US embassy cable - 04MADRID3914

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 003914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR DAS FISK 
WHA/CCA FOR KEVIN WHITAKER 
USEU FOR TODD HUIZINGA 
IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, SP 
SUBJECT: CUBA: MFA ON INVITING DISSIDENTS TO SPANISH 
NATIONAL DAY, UN ANTI-EMBARGO RESOLUTION 
 
REF: A) MADRID 3552 B) BRUSSELS 4080 C) SAINZ E-MAIL 
 
     OF 10/6 D) STATE 215870 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.5 (B) a 
nd (D). 
 
1. (C) Poloff contacted MFA Deputy Director General for 
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Pedro Gomez de 
Olea on 10/7 to discuss reports that the Spanish Embassy in 
Havana was planning to break with EU policy by not inviting 
dissidents to its national day reception on 10/12.  Gomez de 
Olea, who had clearly anticipated poloff's call, said he had 
no information to provide because the decision on whether to 
invite dissidents would be made by Foreign Minister Moratinos 
himself.  He said that, to his knowledge, no final decision 
had been made. 
 
2. (C) Gomez de Olea (please protect) indicated a certain 
exasperation with the issue, saying it had been his 
understanding that the GOS would comply with EU policies 
calling for the inclusion of national day event, but that it 
now seemed FM Moratinos felt he had to make the decision 
himself.  Gomez de Olea said it was likely no decision would 
be made until right before the 10/12 event and that he would 
likely learn of it at the same time we did.  He added that it 
was well known that the GOS wanted to revisit EU measures 
against the GOC to find "more effective" tools, but his tone 
suggested frustration with the way in which the issue of 
invitations is being handled by FM Moratinos. 
 
3. (C) Poloff inquired about the accuracy of news reports 
that Cuban FM Perez Roque had told Moratinos in New York that 
noted political prisoner Raul Rivero would not be released if 
Spain invited dissidents to its national day event, comments 
which Popular Party politicians denounced as blackmail. 
Gomez de Olea scoffed, saying that Perez Roque had not made 
such a statement, but that in fact his comments were even 
"more insulting" than those reported.  He said Perez Roque 
demanded not only the lifting of EU measures undertaken in 
the wake of the 2003 GOC crackdown on dissident, but also the 
full revision of the EU Common Position to remove all 
European political conditions on improved ties with Cuba. 
 
//CUBAN ANTI-EMBARGO RESOLUTION// 
 
4. (C) Poloff took advantage of the conversation to review 
ref D points regarding the upcoming Cuba embargo resolution. 
Gomez de Olea said Spain would hew closely to past EU 
practice, including voting in favor of the Cuban resolution 
while criticizing GOC human rights practices in an 
Explanation of Vote.  This was GOS policy under the Aznar 
Government as well.  We will follow up by delivering ref D 
points to the MFA Office of UN Affairs. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
5. (C) Moratinos' positions on Cuba continue to undermine the 
Zapatero Administration's contention that human rights will 
remain on the forefront of GOS policy towards Cuba.  Instead, 
Moratinos appears to favor "dialogue at any cost" with 
respect to Cuba and seems willing to risk the ire of both the 
EU and the USG in order to improve relations with the GOC. 
Even if Moratinos does opt to invite dissidents, this episode 
makes it abundantly clear that the GOS will continue to chip 
away at EU resolve to hold the GOC to at least minimal human 
rights standards.  Given Spanish public opposition to U.S. 
policy towards Cuba, the Zapatero Government could be tempted 
to portray any rapprochement with Havana as yet another 
demonstration of its "independence" f