US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2559

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EU-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE: DISAPPOINTING, BUT NOT DECISIVE

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE2559
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE2559 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-10-07 09:14:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PREL KIRF KJUS CH NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, KIRF, KJUS, CH, NL 
SUBJECT: EU-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE: DISAPPOINTING, BUT 
NOT DECISIVE 
 
REF: A. USEU TODAY OF 10/5/04 
 
     B. THORNTON/TRAUB EMAIL OF 9/28 
     C. BEIJING 16294 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary:  While working-level MFA contacts found 
recent EU-China discussions on human rights disappointing, on 
balance the October 11 GAERC will almost certainly determine 
that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue is worthwhile and 
should continue.  Dutch interlocutors stressed on October 5 
and 6 that human rights concerns are just one of four 
criteria -- along the code of conduct, regional stability, 
and concerns of non-EU allies -- that will factor in any 
decision to lift or extend the arms embargo.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On October 5, Gerrie Willems, Dutch MFA China Desk, 
characterized the EU's September 21-24 visit to China for 
human rights talks (led by Dutch Special Ambassador for Human 
Rights Piet de Klerk) as "nothing new" and holding "no 
surprises."  While the MFA will provide a more formal brief 
on the visit on October 8 (prior to the October 11 GAERC), 
Willems told POLOFF privately that, in her view, China missed 
a chance to influence the arms embargo debate positively by 
taking a more proactive approach to the human rights dialogue 
with the EU.  Instead, the Chinese failed even to respond to 
the points that the EU had shared with them in advance. 
Without offering specifics, Willems reported mixed results 
from the talks themselves: "progress" in the socio-economic 
field and rule of law, and the opposite with regard to death 
penalty, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, torture, and 
related issues. 
 
3.  (C)  Willems recalled that the EU had made clear before 
the visit that it was looking for concrete actions, not just 
words, from the human rights dialogue process.  The current 
trip had produced only two concrete results that she could 
recall: the promise of a visit by the Dalai Lama's 
representative to Beijing, and the setting of dates (November 
15-23) for the oft-delayed visit to China of UNCHR Special 
Rapporteur on Torture Theo Van Boven (a Dutchman).  "There 
might have been a third item," she added, "but I cannot 
recall it so it could not have been that important."  Willems 
noted that the October 11 GAERC will consider the history of 
the human rights dialogue with China with a view to revising 
it if necessary, but would not comment on the status of this 
review or likely outcomes.  Willems emphasized that, in its 
national capacity, the Netherlands "shares the USG concerns 
about China's human rights" and is therefore engaged on human 
rights issues across the board, with other governments, 
NGO's, and public opinion. 
 
4.  (C)  With regard to the arms embargo, Willems volunteered 
that "China did nothing to encourage the EU into lifting the 
embargo" during the visit.  Willems surmised that the Chinese 
wanted to prove that "they won't be pushed on human rights," 
and therefore would not link the two issues.  She noted, 
however, that the Chinese had been willing to discuss other 
"possible EU-China Summit deliverables," although she did not 
provide details.  Willems stressed that the Dutch, as EU 
president, believe they have an obligation to gather as much 
information as possible with regard to the arms embargo and 
human rights dialogue, create an inventory of the state of 
affairs, and present this neutrally to ministers for 
evaluation and decision on next steps.  The Netherlands is 
currently concentrating on "getting as much information on 
the table as possible," she said, noting that the arms 
embargo is viewed as part of a larger equation including the 
code of conduct, human rights, relations with non-EU 
partners, and regional stability.  In that context, she 
rejected the notion that an "arbitrary" December deadline 
would determine the outcome of the EU debate. 
 
5. (C) On October 6, Jaap Werner, Director of the MFA's 
Political Affairs Department, provided a different slant on 
the visit.  While he acknowledged that the Chinese could have 
done more, he told POLOFFS that, on the whole, the visit had 
been seen as "fairly positive."  Werner observed that both 
the visit, and the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in general, 
could be seen as glasses half-full or half-empty.  On 
balance, he predicted that the GAERC would most likely decide 
that the human rights dialogue was worth continuing despite 
its frustrations.  Werner suggested that ongoing (albeit 
slow) progress on the human rights front would be cited by 
some to support lifting the embargo, although he stressed -- 
like Willems -- that human rights was just one of four 
criteria the EU would look at when considering the arms 
embargo. 
 
SOBEL 

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