US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5734

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, TU, CY 
SUBJECT: TURKEY CANCELS EU/OIC FORUM OVER CYPRUS DISPUTE 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On September 30, in a dispute with the EU 
over designation of the Turkish Cypriot observer delegation, 
Turkey canceled the October 4-5 EU-OIC Joint Forum in 
Istanbul.  The Turkish MFA and the Dutch EU Presidency each 
claim the other turned down reasonable compromises and 
ignored the problem until it was too late.  EU diplomats in 
Ankara say the episode will not directly affect Turkey's 
December bid for a date to begin accession negotiations but 
has given ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics.  It has also 
strained relations between the Turks and the Dutch Embassy 
here.  In this incident, Ankara's frustration with the EU 
trumped what should have been its better judgment.  End 
Summary. 
 
Early Problems 
-------------- 
 
2.  (U) That Cyprus would be a problem for the Forum was 
clear as early as August, when the Turkish MFA invited the 
"TRNC Ambassador" to a briefing on Forum preparations.  The 
Dutch, as EU President, participated in the briefing but then 
made a public statement that their participation did not 
signify recognition of the "TRNC."  When the Turks later sent 
out invitations to the Forum, they did not send one to the 
Republic of Cyprus; the Dutch stepped in and asked the Turks 
to invite all EU member states via the Presidency. 
 
3.  (C) Although Turkey does not recognize the ROC, the Turks 
accepted ROC participation in the Forum.  They expected the 
EU to adopt the same stance toward the "TRNC," which Turkey 
invited under its OIC observer designation as the "Turkish 
Cypriot State."  The EU was willing to have TC observers, but 
not designated as the "Turkish Cypriot State."  Ironically, 
according to Dutch DCM Bekkers, OIC contacts told the Dutch 
the OIC was indifferent to the TCs' designation. 
 
Each Blames the Other for Delay, Refusing Compromise 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
4.  (C) The Turkish MFA and the Dutch Embassy both claim they 
raised the issue with the other side during September, 
including at the two FonMins' meeting on the margins of UNGA. 
 According to UK Political Chief Sharma, the UK also warned 
the Turks early on that the designation was going to be a 
problem.  The Dutch and the Turks both claim they clearly 
indicated they would not back off, but that the other side 
said there would be no problem.  Both sides accused the other 
of refusing to deal with the issue until it was too late. 
 
5.  (C) The EU Presidency refused Turkey's offer that the TCs 
would use their OIC designation and that EU members or FM Gul 
would open the Forum with a statement that this did not imply 
recognition.  EU diplomats here tell us that other EU 
members, including the French, backed that approach, but the 
GCs shot it down.  The Turks refused several EU Presidency 
proposals for alternate designations of the TCs, or to 
postpone the Forum until the sides could find a solution. 
 
6.  (C) The Turkish MFA blames the Greek Cypriots and the 
Dutch Presidency for the incident.  MFA Cyprus Department 
Head Bilman called us in October 4 to express Turkish 
displeasure and give us the MFA's version of events.  On the 
other side, Dutch DCM Bekkers attributed the incident to 
Turkish misperception that the EU would back down.  Bekkers 
told us a majority of EU members objected to the "Turkish 
Cypriot State" designation, not just the Greek Cypriots and 
the Greeks.  According to Bekkers, the Dutch told the Turks 
this, but the Turks remain unconvinced.  The truth may be 
closer to the middle:  according to UK Political Chief 
Sharma, some countries went along with the Greek Cypriots not 
on principle, but to preserve EU solidarity. 
 
Strained Dutch/Turkish Relations in Ankara 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) All EU diplomats we have talked to here doubt this 
incident will directly affect Turkey's EU bid.  However, 
Dutch DCM Bekkers thinks that, like the controversy 
surrounding PM Erdogan's gambit to criminalize adultery, this 
gives ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics.  "Things like this 
cost Turkey one extra year in the accession process per 
incident," he added.  Bekkers and other EU diplomats we have 
talked to here worry that the Turks still do not understand 
the EU. 
 
8.  (C) Publicly, the MFA and the Dutch are trying to play 
down the incident.  The MFA has not expressed the bitterness 
toward the Dutch in public that Cyprus Department Head Bilman 
expressed to us privately.  Bekkers says the Dutch want to 
put the incident behind them and claims it has had no effect 
on his Embassy's relations with the Turks.  Sharma and Bilman 
disagree, both saying the affair has strained the 
Dutch/Turkish relationship in Ankara.  Communication between 
the two sides broke down; neither Bekkers nor Bilman 
understands why the other side acted as it did. Bilman 
worries about what the incident augurs for EU-related 
matters.  He asked rhetorically what is in store for the near 
future if the Greek Cypriots managed to derail the Forum over 
what he called a "non-issue." 
 
Frustration Trumps Ankara's Better Judgment 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Comment:  In this case, Ankara's frustration with the 
EU, including EU failure to deliver on steps to end the TCs' 
isolation, trumped what should have been its better judgment. 
 Bilman tried to justify Turkey's stance by saying that 
Turkey could not give any more "concessions" in light of GC 
intransigence on trade and aid for the TCs.  In this regard, 
PM Erdogan and FM Gul are under increasing fire from domestic 
critics for allegedly selling out core Turkish interests. 
Some EU embassies are concerned at what they see as too 
hard-line a Dutch approach in this context. 
 
10.  (C) Comment (cont'd):  However, the name plate was (as 
Bilman himself noted) a "non-issue" that would have given the 
TCs nothing.  Moreover, the GOT's stance cuts against its 
assertion that it is not seeking recognition for the "TRNC." 
The echo of this incident will fade.  However, the poor 
communication between the GOT and Dutch Presidency (which 
continues in Ankara through June 2005 due to lack of a 
Luxembourg representation here) does not bode well for 
avoidance of miscommunication or missteps in the months to 
come.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN