US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5721

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2029 
TAGS: MARR, OVIP, PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: DASD BRZEZINSKI DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY WITH 
TURKISH DEPUTY U/S SENSOY 
 
REF: ANKARA 5266 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) 
Ian Brzezinski requested MFA Deputy Under-Secretary Sensoy's 
assistance to elevate the level of U.S.-Turkey strategic 
dialogue.  He praised Turkey's agreement to command ISAF VII. 
 On Missile Defense, he emphasized the importance of our 
bilateral cooperation, urged faster progress in working group 
efforts and noted USG interest in conducting a site survey as 
part of a sensor placement study in Turkey.  D U/S Sensoy 
emphasized that MD efforts should address all ranges of 
missiles and focus on population center defense, and saw gaps 
in MD coverage as its primary concern.  Sensoy said the 
Turkish Air Force (TUAF) was finalizing changes to the draft 
space agreement.  He noted Government of Turkey (GoT) 
disappointment at not gaining Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) Core Group membership, highlighted penal 
code changes to criminalize the import/export of restricted 
dual-use items and expressed concern about Iran's nuclear 
program.  On ISAF VII, Sensoy said the GoT would like to see 
an American in the Deputy Commander slot.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) In the September 22 meeting at the MFA, DASD 
Brzezinski and D U/S Sensoy were joined by Ambassador Eric 
Edelman, OSD Director for European Affairs South Tony 
Aldwell, OSD Turkey Desk Officer Lisa Heald, JCS J-5 LTC Eric 
von Tersch, EUR/SE Deputy Director Doug Silliman and Embassy 
Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Maggie Nardi, Turkish MFA Director 
General for International Security Affairs Haluk Ilicak and 
MFA NATO Department Chiefs Alper Coskun and Atilla Gunay. 
 
-------------------------- 
TURKISH STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (S)  DASD Brzezinski noted USG interest in raising the 
Political-Military Working Group (PMWG) discussion to a more 
strategic level, building on the strengths of our bilateral 
relationship and shared goals in the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and intensifying our Defense Industrial Cooperation 
(DIC).  This would mean deepening our dialogue on  missile 
defense (MD), space cooperation and regional security issues. 
 Sensoy welcomed this approach. 
 
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MISSILE DEFENSE 
--------------- 
 
4. (S) D U/S Sensoy said that bilateral MD cooperation was 
good.  The July 8 Technical Experts Group meeting had been 
fruitful.  In his view, two issues should guide our 
discussions - whether bilaterally or within NATO: 1) 
Consideration of the full range of missiles; 2) Protection of 
population centers.   Sensoy stated his belief that Turkey 
had succeeded in convincing Allies that there should be "no 
gap in NATO's geography"  when it came to missile defense. 
All ranges of missiles were being discussed in NATO fora and 
the coverage/defense issue had come up in NATO prior to the 
U.S. intervention in Iraq.  At that time, according to 
Sensoy, the GoT questioned whether Turkish population centers 
were adequately protected, and felt very vulnerable to what 
it perceived as a real threat but was later proved untrue. 
 
5. (S) DASD Brzezinski urged faster progress in the 
U.S.-Turkey MD Technical Experts Group efforts.  He noted USG 
interest in doing a sensor placement study that included a 
site survey in addition to modeling and simulation. 
Brzezinski recognized the GoT threat concerns, which he had 
heard first hand two years earlier when he led a USG 
delegation to Turkey to discuss U.S. missile defense policy 
and planning.   Given the bilateral MD work Turkey and the 
U.S. had done, Brzezinski looked forward to Turkey's 
participation in the Missile Defense seminar the U.S. and 
Romania were sponsoring at the 13-14 October NATO informal 
ministerial in Bucharest.  The seminar would examine two 
scenarios involving long and short range threats against 
Alliance forces as well as population centers.  In response 
to DASD's question on whether the GoT preferred the bilateral 
or NATO MD approach, Sensoy said that the choice of forum was 
unimportant; the GoT was open to any method of dealing with 
Turkey's security concerns.  DASD noted the USG preference 
for a bilateral track, which was more efficient than the 
slower Allied approach.  He noted progress the U.S. had made 
working bilaterally with Denmark and the UK. 
 
6. (S) Deflecting discussion on sensor placement, Sensoy said 
that talk about placing sensors was technical, and he 
couldn't go into detail.  He did say that, if this request 
was made, the GoT would want to see how the sensor placement 
would contribute to Turkey and to the alliance.  This would 
have to be explained to the public.  In Sensoy's view, 
sensors would be a possible target for Turkey's enemies and, 
therefore, a danger.  DASD pointed out that, while a sensor 
could be a target, it also enhanced a country's ability to 
see more.  He questioned whether being less of a target but 
being blind was really a better option. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
7. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's question about the 
GoT's perception of the Iranian nuclear threat, Sensoy 
acknowledged that Turkey is one of the most concerned about 
Iran's nuclear progress and what it means for regional 
stability.  Sensoy said he thought the U.S. and Turkey saw 
eye-to-eye on this threat and were cooperating effectively in 
pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear program. 
 
-------- 
CAUCASUS 
-------- 
 
8. (S) Sensoy noted GoT support for extending NATO's 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) to the Caucasus, which he 
considered a region of strategic importance for the USG and 
NATO.  He pledged Turkey's cooperation, suggesting the PfP 
Training Center in Ankara as a forum to send this message to 
Caucasus countries.  According to Sensoy, Turkey was meeting 
resistance in its efforts to help them to strengthen their 
democracies and join the international community.  In his 
view, PfP policies and programs had to be tailored to each 
country's individual situation, with the understanding that 
it could take a generation to see democratic institutions and 
protection of human rights take hold.  A rushed approach 
imposed from the outside could leave Russia to gain the upper 
hand in "giving them what they need."  DASD expressed USG 
disappointment at the recent decision to cancel the 
Azerbaijan-hosted PfP exercise, Cooperative Best Effort 2004, 
 and suggested that the presence of a NATO liaison officer 
there might have changed the situation. 
 
9. (S) Sensoy called the Caucasus the "soft belly" of Russia. 
 Putin had ended the disintegration of Russian territorial 
integrity but the Chechen issue was emotional for Turks given 
the large number of Chechens in Turkey.  However, he 
emphasized that the GoT still supported the preservation of 
Russia's territorial integrity.  DASD noted the potential for 
problems to spread to other areas.  Sensoy said that, 
although Putin's iron-handed manner and centralized handling 
of the Chechen issue was not good, sympathy for the Chechens 
was waning after their recent actions (Note: Reference to the 
August Beslan hostage crisis. End Note.).  He added that 
Putin was a strong leader, with 70 pct. popular support.  His 
heavy-handed actions were getting tougher and the 
international community needed to send a unified message to 
Putin that there were limits to what it would tolerate.  In 
the past, when Russia's help was needed elsewhere, such as 
Kosovo, there was a reluctance to press this issue.  Sensoy 
said that Russia has been successful in making Chechnya a 
terrorist issue and the international community had helped 
create that image by being inconsistent in its message to 
Moscow. 
----------- 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
10. (S) DASD welcomed Turkey's willingness to take command of 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII 
(February-August 2005).  He noted the debate among Allies 
over the pros and cons of unifying ISAF with Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF).  DASD Brzezinski emphasized the 
importance of bringing the strengths of each mission to any 
future merger of ISAF and OEF.  For instance ISAF had allowed 
Allies to manage domestic political constraints by defining 
their contribution as participation in stability operations, 
while OEF's strength was its operational flexibility to 
conduct kinetic operations against al Qaida remnants and 
their supporters.  Sensoy opined that the two should 
eventually overlap geographically.  DASD pointed out that the 
two did overlap, but Sensoy said further Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) expansion was needed.  He added 
that Turkey had offered to establish a PRT in the north where 
the GoT thought it could be useful, but the offer was not 
well-received.  Sensoy said he couldn't envision a time frame 
for unification of OEF and ISAF but did not see a rush to do 
so, adding that a success story in Afghanistan would have 
positive repercussions elsewhere.  Sensoy said that Turkey 
was now focused on ISAF VII but needed USG and Allied 
assistance to enable use of NATO Common Funds.  Sensoy also 
mentioned that the GoT would like to see an American Major 
General deploy with ISAF VII as its Deputy Commander. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Sensoy underscored the GoT's disappointment in the 
USG reaction to Turkey's request for PSI Core Group 
membership.  In his view, Turkey had tried its best to bring 
a contribution to PSI and failed to understand why Singapore 
and Norway, for example, had been invited into the Core Group 
when Turkey was not.  The government felt it never got a 
straight answer on the rationale.  That said, Turkey would 
cooperate in PSI efforts.  DASD explained that there were no 
current plans to reconvene the Core Group, and underscored 
that the action was with the Operational Experts Group.  He 
expressed his disappointment that Turkey had not been as 
aggressive or eager as others and that its delegations to 
operational experts meetings (with the exception of the 
August meetings in Oslo and Copenhagen) had been less than 
robust.  The USG had expected more from Turkey, given its 
abilities and experience. 
 
12. (C) In response, Sensoy wondered why Turkey had not been 
invited as one of the original eleven PSI members if its 
contribution was valued.  He said the GoT had had to overcome 
legal restraints on its naval forces activities and to 
determine the best way to contribute following its late 
invitation.  Having done that, Sensoy said Turkey 
demonstrated significant interest only to receive a negative 
response on the Core Group.  Ambassador emphasized that the 
Core Group was never intended to be an Executive Committee, 
but rather a small steering group to articulate core 
principles.  Having done that it may cease to function.  Some 
Allies wanted to dissolve the group.  The Ambassador 
expressed his hope that Turkey could overcome its concern. 
Given its extensive knowledge about illicit networks like AQ 
Khan, Turkey had a valuable role to play. 
 
-------------------------------- 
OTHER REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
-------------------------------- 
 
13. (S) Sensoy ticked off the status of other security 
issues.  He said TUAF was making the final touches to its 
revision of the revised Space MoU submitted by the USG this 
summer.  The MFA would need to review the document but Sensoy 
didn't foresee any problems there.  Referring to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting on Iran, 
Sensoy said the GoT was very concerned about Iran's nuclear 
program.  Turkey wanted Iran to stop the program and 
dismantle its weapons supply.  Touching on Turkey's sale of 
dual-use items to Libya, Sensoy said the GoT had been very 
cooperative and forthcoming and noted the MFA had been 
instructed to be as transparent as possible.  He highlighted 
the last minute addition to the penal code of language to 
criminalize the import/export of restricted items. 
 
14. (U) This cable was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Ian Brzezinski. 
 
15. (U) Baghdad and Kabul minimize considered. 
EDELMAN