US embassy cable - 01ABUJA2797

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12598: 1.6X6 
TAGS: PTER, ETTC, SOCI, PINS, PREL, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S RISKS IN SUPPORTING US ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
A) Booth-Jeter Email 23OCT01 
B) State 170698 
C) Abuja 2793 
 
 
Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.6X6. 
 
 
1. (C) Since September 11, the Obasanjo Administration has 
lent unequivocal diplomatic support to USG anti-terrorists 
efforts, including coalition military operations against Al 
Qaeda and its Taliban hosts.  This unambiguous support was 
not a given.  Nigeria, home to Sub-Saharan Africa  largest 
Muslim population has its own ethno-religious dynamic. 
Domestic political expedience would have had Obasanjo hold 
his tongue, mute his support, or condemn both the September 
11 attacks and our response.  However, he did not flinch. 
Acting more a statesman than a politician on this issue, he 
moved toward what he thought were Nigeria  wider, long- 
term interests. 
 
 
2. (C) As a result, Obasanjo and his Administration have 
been on the receiving end of a stream of invective from a 
small but vocal clique of northern politicians and Islamic 
clerics.  Some disliked his decision; some simply dislike 
him and seek any opportunity to criticize.  Obasanjo  firm 
anti-terrorism stance has had a minimal direct, measurable 
impact on internal security thus far (violence in Kano 
being the clearest exception).  But simmering tensions in 
many parts of Nigeria do not need much more heat to boil 
over.  The President's principled stand also highlighted 
the reality of the country  preexisting religious divide: 
The largely Christian South tends to support U.S. action 
while the mostly Muslim North is deeply ambivalent. 
 
 
3.  (C) Depending how our military operations unfold, the 
negative rhetoric of Obasanjo  militant critics could gain 
adherents, grow feet and take to the streets.  Further 
demonstrations are almost certain and could turn violent, 
especially if civilian casualties are perceived to be 
increasing sharply as a result of our continuing military 
operations.  With elections so near and party nominating 
conventions even closer, Obasanjo (should he run) will have 
to wrestle claims that he kowtowed to American pressure 
while ignoring the sensitivities of (the Muslim) half of 
Nigeria's population. 
 
 
4. (C) Against this backdrop, President Obasanjo arrives in 
the U.S. to confer with President Bush about counter- 
terrorism.  We must keep these factors in mind as we seek 
to forge greater cooperation between Washington and Abuja 
on this paramount issue. 
 
 
5. (C) With statements condemning the attacks and 
supporting our military action, Nigeria has run the field 
on what it can do as a matter of unilateral public 
diplomacy.  Thus, our strategy for counter-terrorism 
cooperation with Nigeria must rest on three columns. 
First, we must encourage Nigeria toward concrete unilateral 
actions that actualize its public statements.  Second, 
Nigeria should play a leading role in multilateral fora, 
in Africa and beyond.  Third, we should minimize actions 
that might spark internal unrest in Nigeria attributable to 
GON support for our efforts.  It would be a blow to our 
objective to build an anti-terrorism front in Africa if his 
strong support for us weakened Obasanjo internally.  It 
could scare other leaders and embolden our adversaries. 
 
 
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CONCRETE ACTION AT HOME 
----------------------- 
 
 
6. (C) MONEY LAUNDERING: Given Nigeria  lax regulatory 
scheme, the local financial system is potentially an 
attractive haven for terrorist funds.  Nigeria must work 
hard to seal this sieve.  Obasanjo has promised a Financial 
Crimes Commission (FCC) and an omnibus money-laundering law 
to replace the current law that only governs drug related 
laundering.  We should accede to Obasanjo  request for 
assistance in building the FCC and implementing the draft 
money laundering legislation (Ref C).  We should also send 
experts to help the Central Bank of Nigeria's efforts to 
identify terrorist bank accounts. 
 
 
7. (S/NF) INTELLIGENCE SHARING: We are already sharing more 
intelligence with the Nigerians than any other African 
service.  Yet Nigeria's strong support, its importance in 
Africa, and the possibility that parts of Africa may be 
attractive alternate havens for some terrorists, make a 
case for us to consider a higher level of intelligence 
sharing.  This step would require a political decision in 
both capitals. 
 
 
8. (C) COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING: Nigeria  police and 
overall security apparatus are not trained for counter- 
terrorism.  We could help Nigeria train a small, sharply- 
focused inter-agency unit that could coordinate anti- 
terrorism efforts here.  This unit could be tasked with 
looking for ways of improving counter-terrorism measures 
for oil installations.  We recognize that establishing 
effective inter-agency groups is never easy.  Each agency 
has its turf and established interests.  However, if the 
number of agencies is kept to a minimum, this concept could 
work.  Given our post-September 11 security imperatives and 
our long-term energy security concerns, this concept may be 
worth exploring. 
 
 
9. (C) SOFA: A SOFA would likely cause great consternation 
within Nigeria, and could cost the GON political capital 
that could be more effectively invested elsewhere.  Some 
alleged before 9/11 that Operation Focus Relief was really 
intended to establish bases from which the U.S. could 
strike troublesome Muslim countries.  OFR is proceeding 
smoothly now, and we need to keep it that way.  Generally, 
the Nigerian public mistrusts mil-to-mil relationships, and 
not everyone loves OFR.  Seeking a SOFA risks raising many 
issues that are best not addressed now.  We can get most of 
what we want/need without a formal SOFA. 
 
 
10. (C) ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS AND MLAT: There is 
little cost for the GON to sign and ratify the anti- 
terrorism conventions and the MLAT.  We should continue to 
urge these steps.  On this and other points it may be 
useful to state that we expect Nigeria to lead Africa, and 
certainly West Africa. 
 
 
11. (C) INVITING AMERICAN MUSLIMS: We should raise with 
Nigeria the idea of gathering a team of Muslim notables to 
visit the U.S., particularly to see WTC ground zero and 
talk to representatives of the Muslim community there. 
This might lead to a reciprocal visit.  We need to change 
the picture many Nigerian Muslims have of the U.S. as anti- 
Islamic.  They need to understand that the U.S. is an open, 
tolerant society that welcomes Muslims. 
 
 
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NIGERIA  AKING THE LEAD IN THE REGION 
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12. (C) We need to press Nigeria to work within the Sub- 
Saharan African institutional framework to ensure that 
African multilateral institutions, particularly ECOWAS, 
support our efforts diplomatically and with practical 
steps.  Nigeria can also play a useful role beyond Africa 
through its active participation in the G-77, D-8, and NAM, 
among other organizations. 
 
 
13. (S/NF) ECOWAS SUMMIT: Nigeria should use its weight to 
ensure that counter-terrorism is a focal point on the 
agenda for the Summit tentatively set for December.  We 
would like a strong statement from ECOWAS and would urge 
Nigeria to push for all member countries to sign extant 
terrorism conventions.  ECOWAS should establish a sub- 
regional counter-terrorism mechanism.  We should be 
prepared to have senior intelligence personnel to meet with 
ECOWAS counterparts to discuss intelligence sharing and 
counter-terrorism training. 
 
 
14. (C) We should explore with Nigeria and Senegal ways 
that Wade  Terrorism Initiative can be made useful. 
Africa (through the AU or NEPAD), and ECOWAS regionally, 
must align their efforts so they become complementary. 
Nigeria can and should be expected to lead on both levels. 
 
 
15. (C) SUDAN: Nigeria  participation in the Sudan Peace 
Process may provide another avenue to influence Khartoum 
regarding its support for terrorism.  Nigeria, a broker in 
the peace process, has decent relations with the NIF 
government.  We should work with Nigeria to see how it can 
use its role in the peace process and as a leading African 
nation to persuade Sudan to wash its hands of supporting 
terrorism. 
 
 
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HEARTS AND MINDS 
---------------- 
 
 
16. (C) Public opinion among Nigeria's Muslims is slowly 
turning against us.  Those long opposed to us are taking 
ever-harder lines.  We want to reverse this trend but need 
concrete support.  We should draw a clearer evidentiary 
link between the September 11 attacks and Usama Bin Laden. 
This will go far to address the concerns of those who 
condemn the attacks but think we pinned them on UBL because 
of an anti-Muslim bias.  The U.K. FCO website contains much 
of the material in reftel B (classified demarche cable), 
yet we cannot present this information to Muslim Nigeria as 
the USG position.  Our silence is viewed in many quarters 
as proof of the weakness of our "case."  The Department 
should review its restriction on dissemination of the 
information. 
 
 
17. (C) Also, we may need to reshape our message regarding 
civilian casualties in Afghanistan.  While we continue to 
assert that civilians are not targets, Nigerians continue 
to hear and see news of civilian deaths.  For many Nigerian 
Muslims, the fact that our stand-off munitions are killing 
(Muslim) Afghan civilians, and we know that such unintended 
deaths inevitably will result, makes us "terrorists" too. 
While it would be easy to dismiss this logic as twisted, we 
must understand and respond appropriately to it if we wish 
to win hearts and minds.  To the extent possible, we need 
to explain the steps taken to minimize civilian casualties. 
We also need to be more aggressive stating when and if the 
Taliban is using the civilian population as a shield.  Our 
PD regarding USG humanitarian efforts seems to have fallen 
off; this needs to be re-energized. 
ANDREWS