US embassy cable - 04ROME3882

S E C R E T  ROME 003882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
PM/PPA FOR RACHEL FEATHERSTONE; EUR/PGI FOR TABITHA OMAN; 
NSC FOR MARTINA STRONG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014 
TAGS: KPKO, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, IT 
SUBJECT: ITALY ASKS FOR AFRICAN FOCS AND FURTHER U.S. 
INPUT ON GENDARME INITIATIVE 
 
REF: STATE 206032 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUSELOR THOMAS COUNTRYMAN FORREASON 
S 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.(U) This is an action message.  Please see Paragraph 14. 
 
2.(S) Summary. Italy believes that African countries must 
comprise at least half of the countries invited to send 
trainees next year to the Center of Excellence for Stability 
Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza.  Italy recommends that the 
Department choose at least two sub-Saharan countries and one 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) country from its Tier Two list, 
along with India, Morocco, and Jordan from the Tier One list. 
The Carabinieri have arranged to move its non-commissioned 
officers training center from Vicenza and complete material 
preparations by spring 2005. The MOD has approved the COESPU 
project but is delaying release of the project proposal 
because of financial concerns, including uncertainty about 
how much the U.S. will contribute.  To push this project 
along, Italy suggests that the U.S. send a technical team by 
the end of November to assist in completing planning and 
budget assessments.  Quick U.S.-Italian agreement on trainee 
countries and clearer mutual understanding on budget issues 
are key steps toward presenting the COESPU project before G-8 
partners. End Summary. 
 
3.(U) POLMIL Officer delivered Reftel demarche to MFA G-8 
Office Head Giampaolo Cantini on September 26.  Carabinieri, 
MOD, and MFA officials met to discuss the document and other 
COESPU matters on September 28.  POLMIL Officer engaged in 
further conversations with Cantini on September 29 and 
October 4. 
 
Candidate Countries for COESPU,s First Year 
------------------------------------------- 
4. (S) Italy does not agree that the first year,s trainee 
countries should come solely from Reftel,s Tier One list. 
The problem from the Italian perspective is that, from the 
African continent, the Tier One list includes only Morocco; 
there are no sub-Saharan countries.  Cantini did not doubt 
the technical accuracy of the State Department,s evaluation 
of countries in terms of their experience in peacekeeping 
operations and their existing institutional ability to 
sustain a gendarme peacekeeping force.  But the 
under-representation of Africa that would result from 
selection based entirely on those criteria would contradict 
the goal of the G-8 peacekeeping initiative.  Cantini 
recalled that the gendarme initiative had been originally 
conceived in terms of enhancing African peacekeeping 
capability and that the British have already designated 
Africa as the focus for their G-8 presidency.  Pointing to 
current difficulties in finding peacekeepers for Darfur, 
Cantini noted that the G-8 aim was not to train Polish or 
Dutch gendarmes to go to Africa, but to foster endogenous 
African peacekeeping capability as rapidly as possible. 
Industrialized countries with gendarme capabilities should be 
providing COESPU with teachers, not students.  While Italy 
does agree that COESPU,s scope should be global rather than 
restricted to Africa, under-representing Africa would 
undercut the project,s validity in the eyes of G-8 partners 
and make it hard to attract funding support. 
 
5.(C) Of the six to eight countries Italy hopes will send 
trainees to COESPU,s first year courses, Italy,s strong 
view is that a minimum of half of the countries must be from 
Africa.  Italy also believes that, on the whole, trainees 
should come from developing rather than industrialized 
countries. 
 
6.(S) Accepting (and appreciating) the technical value of the 
U.S.-provided lists, Cantini suggested the following 
composition of countries to approach for the first year,s 
courses: India (Tier 1), Jordan (Tier 1), Morocco (Tier 1) 
plus at least two sub-Saharan countries from the Tier 2 list 
plus one PfP country (Cantini suggested Ukraine because of 
its proven willingness to participate substantially in PKOs). 
Cantini invited the U.S. to use the information it gathered 
in generating the two-tier lists for judging which 
sub-Saharan countries would be best able to benefit from 
COESPU training. 
 
 
Status of the Project 
--------------------- 
7.(U) On October 1, Carabinieri Colonel Maurizio Mezzavilla 
replaced Colonel Domenico Libertini as head of the COESPU and 
European Gendarmes projects.  Both Cantini and Libertini have 
expressed satisfaction with the choice of Mezzavilla, who 
brings experience as MSU commander in Bosnia. 
 
8.(U) The Carabinieri have set up a task force (nucleo 
iniziale di formazione), commanded by a two-star general, to 
undertake the physical establishment of the training center. 
The training center for non-commissioned officers currently 
located at Vicenza will be relocated to Velletri, near Rome, 
starting in December 2004.  The Carabinieri will complete 
alterations and equipment setup at the Vicenza facility in 
the first months of 2005. 
 
9.(U) As a means of introducing COESPU to future 
participants, the Carabinieri are prepared to conduct a 
seminar in December or January.  Cantini has suggested 
inviting representatives from the following countries and 
organizations: G-8 countries, Euro-Gendarme countries, EU, 
NATO, OSCE, UN, AU, ECOWAS, and possibly IGAD. The 
Carabinieri will schedule the seminar once the project 
proposal is disseminated to G-8 partners. 
 
10.(U) Cantini reported that the Carabinieri now believe that 
initial hopes to initiate COESPU training courses in early 
2005 were over-optimistic.  Instead, the Carabinieri 
anticipate holding the first course in early summer or, at 
the latest, the beginning of September 2005.  The important 
thing, Cantini said, is to begin on the right foot. 
 
Financial Questions Remain 
-------------------------- 
11.(C) MOD has approved but not released the full COESPU 
project proposal.  At this point the MFA has received only a 
summary without financial details.  Cantini stated that the 
delay reflects continuing MOD/Carabinieri concern about 
taking on one-time and permanent new costs in a period of 
budget cuts.  The MFA has been pressing MOD to furnish a 
detailed estimate of costs, which the MFA guesses will be 
somewhere in the neighborhood of five million Euros annually 
(including the costs of bringing and equipping students). 
More than once, Cantini said that the MOD and MFA were 
looking forward to more clarity about the eventual U.S. 
financial contribution.  Cantini said that Italy understands 
COESPU as a joint initiative and expects its U.S. partner to 
contribute "in kind": that is, on a basis commensurate with 
the cost Italy will bear. 
 
Request for U.S. Technical Team Visit 
------------------------------------- 
12.(C) Italy wants further interaction with the U.S. in 
completing planning. Cantini, speaking for both the 
Carabinieri and MFA Political Director Giampaolo Massolo, 
suggested that this is the right time to bring a U.S. 
technical team to Rome and Vicenza for the purpose of ironing 
out details of what it will take to get COESPU up and 
running.  The team should include military officers 
knowledgeable about the constabulary aspects of peacekeeping 
missions and, most importantly, with experience in 
establishing didactic and training programs.  Cantini 
believes that a U.S. technical team visit before the end of 
November would provide the extra push needed to complete 
planning and move to the operational stage. 
 
13.(C) Cantini stressed Italy,s hope that the U.S. team 
would come with solid information about what the U.S. will be 
prepared to contribute financially. 
 
14.(C) Action Request: Embassy Rome asks PM/PPA to follow up 
its successful July visit to Italy by sending a team whose 
members would have the military and technical experience to 
review and assist in completion of Italian plans.  The team 
should include at least one member qualified to assist with 
financial planning.  We hope this visit can happen quickly, 
preferably by the end of November. End Action Request. 
 
Next Steps: Details Needed for Sherpas, Meeting 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
15.(U) The MFA, encouraged by President Bush,s mention of 
the U.S.-Italian Global Peace Operations Initiative in his 
September 21 UNGA speech, has been spreading the word about 
COESPU.  Massolo outlined the project at the September 20 G-8 
political directors meeting in New York.  Mezzavilla will 
discuss COESPU in more detail at the G-8 Clearinghouse 
meeting on African Peacekeeping in Washington on October 7-8. 
 
 
16.(C) The next step is the October 15 Sherpas, meeting, at 
which the U.S. and Italy hope to lay out the COESPU proposal 
to G-8 partners and begin soliciting partner support. 
Assuming that the official project proposal is available by 
then (and that the U.S. clears on it), Cantini said the key 
information that partner countries will look for at the 
Sherpas' meeting will be: 1) a list of needs along with cost 
estimates; and 2) the list of countries to be invited to the 
first year's courses.  These items, and particularly the 
financial needs assessment, are not yet accomplished. 
Cantini speculated that, if Italian Sherpa Giovanni 
Castellaneta had to discuss COESPU today, he would be 
prepared to offer only a general picture of the project. 
Given Italy,s budget concerns, Cantini said, Castellaneta 
will not get out ahead of whatever has been firmly agreed on 
by Italy and the U.S. 
 
Comment 
------- 
17.(C) To reach our goal of presenting a U.S.-Italian project 
proposal to G-8 partners on October 15, we need to decide 
quickly on a list of trainee countries to approach for the 
first year.  (Bringing those countries, or alternates, on 
board may take somewhat longer.)  Italy is firm that COESPU 
should maintain a primary, though not exclusive, focus on 
Africa.  Given the statements issued at Sea Island and the 
continuing G-8 emphasis on Africa, it is indeed hard to see 
this project attracting much partner support otherwise. 
 
18.(C) Uncertainty about the extent of U.S. commitment to 
sharing the financial burden is contributing to the MOD's 
slowness in releasing the project proposal.  More clarity 
from the U.S. side ) or, at a minimum, reassurance that 
Italy will not find itself left alone to make up the 
difference between major new costs and eventual G-8 partner 
contributions ) might help shake the project proposal loose. 
Announcing the visit of a State Department technical team to 
help wrap up planning should also push things along.  End 
Comment. 
 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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2004ROME03882 - Classification: SECRET