, and enhanced dialogue.  Such regime 
stalwarts as Senate President Zeid al-Rifai told Charge that 
this does not represent a &good cop, bad cop8 strategy, but 
genuine division within the cabinet.  No stranger to 
iron-fist tactics himself, Rifai lamented that the PM neither 
understands the potential danger of dissension posed by the 
Islamist elements, nor has the stomach to preside over tough 
actions by others in his government.  Without leadership from 
the PM, the MB and their parliamentary wing, the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF) would continue to fan extremism and hamper 
the government in parliament.  Rifai noted that over 60 MPs 
) the core of the King,s men in the Lower House -- were 
meeting with Fayez on October 7 to try to stiffen him to keep 
the pressure on the MB.  As we have heard from the King,s 
advisors, Rifai predicted that Fayez, tenure over a 
reshuffled cabinet would be short-lived if he does not 
succeed in taming both the MB and their secular twins in 
opposition, the highly politicized, radical professional 
associations.  MP Mohammad Arsalan (East Banker, Zarqa - 
first district) told PolOff October 7 that a majority of MPs 
were growing increasingly alarmed by IAF aggressiveness.  He 
and some of his colleagues were in the process of drafting a 
letter to PM Fayez - which he expected up to 70 MPs to sign - 
urging him to take a harder line against the Islamists. 
(Note: The IAF holds 17 seats, and can count on an additional 
three independent members.  The lower house consists of 110 
members.) 
 
4.  (C) Another former PM, and hardcore East Banker, 
expressed a similar analysis to Charge.  Fayez Tarawneh 
anticipated more arrests of extremist preachers, and believed 
popular opinion was supportive (he took pride in having the 
radical sermonizer in his smart, West Amman mosque sacked for 
talking politics, not religion, from the pulpit).  Tarawneh 
saw a HAMAS agenda behind the efforts of the 
Palestinian-origin activists in the MB/IAF, who he claimed 
used the moderate, East Bank leadership of the MB as a front. 
 He suggested that Fayez was entering into his reshuffled 
government on shaky ground with the King and the traditional 
East Bank constituencies who see his conciliatory manner 
toward the opposition as a sign of weakness. 
 
5. (C) Putting aside certain personality quirks, Fayez faces 
a genuine dilemma:  he has been handed simultaneously a 
reformist agenda and a command to crack down on an opposition 
element that is adept at advancing its cause by playing by 
the rules.  Persistent, public differences with his own 
Interior Minister also indicate that Fayez is not in charge 
of all elements of his cabinet, as Habashneh is almost 
certainly coordinating with the GID, where the sentiments 
expressed by Tarawneh and Rifai would be seen if anything as 
too soft. 
 
6. (C) This chapter is also a demonstration of how 
Palestinian issues continue to bedevil Jordanian politics. 
Violence in the West Bank and Gaza, and the absence of 
visible diplomatic progress, flavors this debate. 
Palestinian activists here seek to use the few existing 
channels for political organization ) the MB and the 
professional associations ) to exploit popular unhappiness. 
East Bankers see in diplomatic paralysis a diminishing hope 
of a two-state solution ) and by extension, fear that old 
issues of Jordan,s national identity and relationship with 
the West Bank could be revived to their detriment.  However 
misplaced such fears may be to western ears, they are an 
element in current agitation over the MB and its 
&Palestinian8 agenda. 
HALE