US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5742

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PTER, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: MFA TELLS AMBASSADOR THAT INCREASED PKK ACTIVITY 
MEANS IRAQ AND COALITION MUST ACT 
 
REF: A. STATE 201785 
 
     B. ANKARA 5378 
     C. BAGHDAD 1124 
     D. BAGHDAD 1101 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and 
 (g). 
 
1. (S) Summary: PKK/Kongra Gel's increased terrorist activity 
in Turkey will stir up public opinion and prompt more Turks 
to ask why the United States has not taken firmer action 
against the organization, MFA Deputy Under Secretary for 
Multilateral Political Affairs Nabi Sensoy told the 
Ambassador Oct. 5.  Sensoy, a thoughtful interlocutor who has 
worked this issue with senior U.S. officials for some time, 
expressed his personal and professional frustration, stating 
that he believed we had promised more action against the PKK 
than we had delivered.  He cited GOT statistics on the 
upswing in PKK-related violence in Turkey since the group 
revoked its unilateral cease-fire on June 1: these include 
107 killed, including the terrorists themselves. 
Nonetheless, Sensoy acknowledged that we have taken some 
important measures, and undertook to give credit where due. 
Notably, Sensoy asked no questions about operationalizing a 
new trilateral (USG, IIG, GOT) approach to dealing with the 
PKK.  It is vital that the IIG, with our 
prompting/assistance, move quickly on key Turkish concerns, 
such as closing down the PKK's front offices in Iraq.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (S) MFA Deputy Under Secretary for Multilateral Political 
Affairs Nabi Sensoy called in Ambassador Oct. 5 to discuss 
further the U.S.'s proposal for IIG action against the PKK 
(aka Kongra Gel) and a trilateral discussion among the U.S., 
the IIG, and the GOT on the issue.  Sensoy reviewed the 
ongoing U.S.-Turkey dialogue on the PKK, and expressed his 
own and his government's disappointment that the U.S. has not 
taken more concrete non-military action against the terrorist 
organization.  Sensoy reviewed his meetings over the past 12 
months with S/CT Amb. Black and then-EUR DAS Pascoe, and 
expressed his personal frustration that he had advised 
Turkey's leaders that the United States was prepared to do 
more against the PKK than in fact we have done. 
Specifically, he pointed out the need to disrupt PKK command 
and control and its logistics support network and 
dissemination of a message of resolve to eliminate the PKK 
from Iraq. 
 
3. (S) At the same time, Sensoy took pains to thank us for 
U.S. diplomatic efforts, chiefly the listing of PKK's 
successor (Kongra Gel) as a terrorist organization and our 
ultimately successful effort to get the EU to do the same. 
He also welcomed U.S. efforts to disrupt PKK finances in 
Europe.  Sensoy said he believed that Turkey's leaders and 
military have not given the U.S. enough credit for these 
items. 
 
4. (S) That said, Sensoy noted, the PKK still appears to 
operate relatively freely in Iraq.  According to Sensoy, its 
political front organization--the Kurdistan Democratic 
Solution Party--operates offices in Baghdad, Mosul, and 
Kirkuk, and is seeking to set up shop in Sulaymaniya.  The 
PKK is able to transmit radio and television broadcasts. 
According to Turkish military intelligence, most PKK 
militants have moved from the Kandil Mountain area to the Zap 
area, as close as 16 km from the Turkish border. 
 
5. (C) Sensoy read from a GOT estimate of PKK activity in 
Turkey since the PKK ended its unilateral cease-fire on June 
1.  According to this information Turkey has experienced the 
following activity: 
 
--68 armed assaults 
--46 "armed crossfires" 
--67 bombings 
--22 thwarted bomb attacks 
 
--51 terrorists killed 
--10 civilians killed 
--32 soldiers killed 
--8 police killed 
--6 village guards killed 
 
Sensoy closed by echoing FonMin Gul's comments (ref b) that 
Turkey cannot rely on any other country--including the 
U.S--to go after the PKK.  That said, Sensoy added, Turkey 
had approached the U.S. when it was the occupying authority 
in Iraq.  Since June 28, he asked, what is the legal status 
of the U.S. in Iraq, and what can we expect of you there? 
6. (S) Ambassador responded that he appreciated Sensoy's 
assessment of the U.S.-Turkey exchange on the PKK, and added 
that he understood Turkey's frustration, especially given the 
upswing in PKK activity since June 1.  We know that relevant 
UNSC resolutions which demand that Iraq not be a base for 
international terrorism must be implemented.  Ambassador 
highlighted that we maintain an intelligence fusion cell with 
TGS, and that TGS has just agreed to renew this arrangement. 
He reviewed our offer to provide aerial surveillance on the 
PKK, an offer which Turkey in fact turned down.  He noted our 
joint effort earlier this year--which regrettably failed--to 
capture Osman Ocalan based on what turned out to be faulty 
information from Turkish military intelligence.  CPA did 
outlaw the PKK and Amb. Bremer made the PKK a key item in his 
handoff to the IIG.  Ambassador reminded Sensoy that the IIG 
FonMin and DefMin had both said at the Istanbul NATO Summit 
that the PKK has no place in the future of Iraq. 
 
7. (S) Ambassador reported that DCM Jeffrey had met with DPM 
Salih to present our approach to the IIG on taking action 
against the PKK, and that the Iraqis have responded 
positively.  Closing down the KDSP offices in Iraq was among 
the steps we have requested the IIG to take.  The next step 
is for us to operationalize the discussion.  He emphasized 
that in no way is the United States "washing our hands" of 
the problem and handing it to the Iraqis.  We remain engaged 
on this issue and want to work closely with the IIG on coming 
to grips with the PKK. 
 
8. (S) Sensoy responded that U.S. non-military action 
remained important.  For example, he requested that we press 
the KDP and PUK leadership to cease their ties with and 
logistical support for the PKK.  He added that TGS estimated 
that the U.S. could eliminate the PKK's command and control 
structure "if you wanted to."  He said action is vital since 
the PKK is hurting Turkey far more than a year ago.  Now 
people are dying in Turkey and the Turkish public will soon 
agitate for further action.  "We are trying to keep a lid on 
this," Sensoy said, but he expressed concern that the GOT may 
not be able to do so for much longer.  Ambassador responded 
that we continually talk with the KDP and PUK leadership 
about the PKK, and added that we will keep at it. 
 
10. (S) Comment: The GOT no doubt expected that we would at 
some point approach the IIG and ask it to take steps against 
the PKK, and while the Turks are willing to work with the IIG 
they do not have great faith that it is yet up to the job. 
It is telling that Sensoy--generally a fair and thoughtful 
interlocutor not prone to typical Turkish hysterics on this 
issue--essentially asked no questions about operationalizing 
this trilateral process.  The Turks still see the U.S. as 
their main interlocutor on the PKK in northern Iraq, and they 
will expect action.  At the same time, Turkish policymakers 
understand that our military in Iraq does not have the 
resources to devote to a full-scale battle against this 
terrorist organization.  However, Sensoy made it clear that 
the more the PKK ratchets up its terror campaign in Turkey, 
the more pressure the GOT will feel from its people.  This 
pressure could include calls for cutting back or ceasing 
altogether GOT-USG cooperation on Iraq, or even unilateral 
Turkish action in northern Iraq.  It is thus all the more 
vital that we move smartly with both the IIG and GOT so that 
some action--such as shutting down the KDSP offices in 
Iraq--can take place as soon as possible to demonstrate 
concretely our mutual resolve.  End comment. 
 
11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN