US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5720

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005720 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO PRM A/S DEWEY 
DEPARTMENT FOR PRM, IO, EUR/SE, AND NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: TURKS STRESS THE CAMP MUST 
CLOSE 
 
REF: A. STATE 201785 
 
     B. ANKARA 509 
     C. BURGER-WYLLIE EMAILS 10/04/04 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary: Turkey remains ready to discuss a solution to 
the Makhmour refugee camp issue, but any solution must 
include the closure of the camp, MFA Deputy Under Secretary 
for Multilateral Affairs Nabi Sensoy told the Ambassador Oct. 
5.  Sensoy was not explicit on whether Turkey will still 
insist on an official U.S. guarantee to provide security 
around the camp, but if that guarantee were to come instead 
from the IIG we believe the Turks would demand robust 
coalition liaison/support for the Iraqis.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) In the course of an Oct. 5 discussion on our approach 
to the IIG and the GOT regarding next steps against the PKK 
(reported septel), Ambassador raised the issue of the 
Makhmour refugee camp with MFA Deputy Under Secretary for 
Multilateral Affairs Nabi Sensoy.  Ambassador reported that 
PRM A/S Dewey was to meet with GOT, IIG, and UNHCR 
representatives in Geneva on Oct. 7 with an eye to 
re-energizing efforts to begin an orderly repatriation 
process for the nearly 10,000 refugees there (per ref c). 
Sensoy responded that the GOT would be represented at this 
meeting by the Turkish Ambassador to their mission in Geneva. 
 
3. (C) Sensoy recalled that he had participated along with 
A/S Dewey in the negotiations last January to reach an 
agreement on Makhmour, and expressed regret that the USG had 
not met Turkey's request to provide a side letter from 
Secretary Powell pledging our support for the implementation 
 
SIPDIS 
of the deal, especially in terms of the security required to 
prevent PKK infiltration into the camp and intimidation of 
the residents there (see ref b for text of the agreement). 
Sensoy said he did not press for this letter over the course 
of the spring as he believed we were waiting for the June 
handover of sovereignty to the IIG to obviate the need for 
the side letter.  What, Sensoy asked, will be the position of 
the U.S. in the Makhmour discussions now?  What is the status 
of the side letter?  Sensoy confirmed that, with one or two 
points of refinement, Turkey was ready to come to agreement 
on the draft text of January. 
 
4. (C) Sensoy emphasized that the GOT has one main goal in 
this process: the camp must close.  Should Turkey participate 
in an agreement with the IIG and UNHCR, it would not want to 
see a scenario at the end of the day where the camp would 
still be open and subject to PKK infiltration.  He said that 
those people in the camp who wish to return to Turkey can 
already do so at any time, but he allowed that the process 
outlined in the draft agreement would assist in ascertaining 
the free will of the residents.  He added that it would be 
the responsibility of the IIG to care for the people who 
choose to remain in Iraq, but added again that this could not 
be in the context of the camp remaining in place.  Finally, 
Sensoy wondered if time was now working against this effort, 
as winter was approaching. 
 
5. (S) Ambassador responded that the USG had not been sitting 
on the side letter issue in order to wait for the handover, 
but that regrettably the coalition had been compelled to deal 
with the insurgency in other parts of the country and did not 
have the resources to devote to providing security for 
Makhmour.  He emphasized our appreciation that the GOT would 
work from January's draft agreement.  On Turkey's desire that 
the camp should close, Ambassador replied that refugee 
camps--Makhmour included--should not be permanent, and that 
all sides must work together to ensure an orderly 
repatriation process.  However, the camp's ultimate fate 
rests in the hands of UNHCR.  In this issue, the key is to 
eliminate the fear factor.  As part of our demarche to the 
IIG on dealing with the PKK, we have requested that the 
Iraqis patrol around Makhmour camp to deter the PKK from 
intimidating the residents (ref a).  Ambassador added that 
perhaps the winter might actually help us; the harsh weather, 
in combination with proposed IIG patrols, might serve to 
deter the PKK.  The recent strong performance of the Iraqi 
security forces in Samarrah gives us some reason to be more 
optimistic about the capability of the Iraqi security forces. 
 
6. (S) Comment: Sensoy was not explicit on whether Turkey 
will still insist on a U.S. guarantee, such as a side letter 
from the Secretary, to seal the deal on Makhmour.  We believe 
the only way Turkey would agree to back down from its demand 
for a U.S. guarantee is if the IIG not only agrees to monitor 
Makhmour but the monitoring takes place with robust coalition 
liaison/support.  Absent these conditions, we will likely not 
gain Turkish cooperation.  End comment. 
 
7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN